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The principle of Continuous Double Auctioning (CDA) is known to provide an efficient way of
matching supply and demand among distributed selfish participants with limited information.
However, the literature indicates that the classic CDA algorithms developed for grid-like
applications are centralised and insensitive to the processing resources capacity, which poses a
hindrance for their application on resource constrained, smart micro-grids (RCSMG). A RCSMG
loosely describes a micro-grid with distributed generators and demand controlled by selfish
participants with limited information, power storage capacity and low literacy, communicate
over an unreliable infrastructure burdened by limited bandwidth and low computational power
of devices. In this thesis, we design and evaluate a CDA algorithm for power allocation in
a RCSMG. Specifically, we offer the following contributions towards power auctioning on
RCSMGs.
First, we extend the original CDA scheme to enable decentralised auctioning. We do this by
integrating a token-based, mutual-exclusion (MUTEX) distributive primitive, that ensures the
CDA operates at a reasonably efficient time and message complexity of O(N) and O(logN)
respectively, per critical section invocation (auction market execution). Our CDA algorithm
scales better and avoids the single point of failure problem associated with centralised CDAs
(which could be used to adversarially provoke a break-down of the grid marketing mechanism).
In addition, the decentralised approach in our algorithm can help eliminate privacy and security
concerns associated with centralised CDAs.
Second, to handle CDA performance issues due to malfunctioning devices on an unreliable
network (such as a lossy network), we extend our proposed CDA scheme to ensure robustness
to failure. Using node redundancy, we modify the MUTEX protocol supporting our CDA
algorithm to handle fail-stop and some Byzantine type faults of sites. This yields a time
complexity of O(N), where N is number of cluster-head nodes; and message complexity of
O((logN)+W ) time, whereW is the number of check-pointing messages. These results indicate
that it is possible to add fault tolerance to a decentralised CDA, which guarantees continued
participation in the auction while retaining reasonable performance overheads. In addition,
we propose a decentralised consumption scheduling scheme that complements the auctioning
scheme in guaranteeing successful power allocation within the RCSMG.
Third, since grid participants are self-interested we must consider the issue of power theft
that is provoked when participants cheat. We propose threat models centred on cheating
attacks aimed at foiling the extended CDA scheme. More specifically, we focus on the Victim
Strategy Downgrade; Collusion by Dynamic Strategy Change, Profiling with Market Prediction; and
Strategy Manipulation cheating attacks, which are carried out by internal adversaries (auction
participants). Internal adversaries are participants who want to get more benefits but have no
interest in provoking a breakdown of the grid. However, their behaviour is dangerous because
it could result in a breakdown of the grid.
Fourth, to mitigate these cheating attacks, we propose an exception handling (EH) scheme,
where sentinel agents use allocative efficiency and message overheads to detect and mitigate
cheating forms. Sentinel agents are tasked to monitor trading agents to detect cheating and rep-
rimand the misbehaving participant. Overall, message complexity expected in light demand is
O(nLogN). The detection and resolution algorithm is expected to run in linear time complexity
O(M).
Overall, the main aim of our study is achieved by designing a resilient and cheating-free CDA
algorithm that is scalable and performs well on resource constrained micro-grids. With the
growing popularity of the CDA and its resource allocation applications, specifically to low
resourced micro-grids, this thesis highlights further avenues for future research. First, we intend
to extend the decentralised CDA algorithm to allow for participants’ mobile phones to connect
(reconnect) at different shared smart meters. Such mobility should guarantee the desired CDA
properties, the reliability and adequate security. Secondly, we seek to develop a simulation of
the decentralised CDA based on the formal proofs presented in this thesis. Such a simulation
platform can be used for future studies that involve decentralised CDAs. Third, we seek to find
an optimal and efficient way in which the decentralised CDA and the scheduling algorithm
can be integrated and deployed in a low resourced, smart micro-grid. Such an integration
is important for system developers interested in exploiting the benefits of the two schemes
while maintaining system efficiency. Forth, we aim to improve on the cheating detection and
mitigation mechanism by developing an intrusion tolerance protocol. Such a scheme will allow
continued auctioning in the presence of cheating attacks while incurring low performance
overheads for applicability in a RCSMG.
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The shift in emphasis from centralised to decentralised systems to meet the increasingly de-
manding requirements of complex systems has been observed in the past decades. Autonomy
and flexibility in such systems also led to the emphasis of the agent-oriented approach as an
appropriate computational model. In such systems, decentralised control is guaranteed by
interaction of agents capable of local decision-making based on incomplete and imperfect knowl-
edge about the system. Such decentralised control is more challenging when the computational
ecology is comprised of low computational and communication components. Against this back-
ground, this thesis seeks to develop techniques for decentralised control in such computationally
constrained setups.
Decentralised control can be achieved by the allocation of scarce resources in a decentralised
way [1]. The subject on decentralised resource allocation has long been studied in economics.
This thesis is specifically concerned with using economic tools to achieve decentralised power
allocation in resource constrained smart micro-grids (RCSMG). A RCSMG loosely describes a
micro-grid where communications are handled by an infrastructure characterised by limited
bandwidth, low computational power and energy. The constraints we are thus concerned with
are the ones imposed by the processing limitations of the underlying communications network.
Such constraints can be counterbalanced by designing power allocation algorithms that are able
to run efficiently even under limited processing power.
1
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In general, decentralised control can be non-price based or price based. A non-price based
approach does not involve price for the resources and includes techniques such as game theory
models. A price based approach is market oriented which uses price as the main economic
motivator. We will focus on the market based approach in this thesis due to its ability to
facilitate resource allocation based on very limited information, its flexibility, its reliance on
local decision-making by selfish individuals and ability to adapt to changes. According to Smith
[2], the interaction of selfish, profit motivated agents in a free market can result in a close to
optimal allocation of resources. Efficient resource allocation is an emergent behaviour from the
interaction. Although such market mechanisms exist in a multitude of forms, we are interested
in a power marketing mechanism that is based on the principle of auctioning1. Auctions can be
single sided, or double sided [4]. Our focus is on the double-sided variety which address the
decentralised power allocation problem with multiple buyers and sellers.
The most prominent and ideal mechanism is the Continuous Double Auctioning (CDA) that
aligns well with our focus and objectives. Thus, we focus on the CDA as the economically
inspired mechanism for decentralised control. The CDA, is a good way of encouraging users to
compete for power resources during both low and peak periods. For instance, during periods of
scarcity, we can fetch attractive prices for power suppliers thereby encouraging grid participants
to generate and share power. At the same time, we are also able to handle power surpluses
by dropping prices to encourage purchases without having to deal with issues such as power
storage. However, due to the distributed management of the power generation resources we
must handle elasticity in demand in addition to ensuring algorithmic efficiency even under
low processing conditions. Furthermore, robustness to failure and fair resource allocation is an
important consideration in maintaining user participation on the grid. By not providing users
with firm guarantees of reliable access to power, a breakdown of the grid is likely to occur due
to users withdrawing from grid participation. We counter the occurrence of such situations by
extending our auctioning algorithm to provide fault tolerance as well as robustness to cheating
attacks towards power theft.
1.2 Context and Motivation
Rural and/or remote areas in developing world countries are sometimes completely discon-
nected, or intermittently connected to the national grid. The result is that these regions suffer
from power shortages that are economically detrimental. In recent years, individually owned
generators have become a popular approach for addressing this problem [5]. However, this
solution is individualistic and is not environmentally friendly. A reasonable and cost effective
1A mechanism that establishes prices based on participant’s offers to buy or sell resources [3].
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approach to addressing this issue is to design a distributed cyber-physical-system based on low-
cost information technology, to coördinate and manage available power resources distributed
over the region [6], [7]. We term such a micro-grid a “resource constrained" micro-grid because
all communications are handled over a lossy network composed of low-cost, low-processing,
and low-energy devices. The limitations of the network, such as low-bandwidth, intermittent
wireless connectivity, low processing power and unreliable battery-life imply that existing
algorithms must be remodelled to operate efficiently and reliably under these conditions, to
guarantee grid sustainability. In focusing on power auctioning we consider specifically the
continuous double auctioning scheme which is popular for power marketing on standard smart
micro-grids. We show that standard CDA schemes operate inefficiently on RCSMGs because
they consider a centralised architecture which results in a single point of failure and therefore
need to be re-adapted to handle bottlenecks, scalability, privacy and concerns associated with
centralisation. We offer a breakdown of the drawbacks of applying the standard CDA scheme
to RCSMGs in Section 3.3.1.
1.3 Power Auctioning - Problem Statement
Unlike common alternatives like First-Come-First-Served allocation, reservation mechanisms
or priority queues market-based resource allocation alleviates the power allocation challenges
more naturally. Market-based allocation mechanisms are preferable as they create a competitive
environment that mutually balances conflicts of interest between parties (Section 3.2). As
such, we use a market-based approach to manage the unbalanced power in a typical resource
constrained micro-grid while providing fault tolerance and security. Specifically, we propose
a Continuous Double Auctioning (CDA) algorithm as an ideal way to control and minimise
the differences between the current energy demand and the actual energy production. The
differences between the actual demand and generated power are caused by “elasticity" in both
demand and generator capacity. Users have partially predictable electricity demand which
must be supported by uncontrolled, partially predictable, and constrained power generators. In
addition, energy cannot be stored efficiently, which implies that supply and demand of power
has to be balanced at all times thereby adding complexity to power trading operations. Thus,
there is a need of a power allocation scheme that addresses the allocation problem. The classic
CDA algorithms have desirable properties that can help address this challenge significantly.
These include:
• simple and fairly robust, achieving high market efficiency in a wide range of market
conditions;
• local decision-making by users who have incomplete and imperfect information [2];
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• continuous matching which makes it flexible and fulfils the requirement of immediate
allocation [4], [8], [9];
• fairness of resource allocation.
Given such desirable properties, our research needs to contribute to the efficient power allocation
within a low resourced platform, to the robustness and the security aspects of the CDA. We
will now discuss the research aims of this thesis that deal with a number of the aforementioned
issues.
1.3.1 Problem #1: Decentralised Efficient Allocation
The application of auction market mechanisms [10], specifically CDA algorithms [11]–[13] has
been at the heart of major road-maps for resource allocation in micro-grid structures. However,
existing CDA algorithms are mostly centralised and assume that computational resources and
bandwidth are abundant (no resource constraints). This is not realistic on lossy networks where
low cost, low bandwidth, and processing poor devices are used to support the cyber-system of
a micro-grid. Thus, the first research aim of our thesis is to modify the structure of the CDA
so that it can solve power allocation in a RCSMG architecture in a decentralised way. The
improvement should be scalable, maintain the desired properties associated with CDA algo-
rithms (such as high market efficiency), and minimise the communication and computational
overheads.
1.3.2 Problem #2: Robustness to Failure
In the considered constrained grid platform, problems ranging from signal loss and distortion
to component failures emerge [7], [14] which usually results in system failure. System failures
and inadequate fault tolerance result in poor performance, system shut-downs, and security
vulnerabilities [15]; therefore compromising grid stability and disrupting user participation
(since users buy into the concept of resource sharing with the expectation of a reliable process).
For example, regular node/component failures may require frequent restarts of the power
allocation algorithm, which consumes a significant amount of system resources and culminates
in poor system performance. In such cases, inadequate fault tolerance can create an avenue for
weak attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks which capitalise on node failures. A system
is fault tolerant if it is capable of providing correct service despite the occurrence of one or more
faults, thereby masking the presence of faults [15]. The second research aim is to integrate some
fault tolerance into the power allocation scheme to ensure uninterrupted power allocation
in the presence of faults. We believe that adding some level of fault tolerance improves the
CDA algorithms robustness and therefore participants buy in, which is desirable in maintaining
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grid stability.
However, in the event that fault tolerance has failed to guarantee continued market access
for traders, participants may fail to secure power during the trading period. This means that
the variations in generation and demand that make demand management (balancing demand
and supply) a challenge will still exist. Matching supply and demand is vital to grid stability
[16]–[18]. It is understood that power consumption scheduling (demand management) can
smoothen the demand profiles out over time to avoid overloading during peak times, thus,
encouraging grid participants to shift their heavy consumption to off-peak periods. Similar to
auctioning, a myriad of centralised power scheduling approaches [19], [20] may not be ideal in
the RCSMGs context. The third research aim is to design a decentralised power consumption
scheduling scheme that complements the power auctioning algorithm within the RCSMG.
This is important as it minimises the total power consumption while maximising on the social
benefit [18] of power distribution on the grid.
1.3.3 Problem #3: Detecting and Mitigating Cheating
Given the economic significance of the CDA in resource allocation, it seems reasonable to expect
a well-established body of research towards security. Surprisingly, this is not the case. To the
best of our knowledge, the number of scientific studies towards securing distributed forms
of CDA is staggeringly small [21]–[24]. Given the background that cheating is prevalent in
auctions [25], participants can engage in undesirable and fraudulent behaviour in trying to
gain an unfair advantage, which can disrupt grid stability. Furthermore, it is understood that
not only is cheating auction mechanisms specific, but so are the cheating attacks and plausible
mitigation measures [21]. This means existing classic forms of cheating are not as useful in
equipping the system developers with tools to secure the CDA algorithm. In addition, system
defenders have limited understanding of the types of attacks there should defend against. There
is no systematic framework available for designing such attacks to allow for an in-depth study.
The fourth research aim of this thesis is to develop a framework that allows for the design
and study of cheating attacks on a decentralised CDA. This is motivated by a need to better
understand cheating attacks that can manifest in a decentralised CDA. Studying cheating attacks
is important from the power theft perspective, because power theft can cause a breakdown of
the grid which is undesirable.
Cheating within CDAs can be resolved in one of three ways: adding cryptography scheme
[22], [24]; modifying the auction protocol [26]; or adding a distinct proactive, detection and
mitigation protocol [21], [27]. It is prudent to study plausible mitigation solutions on these
CDA schemes. Cryptography and some standard security solutions are not ideal in mitigating
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the automated cheating forms, due to their computational demand and inapplicability [21].
Modifying the auction protocol may change the core fundamental principles (which alters
the desirable properties of an auction), emphasised when building the auction mechanism.
Thus, the fifth research aim of this thesis is to develop a mitigation scheme that addresses
automated cheating attacks designed for decentralised CDAs. The mitigation solution should
prove the generality and utility of the scheme in a given resource constrained smart micro-grid
environment.
1.4 Contributions
The thesis is organised to separate the three avenues of research it contributes to. Given the
research aims outlined in 1.3, we now highlight the specific contributions to the state of the art
made by this thesis:
Contribution #1: State-of-the Art
In Chapter 2 we present the background and context of our research work. Our work is built
on an amorphous distributed model proposed by Kayem et al. [7] which captures a remote
community-based setup, where community members agree to coöperate to coördinate grid
activities with the main aim of guaranteeing a reliable, efficient and fair access to power. We
extend Kayem et al.’s model by specifying assumptions and parameters governing our contribu-
tions. Further models and concepts valuable to our study are described.
In Chapter 3 we review the literature on CDA algorithms developed for grid-like platforms. Spe-
cial attention is taken towards identifying the CDA algorithms developed for allocating power
within grid-like platforms or constrained environments. Thus, we discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of each algorithm; the overheads incurred; reliability; and security considerations
made for each algorithm.
Contribution #2: Decentralised Efficient Allocation
In Chapter 4, we propose a token-based CDA algorithm which maintains the desirable standard
CDA properties (such as high market efficiency, low communication overheads, fairness of
profit distribution among traders and robustness), while efficiently matching loads and gen-
erator capacity. We show theoretically that our CDA algorithm satisfies the mutual exclusion
properties, while yielding an acceptable time and message complexity of O(N) and O(logN)
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respectively. Our decentralised CDA algorithm scales better to similar CDA algorithms de-
signed for grid-like platforms. Our algorithm should generally be compatible to micro-grids
supported by a hierarchical network topology where households form cluster nodes around a
single shared smart meter-cluster head (a setup similar to the one discussed Section 2.2. Some
results in this chapter are based on the following publication:
• Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V.D.M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2015) “A Dis-
tributed Continuous Double Auction Framework for Resource Constrained Microgrids",
In Proceedings, 10th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures
Security (CRITIS 2015), October 5-7, 2015, Berlin, Germany; Vol. 9578, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 183-196 (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33331-1 15) [28]
Contribution #3: Robustness to Failure
In Chapter 5, we integrate fault tolerance capabilities to our CDA algorithm. Fault tolerance
allows the CDA algorithm to run with some measure of reliably which significantly contributes
to the overall grid robustness and stability. We mainly focus on handling some crash-fail and
Byzantine faults. To handle crash-fail faults we propose a simple effective protocol based on
redundancy of the functional shared smart meter nodes. Contrary to fault tolerance approaches
proposed to handle failure in a MUTEX oriented protocol in the literature which bypass faulty
nodes through a network reconfiguration process, our approach masks crash failures of cluster
head nodes through redundancy. Masking failure of the shared smart meter nodes ensures
the dependent mobile phone cluster nodes hosting trading agents (T A s) are not isolated from
auctioning. A redundant shared smart meter component acts as a backup which takes over if the
primary shared smart meter components fails, allowing for some fault tolerance and a graceful
degradation of the network. Extension of crash-fail fault tolerance ability to our CDA algorithm
yields upper bounds in: time complexity of O(N) (where N is number of cluster nodes); and
message complexity ofO((logN) + W ) time (W is the number of check-pointing messages;
N is the number messages exchanged per critical section execution). To handle selected few
Byzantine faults we extend the CDA algorithm, which incurs no other costs. Results in this
chapter are based on the following publication:
• Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V.D.M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2016) “Fault-
Tolerant Distributed Continuous Double Auctioning on Computationally Constrained
Microgrids", In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Information Systems
Security and Privacy (ICISSP 2016), Rome, Italy —Feb. 19-21, 2016, SCITEPRESS pp.
448-456 [14]
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In Chapter 6, in a collaborative effort, we propose a decentralised power consumption schedul-
ing algorithm that can be used to complement the decentralised CDA in guaranteeing power
allocation in a resource constrained smart micro-grid. The scheduling algorithm employs the
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to decompose the scheduling problem into
smaller sub problems that are solved in parallel over local computation devices, which yields
an optimal solution. The ADMM can be used to model a scheduling solution that handles both
semi-decentralised and fully decentralised providing another layer of power management that
compliments the decentralised CDA layer. The reliability and security aspects of the scheduling
algorithm are beyond the scope of this thesis. This chapter is based on our results from the
following application:
• Goitom K.Weldehawaryat, Pacome L. Ambassa, Anesu M.C. Marufu, Stephen D. Wolthusen
and Anne V.D.M. Kayem (2016), “Secure and Decentralised Power Consumption Schedul-
ing in Constrained Micro-Grids", In Proceedings, 2nd Workshop on the Security of Indus-
trial Control Systems and Cyber-Physical Systems (CyberICPS 2016), September 26-30,
2016, Heraklion, Greece (in press) [16]
In this conjoint work my main role was mainly designing and analysing the decentralised
and fully distributed ADMM algorithms; providing the correctness and complexity analysis.
Modelling, problem formulation and security aspects of the paper were heavily contributed by
the co-authors.
Contribution #4: Detecting and Mitigating Cheating
In Chapter 7, we propose the Automated-Cheating-Attacks ACA framework that can be used to
model cheating attacks on decentralised Continuous Double Auction (CDA) algorithms. The
framework is a process consisting of eight stages, labelled 1 through 8, to derive attacks. We
then use the ACA framework to design novel automated cheating attacks for a decentralised
CDA. The generalisability of the framework is demonstrated by mapping existing attack models
to the models proposed in this chapter. The cheating attacks designed from the ACA framework
are then classified with respect to their design. A study of a selected few attacks is done to
inform the design of a plausible mitigation solution.
We propose, in Chapter 8, a citizen approach based exception handling (EH) mechanism where
sentinel agents use allocative efficiency and message overheads to detect and mitigate cheating
forms. The automated cheating attacks give rise to exceptions; situations which fall outside
the normal operating conditions expected of the T A s. One way to deal with exceptions is
employing exception handling by distinct domain-independent agents. Sentinel agents are
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tasked to monitor changes in message overheads and decrease in market efficiency. Colluding
T A s will gain higher surplus with a trade-off in the allocative efficiency. The exception han-
dling mechanism use these parameters to detect and mitigate cheating. The second exception
measure takes care of the number of messages passed among T A s in the auction. This gives a
computational measure of efficiency, that is, how many resources the auction consumes in a
run. A slight and sudden increase in the number of messages will give off a red flag for possible
cheating. Our exception handling (EH) solution yields a new overall complexity of O(nlogN)
in light demand and runs at a linear time complexity of O(W) (where W is the number of
participating TAs) and a reasonable ease of implementation.
The results in Chapter 7 and 8 are based on our following publications:
• Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V.D.M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2016), “Power
Auctioning in Resource Constrained Micro-Grids: Cases of Cheating", In Proceedings,
11th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS
2016), October 10-12, 2016, Paris, France, vol. 10242 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pp. 137–149 Springer-Verlag DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-71368-7_12 [27]
• Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V. D. M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2016), “Cir-
cumventing Cheating on Power Auctioning in Resource Constrained Micro-Grids ". In
Proceedings, IEEE 14th International Conference on Smart City (HPCC/SmartCity/DSS),
Sydney, NSW, 2016, pp. 1380–1387 doi:10.1109/HPCC-SmartCity-DSS.2016.0195 (IEEE
Press [21]
• Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V. D. M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2018), Secure
Power Marketing in Resource Constrained Smart Micro-Grids: Adversarial Cases and
Counter Measures, Book Chapter (reviewed and accepted), Submission to: Smart Micro-
Grid Systems Security and Privacy, Springer.
Finally, in Chapter 9, we summarise the contributions of this work and end by highlighting the
new areas of interest for future work.
1.5 Future work
With the growing popularity of the CDA and its resource allocation applications, specifically to
low resourced micro-grids, this thesis highlights further avenues for future research. Additional
work can be made towards the algorithms efficiency, reliability and security aspects. First, we
intend to introduce mobility of the agent-hosting mobile phones, by allowing connectivity at
other neighbouring shared smart meters. Such mobility should not disrupt the desired CDA
properties, or greatly expose the CDA algorithm to critical reliability and security issues. In
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addition, we foresee more work towards in ensuring security and reliability in the enhanced
decentralised CDA, after the introduction of mobility. Such an approach, will allow a pro-
gressive evolution of our decentralised CDA. Secondly, we seek to develop a simulation of
the decentralised CDA based on the formal proofs presented in this thesis. Such a simulation
platform can be used for future studies that involve decentralised CDAs. Third, we seek to find
an optimal and efficient way in which the decentralised CDA and the scheduling algorithm
can be integrated and deployed in a low resourced smart micro-grid. Such an integration
is important for system developers interested in exploiting the benefits of the two schemes
while maintaining system efficiency. Forth, we aim to improve on the cheating detection and
mitigation mechanism by developing a intrusion tolerance protocol. Such a scheme will allow
continued auctioning in the presence of cheating attacks while incurring low performance
overheads for applicability in a RCSMG.
Chapter 2
Background
All theories are legitimate, no matter.
What matters is what you do with them.
JORGE LUIS BORGES.
2.1 Overview
Kayem et al. [7] provide a RCSMG architecture that incorporates power flow, communication,
and control network structures that encapsulates the constraints we are interested in. The
conceptual distributed model captures well a remote community-based smart micro-grid,
where community members agree to coöperate to coördinate grid activities with the main
goal of guaranteeing a reliable, efficient and fair access to power. Such a model, although it
is conceptual, it is novel and has allowed for some results to be drawn from questions asked
on scheduling [16], power consumption monitoring [29], [30], power auctioning [14], [28],
and security in power auctioning [21], [27]. The models and results we outline in this thesis
were based mostly on the RCSMG architecture described by Kayem et al.. We make additional
assumptions and consider more constraints (these are indicated clearly in the different chapters).
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.2, we describe the RCSMG architecture
upon which the rest of thesis was modelled on. Specifically, we present the notation, the power
network, the communication network and the control/power management layer. In section
2.2.4.1 we focus on continuous double auctioning (CDA), where we give a brief overview of the
CDA market institution and useful terminologies. In section 2.3 we describe the RCSMG as a
distributed system, outlining the system model, the distributive primitives, and fault models
that are considered for later chapters of this thesis.
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2.2 Resource Constrained Smart Micro-grid
2.2.1 Notation
We assume an energy sharing agreement exists among the community members P and a grid
coördinator GC (utility provider), to provision trading of power. The GC can be an individual
or business with the generation capacity to power the entire, micro-grid. The GC can be a
participant with a significantly higher proportion of power than the other users in the RCSMG.
All participants generating extra power and willing to sell can do so to participants requesting
power through the GC who administrates the auction market. The GC can start the auction
trade day and can carry out administrative duties. Furthermore, any extra power generated in
the RCSMG, can be bought and sold by the GC to other linked RMGs. This is however beyond
the scope of the model we consider. Stanczak et al. [13], proposed a similar model that considers
an auctioning scheme that allows internal traders to buy and sell with external traders.
Participant: P denotes a set of all authorised participants that reside in a dispersed area, who
can either be producers (sellers) PS̃ or consumers (buyers) PB̃ depending on whether they
are generating and willing to sell, or consuming energy. Hence, PS̃ ⊂ P and PB̃ ⊂ P . We
consider the existence of a symmetric relationship between participants i.e a member can behave
as a seller in some instances (if he/she is generating more energy than he/she requires) or
as a consumer (buying energy from other members willing to sell). We consider that a user
has access to their electric energy consumption as well as generation profile which enables
significant user participation (as supported in [31]).
Household: Each element of P owns a single household/ small business (H) within the given
community (number of P = number of H) which can have generation and storage capacity (see
2.2.2). Each household has appliances connected to sensors which collect consumption data (see
2.2.2, B). Ambassa et al. [29], [30] propose an algorithm to allow secure household consumption
data collection. A member of P is responsible for reporting his/her household consumption,
and allowing trade (buying or selling) of power for his household. We assume that automation
of trade can be assigned to agents (T A) for such tasks (see 2.2.4). Each member of H’s power
demand and/or generation, reports are first aggregated at the Mmp, where a set of U users is
authorised to report consumption or interact with the T A. A request to participate by the T A is
transmitted from the mobile device Mmp to the smart meter Msm.
Aggregation Device: Each member of H has a single aggregation device Mmp. In our case we
assume this is a mobile phone. As advised by Kayem et al. [7], a single Mmp and a set of users U
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controlling the Mmp is declared for each H . Each member of Mmp:j hosts a single trading agent
T A that participates in the auction market autonomously on behalf of a member of P . Each
member of H’s power demand and/or generation reports are first aggregated at the Mmp and
they inform T A s on the bid or ask to offer in the auction market. A request to participate by
the TA is transmitted from the mobile devices Mmp to the smart meter Msm.
Shared Smart Meter: A shared smart meter is denoted by Msm. Sharing smart meters in
economically challenged areas presents a cost-effective solution to reduce costs [7]. Each Msm
has a maximum nodal degree of d indicating the maximum number of households that a single
Msm can handle efficiently. Each Msm is endowed with protocols that enable distribution of the
token integrated order-book to all requesting cluster Mmp s.
Household Clusters: Each member of H is grouped in sets of ς clusters. This set is denoted
by ς = c1, ..., cj , ..., cN where the subscript j represents the jth cluster and N is the maximum
permitted number of clusters. Each member ofH belongs to only one cluster cj that is associated
with a single shared smart meter Msm:j .
Authorised Users: A mobile phone Mmp can only report consumption or generation data of
its associated household, and for a period ∆t only one user can make reports. All authorisation
changes must be explicit. U is a set of authorised users, where U ⊂ P .
Adversary (Attacker): For simplicity and to narrow the scope of our thesis we shall only con-
sider internal attackers (participants who have some motive to cheat in the system). Adversaries,
denoted by PA, describe a subset of P members, that act maliciously to disrupt or cheat in the
system. Thus, PA ⊂ P , while PA 6= P . Without losing generality, this set of adversaries can
comprise buyers and/ or sellers, PA = {Pβ;P}
2.2.2 Power Network
We assume a power network of nearby households equipped with renewable generators and/or
distributed energy storage and a set of distribution lines that connect household and represents
the power line 2.1. Thus, each household h ∈ H can have a set of electric appliances consuming
energy, a distributed generator, and/ or an energy storage component.




















FIGURE 2.1: The power network, adopted from Kayem et al. [7, p. 3]
A. Power Generation and Storage
We denote a subset of households with generators to be hg, the subset of households with
small storage as hs, and the subset of users without generators and/or storage devices as hr. A
household can belong both to hg and hs, but users in hr cannot be in either one of, or both hg
and hs. If hi ∈ hr then hi /∈ hg ∪ hs.
The utility does the following:
• generate part of the electricity in the RCSMG;
• facilitate efficient exchange of energy in the community through an auction market;
• participate in a short-term wholesale market.
B. Household Appliances
We consider that each household has electrical appliances equipped with a sensor and connected
directly to the power source. If an electrical appliance is not sensor-enabled, consumption is
reported manually. But, for simplicity, we focus on sensor supported reporting. The set of
electric appliances in a particular household denoted Ah = {a{h,1}, ..., ah,A} contains four types
of loads as proposed by Ambassa et al. [30]: resistive load, inductive load, non-linear load
and composite load (potentially interruptible), non-interruptible and deferrable. An appliance
has a low cost, often inaccurate, sensor which measures consumption of the appliance and
transmits it to a local controller LC (in our context this can be the Mmp). This transmission
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occurs via an unreliable communication channel which means the measurements are likely
to be untrustworthy. As a result, household demand may not correspond to the exact load
requirements. Such data inaccuracies can be mitigated by assuming that the appliances’ power
consumption is bounded by a minimum and a maximum value representing the lower bound
and upper bound. Specifically for the scheduling problem (in Chapter 6) we consider the upper
bound value.
2.2.3 Communication Network
We assume a hierarchically clustered network with three, distinct interdependent networks
namely: the Home Area Network (Level 1); the Neighbourhood Area Network (Level 2); and the
Micro-grid Network (Level 3) with two sets of entities: many mobile phones Mmp and relatively
fewer, fixed shared smart meters Msm, hence Mmp >>Msm (Figure 2.2). We consider Msm are
cluster head nodes (Level 3), while different Mmp are child nodes (Level 2). The clustering










FIGURE 2.2: The communication network
Level 1 describes a HAN of sensors connected to appliances, storage and generator devices.
This allows coördination through wireless sensor network protocols such as Bluetooth, ZigBee,
and WiFi. Generation and consumption data is communicated through the single Mmp within
the HAN. Just outside Level 1, we have Level 2 - a NAN consisting of households within the
same cluster that share a single Msm.
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Level 2 is characterised by frequent and unpredictable topology changes and highly variable
message delay, as users move constantly within and outside the household clusters. Mmps are
carried by the authorised participants, U , who move independently in any direction. Trans-
mission of messages is variable, since node proximity changes. We consider the Mmp nodes
can only connect to a single Msm (their proxy cluster head node), to which there are securely
authenticated before joining the network. Each mobile phone is subject to frequent disconnec-
tions and doze mode functions(optionally disconnecting to save battery life). Further, Mmp only
connect to Msm nodes in the same cluster when connection to the cluster head was lost during
its execution in the market. For simplicity, we consider same cluster Mmp form a mesh network
with the Msm, supported by wireless communication such as ZigBee and WiFi. We assume,
each Msm is capable of supporting |d|maximum number of Mmp within a considerable radius
(range of 10-100m) to its location.
Level 3 is the MGN, where all information from the other sub-networks (HAN and NAN) is
aggregated. Level 3 is where the micro-grid control centre (utility provider) operates from. We
assume, communication protocols applicable for this level include WiMAX, Cognitive Radio,
together with wireless mesh topology to support data transmission.
2.2.4 Power Management and Control Layer
2.2.4.1 Auction-based Management
To understand how the control network handles trader bidding and double auctioning informa-
tion to ensure causality in operations between the distributed network components, we first
discuss the concepts of continuous double auctioning and automated trading before describing
the system model.
A. Continuous Double Auctioning: To better understand continuous double auctioning, we
consider the terminology in Smith’s [2] seminal work on double auctions. Buyers and sellers are
known to be traders who interact to exchange goods. The process permits traders to alter the
allocation of commodities, without changing their total quantity. This occurs when traders swap
indivisible goods for some divisible money. The amount a trader places on goods is known as
the trader’s private value or limit price. This value is only known by a trader and when a buyer
(seller) pays (accepts) more(less) than this limit price, a loss is recorded. A buyer is a trader
willing to buy a commodity while a seller is a trader willing to sell their commodity at a given
price. A market institution defines how this exchange occurs. In specific terms it defines the
rules on what traders can do and the allocation of the commodity with respect to traders actions.
Allocation of commodities in response to trader action is known as market clearing. Friedman
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[4] defines an auction as a market institution, where messages from traders include some price
information which gives priority to higher bids and lower asks. An ask defines the price offer
submitted by a seller to sell a unit of goods while a bid is the request offer submitted by a buyer
to buy a unit of goods. Sellers and buyers can submit their asks and bids at anytime during a
CDA trading day. The current lowest ask in the market, is called the outstandingask (oa). The
current highest bid in the market, is called the outstandingbid (ob). Permitting multiple buyers
and sellers to trade is what is loosely called as ’double auctioning’. NYSE spread-improvement
requires that a submitted bid or ask ’improves’ on the ob or oa. The no-order queuing rule specifies
that offers are single unit, therefore are not queued in the system, but are erased when a better
offer is submitted as bid-spread (the difference between ob and oa) decreases.
B. Automated Trading Agents: In market-based control, software agents1 2 offer truly au-
tomated and distributed control systems, rather than relying on a central auctioneer [34] or
human intervention. Agent technology can contribute to different aspects of consumer buying
—deciding what to buy, whom to buy it from, how much to pay, and the actual trade of goods
for money [35]. The level of sophistication of agent automation benefits CDAs. To achieve this,
software agents acting on behalf of human users (as delegates) are required to fulfil the user
requirements and expectations [1], [36] . Such an agent must show the following properties:
autonomy; adaptivity, pro-activeness; reactivity; prediction; social ability; ability to learn; and
sometimes mobility [36].
Structure According to Klusch [33], agents can be differentiated between communication,
knowledge, collaboration and rather low-level task skills as depicted in Figure 2.3. In the
Figure, the corresponding, key enabling technologies are listed below each skill type. In our
case, the Task level skills would include information retrieval and bidding. The communication
skills imply the agent accesses information systems and databases or processes input from
humans or other agents. An Agent Naming Service (ANS) and an Agent Communication
Language (ACL) enable communication between intelligent agents on different levels. Similar
to Klush, it is considered that the ACL sits on top of, middleware platforms like OMG’s CORBA
and Sun’s Java RMI, or specific APIs like JDBC (Java Database Connectivity), OKBC (Open
Knowledge Base Connectivity) or ODBC (Open Database Connectivity). Knowledge Skills entails
the techniques that allow the information agent to acquire and maintain knowledge about itself
and its user, the network and market environment. Collaboration skills of the information agent
with other agents relies on negotiation, conversation, whereas collaboration with the human
user relies on human computer interaction techniques.
1Referred to as a bargaining agents by Priest and Tol [32]
2Referred to as information agents by Klusch [33]
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FIGURE 2.3: Automated Agent Structure and Skills,
(Adopted from Guerin and Pitt [7, p. 4])
Agent Communication Framework: Our framework builds on the frameworks presented by
Wooldridge [37] and, Guerin and Pitt [38]; we attempt to make the framework more general to
allow ACLs with social semantics to be accommodated. We consider the agent communication
framework to be a 4-tuple:
XACF =< υ, %,ACL, φ,>
where:
• υ is the agent’s unique version identifier to identify a new agent at the beginning of a
trade day or in the event of token regeneration.
• % designates the agent program that is executed at every T A visited by the token.
• ACL =< LC , LF , LT > is an ACL including mental LT and social components LF .
• φ is the initial assertion for social states.
Negotiation Strategy Thus, the agent requires a strategy for negotiation which is at least as
effective as a qualified human being in the same situation [32]. Multi-agent based distributed
energy resource management has been studied extensively by [39]–[41]. In this thesis, we
consider trades in an auction occur when trading agents (T A s) interact with one another
(i.e., they buy and sell goods or services). Each T A knows information about itself and can
collect information made public from auction market. The T A s employ some heuristics in
their ’strategy’ to handle incomplete information and the dynamic market environment [36].
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The strategy’s input includes private information (limit price, eagerness to trade, etc.) and
public information (such as outstanding ask/bid, last transaction price, etc.). The strategy’s
out is the offer to be submitted. Since the Santa Fe Double Auction Tournament (SFDAT) [42]
was conducted, several bidding strategies have been developed to determine the most efficient
strategy best for the CDA market. These include: Gode and Sunder’s [43] Zero-Intelligence (ZI)
strategy; Cliff’s [44], [45] Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP) strategy ; Preist and Tol’s [32] CP strategy;
Gjerstad and Dickhaut’s [46] Gjerstad-Dickhaut (GD) strategy; Tesauro and Das’ [47] Modified
Gjerstad-Dickhaut (MGD) strategy; Tesauro and Bredin’s [48] Extended Gjerstad-Dickhaut
(GDX) strategy; He et al.’s [49] Fuzzy Logic (FL) strategy; Vytelingum et al. [50] Risk-Based (RB)
strategy; Cliff’s [51] ZIP60 strategy; Vytelingum’s [1].
C. Distributed System Model: Consider the RCSMG to be a distributed system consisting of
a finite set of N sites, (i.e. the Msm nodes) Υ = {S1, S2, ..., SN}, that are spread-out forming a
(NAN) network. The nodes communicate only by sending and receiving messages. Message
delivery is guaranteed if nodes and links are up. Solving both link and node failure simul-
taneously can be a challenge, thus, we assume, every node pair is connected by means of a
reliable communication channel. Messages can be delivered in a different order to the one they
were sent. We consider a semi-synchronous fully-connected* network where process speeds
and message transmission times are bounded. The maximum latency for sending a message
between two sites is denoted by Tlat. A critical section execution takes an average of Tcs. We
shall consider two fault models (in section 2.3.2) where: (i) nodes can fail by crashing only, and
this crash is permanent, or (ii) nodes can fail by displaying Byzantine type of faults. Initially,
assume that nodes are fairly reliable (in Chapter 4), then in Chapter 5 we tighten the assumption
to consider cases of node and link failure.
2.2.4.2 Demand Response Management
We now discuss how the control network handles power consumption, generation, and state
estimation information to ensure causality in operations between the distributed network
components. The control network facilitates demand response automation of the micro-grid.
As proposed by Kayem et al, we model this as an acyclic graph G = (Msm, E), where Msm is a
finite set of shared smart meters and E is a finite set of communication paths between the Msm.
Each household can be represented on the tree schema by Mmp. Figure 3 illustrates the schema
for grid connectivity, from the control network perspective.
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FIGURE 2.4: Smart Micro-grid Schema,
(Adopted from Kayem et al [7, p. 4])
2.3 Distributed Algorithms
A distributed system is a collection of individual computing devices (processors) that can
communicate with each other. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, at any single time within
a CDA only one TA is allowed to submit an offer into the market. Thus, the challenge of
serialisation of concurrent accesses to the auction market, results in a mutual exclusion problem
with emphasis on low communication overheads.
2.3.1 Mutual Exclusion Primitives
A Mutual exclusion problem occurs when there is a collection of asynchronous processes, each
alternately executing a critical and a non-critical section, that must be synchronised so that no
two processes ever execute their critical sections concurrently [52]. Our choice for an appropriate
MUTEX algorithm was governed by the following:
• The characteristics of our problem —T A s need to mutual exclusively submit an offer into
the order book (participation in the market)
• The characteristics of the system the algorithm will run on —we consider a constrained
hierarchical architecture (see Section 2.2)
• The type of interprocessor communication —we consider the nodes communicate by
message passing
• The level of timing synchronisation between separate processes —we consider a loosely
asynchronous communication
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Many practical solutions crafted to address the mutual exclusion problem rely heavily on a
central coördinator that manages access to the critical sections [53]. We disregard centralised
solutions using coördinators, and consider a decentralised algorithm, where a subset of the
nodes Msm have a slightly added responsibility over Mmp nodes. We propose a token-based
approach inspired by Raymond’s work [54] to address the mutual exclusion problem. Our
choice was inspired by low message traffic generally associated with token-based algorithms
over other approaches. [53][54] [55] [56].
A token is a permit for entry into the auction market, passed around among requesting T A s. A
T A requiring participation in the auction should acquire the token. Thus, at any moment, only
one T A can exclusively hold the token. We propose an enhancement to this phenomenon, to
support the CDA market protocol. We consider that the token contains a copy of the order-book,
where the trading agent submits its offer once it enters the auction market.
The token is a mobile agent, that is, a program code that migrates from one process to another.
Unlike an ordinary message that is passive, the mobile agent is an active entity that can be
compared with a messenger. The agent code (the token) is executed at the Mmp, uses its
resources, allows T A s to submit a bid and completes the auctioning process. We consider
this to be weak mobility. With weak mobility, the control state is not transferred, so at each
host Mmp, the code executes without this information. The token with weak mobility can be
modelled as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Token Descriptor). The token is a 4-tuple
XToken =< I, υ, %, β, TokenCounter >
where:
• I denotes the initiator (grid coördinator) who initiates the auction and sends the token to
the Mmp nodes requesting it first. At the end of a trade day the token is sent back to I .
• υ is the agent’s version identifier and uniquely identifies a new agent at the beginning of
a trade day or in the event of token regeneration.
• % designates the agent program that is executed at every T A visited by the token.
• β denotes a ‘briefcase’ component encapsulating the token’s data variables, such as Obook,
ob, oa, R.
• TokenCounter variable stores the number of auction market rounds. The variable is
auto-incremented every time a T A receives it. When the predefined number of rounds is
reached trading is terminated.
The logical tree-based (token-based) algorithms are very sensitive to node failure. If a node
having the token fails or the token is lost in transit, a complex process of token regeneration
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and recovery has to be started. Chapter 4 describes in detail the decentralised CDA algorithm
that employs the described MUTEX model. To prove correctness we propose that the MUTEX
protocol must satisfy the following properties:
• ME1: [Mutual exclusion] At most, only one T A can stay in the auction market (critical
section) at anytime. This is a safety property. Safety invariant can be written as Ncs ≤ 1
where Ncsis the number of processes in the critical section at anytime.
• ME2: [Freedom from deadlock] When the auction market is free, but no requesting T A
s can enter the auction market, making further progress impossible. This is a liveness
property. Assuming a configuration satisfies the precondition P and is expected to satisfy
the postcondition Q at termination. Let GG be the disjunction of all guards of all the
processes. Then the desired safety property is expressed by the invariant Q ∨GG
• ME3: [Freedom from Starvation] A T A should not be forced to wait indefinitely to execute
in the auction market, while other trading agents are repeatedly executing their requests.
This is a liveness property.
• ME4: [Fairness] requests must be executed in the order in which they are made. Fairness
is also a liveness property, as the T A should execute in a finite time.
• ME5: [Termination] Starting from the initial state, every feasible behaviour leads to a
system configuration in which all the guards are false and the terminal configuration is
reached. While partial correctness ensures that the desired postcondition holds when
all guards are false termination ensures whether the terminal state is reachable via all
admissible behaviours. This is a liveness property
2.3.2 Classification of Faults
Faults can be classified into one of the three categories according to their persistence, namely
transient faults, intermittent faults and permanent faults [53]. Transient faults occur once and
then disappear. Intermittent faults can be characterised by a fault continuously occurring and
disappearing many times. Permanent faults are persistent and continues to exist until the faulty
component is repaired or replaced. Any one of these faults may either be a fail-silent failure (also
known as fail-stop) or a Byzantine failure [53]. Jalote [15] classify faults in a distributed system
based on how the faulty component behaves when it fails. Such a classification assigns faults
to one of the four categories: crash faults, omission faults, timing faults, and Byzantine faults.
Crash faults causes the component to completely stop and lose its internal state. Omission faults
causes a component not respond to some inputs or fail to send some messages. Timing faults
cause a component to respond either too late or early. Byzantine fault causes the component to
behave in a totally arbitrary manner during failure.
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Our focus is on faults with direct and immediate impact on the CDA algorithms’ execution. We
are aware that such faults may emanate from the routing protocol, hardware failures, etc.. But,
we narrow our scope to faults that disrupt the distributive protocol serialising market access.
FIGURE 2.5: CDA Fault Scenarios
As an initial step to building a fault-tolerant system, the literature [57] [15] [58] [59] suggests
defining the fault model (the number and classes of faults that need to be tolerated). A fault
model includes a set of failure scenarios along with frequency, duration and impact of each
scenario [57]. Inclusion of fault scenarios in our fault model is based on the frequency, impact
on the system and feasibility or the cost of providing protection. We understand there are
variations in the literature about definitions of several of the well-known failure classification
schemes. We consider van Steen et al.’s [58] classification of faults into: crash failures, omission
failures, timing failures, response failures and arbitrary failures.
For simplicity and as a first step towards tolerating failure of some cluster nodes, we consider
first crash failure because this set of failures provides a simple abstraction meant for simplifying
the design of fault-tolerant algorithms (Section 5.3.1). If a system fails to tolerate crash failures, it
cannot tolerate the other classes of failure [53] [58]. We go further and look at more challenging
Byzantine faults resulting from nodes behaving in an arbitrary manner (Section 5.3.2). We
separate failure scenarios into the following cases:
• a single fault;
• multiple separate single faults;
• multiple concurrent faults
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Figure 2.5 shows a visual representation of the fault scenarios we consider affecting the token
distribution within the CDA algorithm. The scenarios presented are not exhaustive but they
help inform on fault tolerance measures that should be developed, thereby ensuring the CDA
algorithm executes successfully. In Section 4.6 our initial CDA algorithm considers token
handling measures which mitigates fault scenarios 1-3 under crash faults and scenario 2 under
Byzantine faults. An in-depth discussion and mitigation measures of the other fault scenarios
(and their respective fault models) is presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
To raise new questions, new possibilities,
to regard old problems from a new angle,
requires creative imagination and marks
real advance in science.
ALBERT EINSTEIN.
3.1 Overview
Overall, the main objective of power allocation or resource management schemes is to establish
a mutual agreement between power generators and consumers while providing a seamless
way to allow exchange of power. In this chapter we discuss the state-of-the-art in the area of
economic models for resource allocation in grid-like platforms. In Section 3.2 we provide a
taxonomy of the resource allocation models in literature, and build a case on why Continuous
Double Auction (CDA) algorithms are appropriate for constrained grid-like environments. In
Section 3.3 we then review the main closely related CDA algorithms designed for resource
allocation in grid-like platforms. Further, we review the main related work on robustness (in
Section 3.4) and cheating resolution (in Section 3.5) aspects within decentralised CDAs.
3.2 Economic Models for Resource Allocation
Economic resource management models can be separated into 3 main classes: Conventional
models, Non-price based models and Price-based models.
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FIGURE 3.1: Taxonomy of Resource Allocation Models
Conventional resource management schemes employ relatively static models with a centralised
controller that manages resource generated and usage. Such conventional management strate-
gies can work well where resources are known in advance, but, fail to work in heterogeneous
and dynamic systems where jobs need to be executed by computing resources whose availability
is difficult to predict [60]. Furthermore, conventional methods are not suitable as they assume
complete control over resources and requests; a steady supply of energy from more reliable
sources; and finite resources for the energy distribution and control mechanism.
Non-price based resource management schemes employ more dynamic systems but the price is
not considered. Pourebrahimi et al. [60] categorises non-pricing approaches into 2 subclasses:
game-theory based and coöperative mechanisms. The coöperative mechanisms ensure all
entities in the distributed system have a global utility function. In these approaches, each
participant (usually an agent) is initially endowed with some resources. They exchange them
until the marginal rate of substitution of the resources is the same for all the agents and there is
no further incentive for coöperation. Kurose and Rahul’s [61] use decentralised algorithms to
allocate resources (such as files or file fragments) coöperatively. Meanwhile, game-theory based
mechanisms are anchored on principles that include selfish optimization and individual utility
functions [31].
Market-based approaches (Price-based approaches) use money and pricing as the main technique
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for coördination between resource producers and consumers [60]. Market-based allocation
mechanisms eliminate the need for a centralised control (which emanates into single point
of failure) and suit decentralised nature of the micro-grid, implicitly enhancing robustness
[62]. In addition, market-based methods create a competitive environment that mutually
balances conflicts of interest between parties; thereby balancing demand and supply. Moreover,
pricing signals can be adjusted to achieve secondary objectives. Such allocation provides
an environment that facilitates complex combinatorial resource requests, i.e. users can freely
acquire energy in a market at their convenient time, provided they pay sufficiently high prices.
Market-based approaches are classified into two categories of economic models: Commodity
Markets and Auctions.
Commodity market models allow providers to specify their resource price and then charge the
consumers according to the amount of resources they consume, while in the auction market
each provider and consumer acts independently, and they agree privately on the selling price.
However, the commodity market model is not incentive-compatible [4], lacks flexibility [9],
since all types of resource have to be predefined. The use of a commodity market model for
obtaining global equilibrium prices for resources in a Grid context has already been proposed
in [63], [64]. Stuer [65] enhances this approach further and extend it to allow for trading and
pricing of substitutable goods. An overview can be found in [66].
When well-designed [67], the auction market models can achieve desired economic outcomes in
RCSMG (described in Section 2.2); as they require little global information, support decentrali-
sation, offer high allocative efficiency whilst being easy to implement in grid-like settings [68],
[31], [22], [69], [13] [28]. In addition, auctions are used for products that have no standard values
and the prices are affected by supply and demand at specific time. Auctions can be classified
into four basic types based on the interactions that exist between consumers and providers:
the ascending auction (English auction), the descending auction (Dutch auction), the first-price
and second-price sealed auction, and the double auction [68]. There is a range of different
variants of the double auctions. Parsons [70] reviews some double auctions variations, with
particular attention to the differences between them. Parsons also describes some theoretical
and experimental work that has been carried out on double auctions.
Among the plenitude of auction formats available, the CDA is the most appropriate market
model that can facilitate power allocation. This claim can be supported by Smith’s seminal
work [2] on competitive market behaviour, which significantly advanced research on CDAs.
He demonstrated that the market efficiency achieved in CDAs populated by a relatively small
number of selfish human traders, in a decentralised environment, where no single agent has
complete and perfect information about the system, was close to one. He further proved that
transactional prices converge to the market’s theoretical competitive equilibrium price. These
results were novel as they showed that markets governed by a decentralised mechanism, such
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as the CDA, do not need to be large to be efficient, as had previously been assumed. Many
subsequent research endeavours in this area have been heavily influenced by this work
De Assuncao and Buyya [71], study the communication requirements of First-Price sealed,
English, Dutch, and CDAs for resource allocation in Grid computing environments. Their
results show that the English auction incurs higher communication overheads, while the CDA
incurs the least. These findings are valuable especially if we consider the RCSMG platform.
Grosu and Das [72], investigate three types of auction allocation protocols: First-Price Auction,
Vickrey Auction and Double Auction, with the find the best suited for the grid environment
from users’ resources’ perspective. The results show that when a mix of risk-averse and risk-
neutral users is considered, First-Price Auction favours resources while Vickrey Auction favours
users. On the other hand the Double Auction favours both users and resources. Similarly,
Kant and Grosu [73] proposed a double auction allocation model for grids they evaluated
with other double auction protocols for resource allocation: Preston-McAfee Double Auction,
Threshold Price Double Auction and CDA. Kant and Grosu showed that the CDA protocol is
preferable, from a resource’s and user’s perspective providing high resource use. The CDA
offers continuous matching and clearance, which makes it flexible and fulfils the need for
immediate allocation. Resource allocation is an emergent behaviour of the individual trading
agents’ complex interactions; the transactions correspond to allocations [74].
3.3 Decentralised Efficient Power Allocation
Application of CDAs has been at the heart of major road-maps for micro-grid structures [75],
[76], [9] [68], [13]. A myriad of these CDA schemes have deferring constructs architectures
and attributes. The two main architectures are the centralised and distributed types. Both
architectures have certain properties associated with the communication model necessary to
apply them. A decentralisation architecture is more desirable over a centralised architecture as
it eliminates bottleneck and scalability issues [77]. In addition, a centralised architecture suffer
from a single point of failure which raises robustness/resilience and security flaws. Although
centralised approaches show some clear limitations, a completely decentralised approach also
raises specific problems. Despite the chosen approach, the main challenge is to make sure they
find the resources needed by users. The next subsection presents a review of CDAs designed
for resource allocation in grid-like platforms.
3.3.1 CDAs for Resource Allocation
Koutsopoulos and Iosifidis [77], note that decentralised multi-lateral node interactions and the
double node role as resource provider and consumer amidst resource constraints cannot be
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captured by single-sided auctions, and even more so, by mechanisms that rely on a central
controller.
Pourebrahimi et al. [60] proposed a CDA algorithm that allocates computational resources (CPU
time) with a single centralised market in a local grid. Their CDA showed comparable resource
efficiency, in comparison to a non-market based model. The system works by allowing every
node that has idle CPU time and a node that has tasks waiting for free CPU, to send (receive)
some requests (offers) to (from) the central auctioneer. Pourebrahimi’s CDA scheme employs
a centralised architecture with three main participants: Consumers and producers agents and a
centralised Auctioneer. Similar to our work, consumers and producers are autonomous agents
capable of decision-making governed by capability and local knowledge. The Auctioneer is
mediating agent that matches the offers using a double auction protocol; implicitly using a
periodic clearing mechanism. It is not clear how many and how often messages are exchanged
between the Auctioneer, Consumer and Provider agents. The CDA formulation does not seem
to consider reliability and security aspects that may hinder auctioning.
Vytelingum’s work [1] was aimed towards CDA structure and behaviour. In the structural
aspect, Vytelingum looked at how the market protocol of the can be modified to meet desirable
properties such as: a high market efficiency, fairness of profit distribution and market stability.
Next the modified protocol is used to solve a complex decentralised task allocation problem
with limited-capacity suppliers and consumers with inelastic demand. Vytelingum shows that
the structure of the CDA (decentralised over centralised) affects the efficiency of the CDA. The
main focus of his contribution is towards market efficiency, which is a slight departure from
our work which investigates computational efficiency. In the behavioural aspects, Vytelingum
developed a multi-layered framework for designing strategies that autonomous agents can use
for trading in various types of market mechanisms. The framework is further used to design a
novel Adaptive —Aggressiveness AA strategy for the CDA. The AA strategy outperformed the
benchmarks in terms of market efficiency in a dynamic market. These contributions are valuable
to our work as study of the multi-layered framework and the AA strategy allowed us to discover
novel attack paths an attacker could exploit in order to cheat in the CDA. Further, despite the
valuable insights Vytelingum’s work provides, it does not show how a decentralised CDA
algorithm would look like (communication-wise) or how it would perform on low computation
resource platform(in message complexity). No insights can be obtained on the robustness and
potentially security of the CDA to failure or attacks.
Tan and Gurd [9] proposed a stable continuous double auction (SCDA1), based on the more
conventional CDA. The SCDA reduces the unnecessary price volatility caused by impatient as
well as insensitive behaviour of some market participants by a novel fuzzy logic and heuristic
based price adjustment mechanism. This is a slight departure from our work which does
1This work is part of Tan’s thesis [78]
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not focus on providing economic efficiency, but rather, focusses on providing computational
efficiency to a CDA. The SCDA entails interactions between three types of software agents
namely: provider agent, user agent and auctioneer agent. The auctioneer agent coördinates
and manages the trading process by communicating with all its participating user and provider
agents. In addition, the auctioneer agent also monitors the system’s efficiency and calculates
the theoretical market efficiency for evaluation purposes. Evidently the CDA herein adopts a
centralised architecture and its associated challenges described earlier in this section. User and
provider agents communicate solely with the auctioneer agent; there is no direct communication
between them. It is not clear how many messages are passed between the agents, and how
often. Instead of a broadcast by the centralised agent, the agents send a query to the auctioneer.
Tan’s CDA may fail to offer efficient resource allocation in a resource constrained platform since
it was built without consideration of the RCSMG constraints.
Izakian et al. [68] continuous double auction method for grid resource allocation. Users have
one or more independent, computational-intensive jobs for execution and will pay for it. Also,
resource owners have computational resources and will rent them for profit. Agents employing
decision-making methods (opposed to known strategies) act on behalf of their human owners
who are either providers or consumers. Provider agents determine their bid value based on
workload while consumer agents determine their bid value based on remaining time for bidding
and remaining resources for bidding (inspired by [79]). The communication and computational
overheads incurred in this CDA are not clear in the paper. In each time unit, consumer agents
and provider agents find their bid and request values and send them to the auctioneer. It is not
clear how many messages (offers to the auctioneer, or trade confirmation) are passed between
consumer agents, provider agents and the auctioneer. Furthermore, no reliability or security
aspects were considered in the formulation of this CDA mechanism.
Teymouri and Rahmani [80] proposed a CDA where users and providers connect with some
auctioneers randomly. Each user or provider can connect to several auctioneers to participate
in different auctions to increase its chance. Market information is decentralised among a set
of auctioneers and each auctioneer keeps the information of local users and providers. The
CDA algorithm engages less with the users, as updating of bids is done by the auctioneer
itself. Intuitively, although the single point of failure is eliminated by such an approach the
other issues remain; scalability may be of concern, security and privacy concerns in case of
a rogue/malicious auctioneer(s). Work by Teymouri and Rahmani is still valuable, as the
researchers show that their protocol increases the success rate of jobs and providers benefits
while decreasing the users’ cost.
Majumder et al. [81] proposes an incentive-compatible double auction mechanism, for energy
trade between buying and selling agents, with the aim of solving the social maximization
problem. The authors implicitly assume, the controller is trustworthy, which can be unrealistic
Chapter 3 Literature Review 31
in a scheme that has selfish participants. Further, the auctioneer presents a single point of
failure.
Stańczak et al. [13] present an example of balancing a micro-grid with its own energy production
sources and connected to a higher voltage distribution grid, by introduction of the continu-
ous double auction market with agents using the Adaptive-Aggressive Strategy. Consider a
centralised CDA architecture were each trader decides how much energy has to be bought or
sold and sends it as an offer to the market with a proposed price per unit. The CDA algorithm
continuously collects offers and matches the new ones with the already submitted bids or asks
(persistent bids and asks). If the deal balancing for the energy is not accomplished in the current
session, a balancing mechanism will check the true usage/production of energy and clears the
unsettled offers by exchanging them with the external grid.
In summary, we note that, CDA algorithms designed for grid-like environments, subject to the
literature we reviewed, use a centralised approach to guarantee market participation. Each
trader submits their bids to a centralised auctioneer, which we ascertain is not ideal for the
considered RCSMG. The knowledge gap is in the lack of a CDA deployable in constrained
grid-like platforms, with traders coördinated without relying on a centralised auctioneer. We
contribute to this knowledge gap by designing such a decentralised CDA algorithm that we
believe contributes to the state of the art and is useful within RCSMGs. The motivation herein,
is to design a CDA algorithm that not only eliminates the shortfalls associated with centralised
CDA algorithms, but is also sensitive to computational resources.
3.4 Robustness to Failure
3.4.1 Fault tolerance in MUTEX protocols
In Chapter 4 we propose a token-based MUTEX protocol to support the decentralised CDA. This
implies the proposed CDA formulation inherits properties of the distributive primitives. Token-
based MUTEX algorithms serialise access to the critical section (CS), through the maintenance
of a single token, which cannot simultaneously be accessed at more than one node in the system.
Requests to enter the CS are directed to whichever node is the current token holder.
The token-based MUTEX approach being proposed for our CDA scheme (Section 4.3) was
inspired by Raymond’s algorithm [54]. In Raymond’s algorithm, requests are sent over a static
spanning tree of the network, toward the token holder. Furthermore, Raymond’s algorithm is
resilient to non-adjacent node crashes and recoveries, but not node/link failures [54]. Chang
et al. in [82] extend Raymond’s‘ algorithm by imposing a logical direction on a number of
edges to induce a token-oriented directed acyclic graph (DAG), where there exists a directed
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path originating from n token-requesting nodes while terminating at the token holding node.
Resilience to link and site failures is achieved by allowing request messages to be sent over all
edges of the DAG. Chang et al.’s solution incurs high message overheads and fails to consider
link recovery. Dhamdhere et al. [83] show that Chang et al.’s algorithm will suffer from deadlock
then go on to propose a dynamically changing sequence number to each node to form a total
ordering of the nodes. Since the token holding node possesses the highest sequence number, a
DAG is maintained if the links are defined to point to a node with higher sequence number. If a
node has no outgoing links to the token holder (due to link failure), it will flood the network
with messages to build a spanning tree. Once the token is part of this spanning tree, a token
will be granted to the particular requesting node, bypassing other earlier requests. Persistent
link failures will inevitably lead to starvation since priority is given to the nodes that lose a
path to the token holding node. Similar to Chang et al.’s algorithm, flooding of messages incurs
overhead not suitable for a typical resource constrained setup. Walter [84] presents a reversal of
the technique, where a destination-oriented DAG is maintained if it its a dynamic destination.
Ordering of nodes is similar to that of Dhamdhere [83], but the lowest node is assigned the
token. The aforementioned solutions mainly address the issue of link failure, with little effort
on addressing node failure, explicitly assuming that nodes do not fail and network partitioning
does not occur. Another body of work towards solving node failure is evident. Revannaswamy
et al. [85] propose a solution to handle failures of nodes and links in a network with definitions
carried over from [54]. Their attempt at fault tolerance involves eliminating the failed nodes and
obtaining a different tree structure utilising chords (edges of the tree yet unused for message
exchanges) from the network. A reconfiguration process attempts to connect parts of the tree
separated due to failures. Since reconfiguration eliminates the failed components, if the static
cluster heads (which act as proxies to the mobile nodes) fail, the trading agents residing on
the mobile nodes will not be able to take part in the auction market. Thus, we argue that this
approach is not an efficient solution to ensure reliability and availability in the given context of
computationally constrained, micro-grids.
3.4.2 Decentralised Consumption Scheduling
Demand Side Management (DSM) facilitates power demand profile smoothing across time by
avoiding peak power periods [86]. These solutions minimise the power costs while guaranteeing
user satisfaction; this can be achieved through optimisation methods [17], [18]. Standard
approaches to addressing such optimisation problems on smart grid networks include dual
decomposition, and augmented Lagrangian methods [87]. However, dual decomposition
methods are not robust, requiring many technical conditions, such as strict convexity and
finiteness of all local cost functions. Augmented Lagrangian methods can be used to bring
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robustness to the gradient method, and in particular, to yield convergence without assumptions
such as strict convexity or finiteness of the objective function [88]. Nevertheless, this method has
the disadvantage of not being separable across the devices in the network. ADMM can be used
to achieve both separability and robustness for distributed optimisation [88]. Kraning et al. [89]
studied an energy management model for a large-scale electrical power network using ADMM.
The problem is solved in a distributed manner by alternating between the parallel optimisation
of single device objective functions and computing average power imbalances in the nets which
the devices belong to. Wei et al. [90] proposed an asynchronous ADMM algorithm with a
convergence rate of O(1/k), where k is the number of iterations. Although their method applies
to a general network utility maximization problem, the results can be adapted to solve the
power consumption scheduling problem. This work employs a decentralised optimisation
approach based on the ADMM method to solve the power consumption scheduling problem in
a distributed manner.
3.5 Detecting and Mitigating Cheating
3.5.1 Understanding Cheating Attacks
Faults and Failures are not the only problems that one should seek to address. CDA algorithm
design and deployment should take into account the fact that actors in the auction market are
self-interested [12], implying they may misrepresent their preferences (e.g. amount of electricity
required, the capacity they can supply and prices they would accept) or even change agent’s
bidding strategy to maximise their profit [27]. Cheating is arguably the most significant group
of auction frauds forming the bulk of all internet frauds [23], [25]. Cheating unlike other fraud
categories leaves no direct evidence of its occurrence, while financial loss resulting from such
cheating behaviour cannot be precisely measured. Cheating is encouraged by: cheap user
pseudonyms; greater information asymmetry; lack of personal contact between participants;
and the tolerance of bidders [91].
The tendency for participants to cheat or employ strategies to gain some economic advantage,
disrupts services and hinders trust, which is necessary for incentivising energy sharing among
the members of such a community. Therefore, it is common for system defenders to study
common cheating attacks with the intention of understanding and developing robust defence
mechanisms. Most widely studied classic cheating attacks occur in single-sided auctions and to
a less extent centralised CDAs. These classic forms include: Multiple bidding[26]; Bid shading
[92]; Rings [91]; Shill bidding [91], [93], [94]; Misrepresented/ non-existent items; and Bid Snipping.
Trevathan and Read in [91] note that cheating is auction mechanism specific, evident in the
decentralised CDA being fairly comprehensive in discouraging some standard cheating forms
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from occurring. This means, system defenders cannot rely on analysing only classic attack
forms to equip themselves with information for deployment of effective defence solutions. We
observed this notion in our work [27], indicating how exploitation of agent-to-agent strategy
dynamics in the market opens new avenues for automated cheating attacks.
In summary, we learn that some T A strategies are superior, with the ability to gain more
surplus from trade than their inferior counterparts. Experimental evidence indicates that the
Adaptive Aggressive strategy is one such superior strategy, while the Zero Intelligence is the
most inferior [95], [1], [74]. This could be attributed to AA agents being adaptive to different
combinations of competitors; and to different supply and demand relationships. ZI agents low
performance could be attributed to their failure to analyse and adapt to their environment and
the competition. The AA obtains huge profit margins in comparison to ZI strategy [36]. In
addition, we also learn that some TA strategies are only superior within given population ratios
[96], which implies that changing agent population ratios can lead to fairly predictable surplus
gain for specific strategies over others.
Automation in auctioning can pave way to an interesting set of automated cheating forms
which to the best of our knowledge had not been documented prior to our published work in
[27]. This means system defenders face a huge challenge of designing a robust security solution
that can capture such novel attacks. One way of addressing such a challenge suggested by
thesis is creating a more encompassing systematic approach that allows the design and study of
cheating attacks. To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic framework available, that
allows the design and study of such cheating attacks on CDA platforms. As affirmed by [97]
[98] [99], attack models and exploitation scenarios provide a valuable source of information,
which inspires development of effective mitigation solutions (e.g. Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS)). In the next subsection we review the attack modelling and evaluation literature.
3.5.2 Attack Modelling
One way of approaching the issue of security in a decentralised agent-based CDA is by mod-
elling random cheating attacks, which can be helpful in understanding potential vulnerabilities
and plausible exploits. However, such an approach yields specific attacks that may be difficult
to generalise (since there are specific to the auction algorithm they target) and does not give
enough coverage of cheating attacks that can help defenders to develop more elegant and
effective solutions. To provide such a broader coverage of attacks, one envisages the use of
security quantification approach.
According to Sedaghatbaf et al. [100], security quantification can take one of three forms:
analysis of large amount of logged operational data; use of simulation techniques and tools;
and construction of analytic models. Analysis of logged data is straightforward, but less
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desirable. Such an analysis is practical, only useful after an incident of a security breach occurs.
Additionally, it can be an expensive approach, as it requires building a real system, taking
measurements and analysing the data statistically. Thus, simulation techniques and tools can
provide an alternative, but they also suffer from lack of proper techniques and tools specific to
security quantification. Constructing analytical models is preferred, since it can be performed in
an a priori manner with less costs. In this thesis, we carry out a model-based security evaluation
approach to provide coverage of attacks in a decentralised CDA. Such an approach is novel
within the CDA security research community.
The existing model-based, security evaluation approaches can be categorised from the attacker
behaviour viewpoint into behavioural [101] [102] [100] and non-behavioural/ technical ap-
proaches [103][104] [105] [106]. As observed in Niitso [102] and Sedaghatbaf [100], attack
modelling approaches proposed in the literature have focussed mostly on the technical aspects
and finding possible attack vectors. Technical approaches are based upon simplistic assump-
tions about the factors that may affect attacker’s decisions without considering factors such
as the costs of bribing people that may affect an attacker’s decisions on whether to perform
the attack, and how to perform it. In this thesis we propose an ACA framework (Section 7.2),
that provides more coverage of attacks on a decentralised CDA by considering both, technical
and behavioural/non-technical aspects of attack modelling. The framework is inspired by the
work of Adepu and Mathur [103]. Adepu and Mathur developed a framework that enables
researchers to design a variety of cyber and physical attacks for the assessment of attack detec-
tion methods and tools. Their framework defines attackers intent but fails to explicitly consider
human behaviour aspects (e.g. attacker’s rational and attacker’s ability) which our framework
considers.
3.5.3 Cheating Mitigation
Cheating is specific to the auction mechanism, which implies that cheating forms and the related
countermeasures are dependent on the auction mechanism. To the best of our knowledge,
research in [22] and [24], is the only closest work that specifically addresses CDA security.
Wang and Leung in [22], describe an anonymous and secure CDA protocol for electronic
marketplaces, which is strategically equivalent to the traditional CDA protocol. Trevathan
et al. in [24], demonstrated that, Wang and Leung’s scheme [22], allows bidder identity to
be revealed immediately after his/her first bid. Furthermore, it allows profiles to be created
about a bidder’s trading behaviour, as bids are linkable. Hence, in their scheme they propose
incorporating a group signature scheme to anonymise traders and secure the trading process.
Wang and Leung’s scheme is given in the context of Internet retail markets while Trevathan et
al.’s scheme was designed specifically for share market applications. Although the schemes
described in these works could protect the customer’s privacy including affording anonymity,
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robustness and non-repudiation, but they are not suitable for deterring automated cheating
in decentralised CDAs such as the one we describe in this thesis. This is due to the following
reasons:
• Presence of a centralised auctioneer: the CDA mechanisms discussed in the aforementioned
works [22], [24], rely on a centralised architecture, where bids are relayed through a
central component (Auctioneer), which determines the winner according to the auction
rules. The problem arises when an Auctioneer influences the auction proceedings in
a manner inconsistent with the auction rules. For example, the Auctioneer may block
bids, insert fake bids, steal payments, profile bidders, prematurely open sealed bids,
artificially inflate/deflate prices or award the item to someone other than the legitimate
winner. Protecting a bidder’s identity and bidding information is crucial since each
bidder/seller’s private information can be inferred at the central Auctioneer. Furthermore,
the Auctioneer presents a single point of failure, is open to biases and can be easily
be manipulated to obtain favourable trades or reveal traders’ reserved information. In
a decentralised CDA [28], the auctioneering duties are carried out by a mobile-token
distributed among the participants following a MUTEX protocol. Franklin and Reiter
[107] suggest distributing the role of Auctioneer amongst s servers. The auction can be
considered secure/fair unless a threshold t, 1 ≤ t ≤ s of the servers collude. However,
these types of schemes have a high communication overhead and cannot be trusted when
the same company owns all the servers.
• Different auction clearing mechanisms: work by Wang and Leung [22] and Trevathan et al.
[24] considers a double auction mechanism where the market clears periodically. Such
a market mechanism allows bidders and sellers to submit bids for a period where the
auctioneer then clears the matching bids. The CDA mechanism we consider (see Section
3.3) lasts for a fixed period, known as the trading period (at the end of which the market
closes and no more offers are accepted). The traders will continuously submit offers at
anytime during the trade period while the market continuously clears matching bids and
asks (i.e., whenever a new transaction is possible between an acceptable bid and ask).
In addition, the trading parties mutually and exclusively submit an order into a mobile
order-book to negotiate a deal. These differences in clearing mechanisms means the auction
schemes are susceptible to different attacks; plausible mitigation methods that can be
employed also differ. These works are valuable to our work, as they provide a form of
benchmark for our security considerations towards a cheating attack.
• Inadequate and resource intensive solutions: Cryptography is an effective approach in de-
terring cheating, resulting from manipulations via communication channels or those
emanating from a corrupt centralised auctioneer [25]. While cryptography helps in bid
authentication and privacy [25], [108], [94], the literature lacks solutions towards pre-
venting automated forms and other classic forms of cheating [91]. These include bid
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sniping, shill bidding, bid siphoning and misrepresented goods [108]. Furthermore, many
cryptographic operations are computationally intensive, and are thus not favourable in
RC environments (such as one described in Section 2.2).
3.5.4 Automated Security Preserving Mechanisms
While auction developers may tinker with new auction formats and policies, many of the
aforementioned problems remain unresolved and threaten the future of online auctioning [21].
Further, such modifications of the auction protocol alters desired core properties offered by an
auction mechanism. Modification of the CDA can for example result in a double auction protocol
similar to the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol [26], which is dominant strategy,
incentive compatible and can be used to make trading agents declare their real evaluation
value. In this particular case, such a modification significantly increases the number of message
overheads. In addition, CDAs are known to perform efficiently over TPDs [73]. Intuitively,
a comprehensive solution is one that incorporates a cryptographic model (to solve the main
security and privacy problems), proactive programs (to detect cheating), and an auction format
that discourages cheating. In this thesis we contribute to this cause by proposing a proactive
protocol to detect and resolve automated forms of cheating. To the best of our knowledge,
adding a distinct, proactive detection and mitigation protocol has never been done to address
cheating in CDAs. We consider cheating attacks (discussed later in Chapter 7) to be exceptions2
that can be resolved by crafting an Exception Handling (EH) mechanism that conforms to one
of two approaches: the Citizenship / Organisational view and the Survivalist / Agent view
approach.
Citizenship approach: This involves an entity/entities situated outside the system agents
[70], [109], [110], [111], which monitor by listening to agent’s internal events and messages
passed to detect exceptional situations. There is considerable support of this [112]. Related
work subsumed by the citizenship approach lies into two further sub-categories; centralised
(a single entity is responsible for handling exceptions) [110], [113] and decentralised views
(EH is a shared responsibility by more than one entity) [109], [111]. For instance, Tripathi
and Miller [110] assigned an agent, named a guardian, in a MAS that manages EH centrally
for global exceptions. Klein and Dellarocas [113] proposed a shared EH service to the whole
MAS. At first glance this approach seems decentralised, but, sentinel agents responsible for
exception detection are the only entities distributed. Centralised view yields higher overheads,
undesirable for computationally constrained, environments. Klein and Dellarocas improve their
approach by proposing a more decentralised approach which assigns the responsibility of EH
to sentinel agents [109]. Every agent has a sentinel agent that controls agent communication
2Exceptions arise in situations where an agents’ behaviour falls outside the normal, system operating conditions.
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and have the ability of using a centralised reliability database shared by all sentinels. Similarly,
Haegg [111] proposes special agents (also called sentinels) which are assigned to each system
agent and controls the agent’s communication for error detection and recovery.
The citizenship approach works in our scenario (see Section 2.2) as it is based on the same
assumption that no-one has access to the trading agents’ internal state. The main criticism of
the citizen approach is that, when the number of participant agents is huge, EH requires more
resources for the specialised agents to handle exceptions of the whole system. Adopting such an
approach should consider this drawback. We are aware that it is essential to reduce the number
of messages passed among the participating agents and this is discussed in our solution (in
Chapter 7).
Survivalist approach: This is where individual system agents are elaborately designed to
cope with all the exceptions that they might face [114], [115], [116]. Souchon et al., [114] proposes
a layered handling approach depending on Java call stack structure- SaGe Framework. Mallya
and Singh [115] proposed commitment protocols, where an exception is identified by violation
of a protocol. Exceptions are handled by definitions of the recovery plan for the exceptional sit-
uation. Cakirlar, Ekinci and Dikenelli [116] classify multi-agent exceptions and implement these
levels with their approach on SEAGENT goal-oriented multi-agent development framework.
Coöperation and internal intents of agents are modelled with goals. The mechanism to handle
exceptions is embedded inside the agent.
Designing survivalist agents greatly increases the burden on agent developers, as they have to
anticipate and correctly prepare for all exceptions an agent may face in the environment it may
have to operate. In addition, agents become difficult to maintain, understand and reuse as a
potentially large body of EH code may obscure the relatively simple normative behaviour of an
agent. Due to the aforementioned con’s of the survivalist approach in comparison to pro’s the
citizen approach the citizen approach can provide an effective approach.
Overall, use of EH is not unknown in double auction schemes, as shown by Parsons and Klein’s
[70]. The authors investigate how EH may address exceptions resulting from unreliable infras-
tructure in double auctioning applications- a significant departure from our work. Employing
the citizen approach, the authors following the approach in [109], define an EH infrastructure
that associates a sentinel to every agent. Sentinels provide EH service to agents there are
associated with. Work in [70] is valuable to our work as it inspired the design of our cheating
EH protocol. The novelty of our automated security preserving solution comes from crafting an EH
mechanism that deters automated forms of cheating (Non-compliant agents exceptions). This is
a significant departure from Parsons and Klein’s work [70], whose EH mechanism addresses
communication disturbances (Unreliable infrastructure exceptions).
Chapter 4
A Decentralised Continuous Double
Auctioning Algorithm
All models are wrong but some are useful
GEORGE BOX.
4.1 Overview
This chapter details our proposed decentralised CDA algorithm for RCSMG, that provides
an additional abstract power management layer, which is crafted to allow automated and
seamless allocation of power, while eliminating issues of technology literacy, promoting low
communication overheads, and handling token loss and some link failures. Our CDA algorithm
can leverage autonomous intelligent trading agents that participate on behalf of the human
participants to negotiate power trade. As a prerequisite to this chapter, the reader is advised to
familiarise themselves with the smart RMG model, CDA model and MUTEX model described
in Chapter 2. We make further assumptions to the aforementioned models (in Section 4.2).
Section 4.3 then details assumptions and the overarching fundamental principles that guided
the development of our proposed decentralised CDA algorithm. In Section 4.3.4 we discuss
the data structures and control messages of the algorithm and then in Section 4.3.5 we present
the algorithm’s procedures. Our token-based CDA algorithm is theoretically shown to satisfy
the MUTEX properties, while yielding a time complexity of O(N) and a message complexity of
O(logN) (Section 4.5). Performance is of paramount importance as the CDA scheme is to be
deployed in a resource-constrained environment. Furthermore, we study the effects of faults,
particularly token loss and link failure. Extensive fault tolerance measures are beyond the scope
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of this chapter and will be addressed in Chapter 5. Section 4.7 concludes this chapter by relating
the chapter contributions to the overall thesis problem.
4.2 Assumptions
For simplicity, we consider the following additional assumptions to the constraints and assump-
tions made in Section 2.2:
• A correct routing protocol exist for successful communication;
• There is a fairly stable connection between the shared smart meters (Msm — Msm links)
as cluster heads;
• Messages are delivered within a finite time;
• There is no message loss during transmission and the receiving node (Msm/ Mmp) can
receive messages without any error or distortion;
• We do not anticipate Msm failure and thus assume the Msm as cluster heads are never
disconnected.
4.3 Algorithm Principle
While there exist many variants of CDAs, we structure our CDA around the market protocol
initially proposed by Smith [2]. We consider the smart micro-grid setup described in Chapter 2
and we refer the reader to Section 2.2.4.1 for a description of fundamental Continuous Double
Auction concepts. We consider that our CDA protocol includes the New York Stork Exchange
(NYSE) spread-improvement and the no-order queuing rules. The agent traders take part in a
single CDA market, trading single-type, homogeneous goods —electric power. The descriptor
of a CDA is a septuple [49]
XCDA = {ρ, B̃, S̃, Vb, Cs,∆price, tround} (4.1)
where:
• ρ is the power in single units to be auctioned.
• B̃ = b1, ..., bn is the finite set of identifiers of buyer T A s, where n is the number of buyer
T A s.
• S̃ = s1, ..., sm is the finite set of identifiers of buyer T A s, where m is the number of seller
T A s.
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• Vb = (V ∗1, ..., V ∗n), where V ∗i (vi1, vi2, ..., vini) is a vector of unit valuations of T A bi.
Here, ni is the number of units of p that bi requires, and vij is the valuation value for the
jth unit acquired.
• Cs = (C∗1, ..., C∗m), where C ∗i (ci1, ..., cimi) is a vector of unit costs of T A si. Here, mi is
the number of units that si wants to sell, and cij is the cost of the jth unit.
• ∆price is the minimum price step required in the auction. That is, a buyer (seller) T Amust
increase (decrease) its bid (ask) at nx∆price, where n is a non-negative integer.
• tround is used for defining the condition for terminating the CDA; that is, if there are no
new asks or bids during a time period tround, or the maximum threshold of rounds per
day R is reached, the CDA terminates.
Formally, we consider S̃ and B̃ to participate in the auction. Each or β abides to an acceptable
price range [Pll, Pul], where Pll is the acceptable lower limit price while Pul is the acceptable
upper limit price, formed on the basis of the T A’s experience and the trading history of the
market. Each T A (buyer/seller) has a secret reservation value λi, where (i = 1, 2, ...N), for a
single unit allocation of energy. Without loss of generality, we assume λi ∈ [0, 1]. For a seller or
buyer T A, each unit of goods has a reservation price (limit price), which is secret to each trader.
If a seller submits an ask lower than the λ, he will lose profit. If a buyer submits a bid higher
than λ, he will also lose profit (no surplus profit). At any single time, only one trader has the
exclusive right to submit an offer. The participant can send a new offer when their earlier offer
has been cleared (if it was matched and the deal was accomplished).
A round r in the CDA is the time period between two successive transactions or the period
from the beginning of the CDA to the time when the first transaction occurs. If a round is the
qth(q ∈ IN+) round of the CDA, then q is called the round number. A CDA usually consists of
multiple rounds which form the trade period, R. Thus, R = r1, ..., rn is the finite set of rounds in
a single run or trade day. For a CDA that has lasted r rounds, where (r > 0) , let pi(1 ≤ i ≤ r)
denote the price of the ith transaction. A history Hl in a CDA is the set of transaction prices
during the last l rounds,
Hl = {pr−l+1, · · · , pi, · · · , pr},
where pi(r − l + 1 ≤ i ≤ r) is the transaction price of round i, and l(l ≤ r) is called the history
length. We define supply to be the total number of units of power that all the sellers can sell in
a trade period /run, R. We define demand as the total number of units of energy that all the
buyers desire in R.
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4.3.1 Auctioning Activities
Activities considered in our decentralised CDA scheme can be summarised into:
1. Registration: In order to participate in the auction, agents must first register (with a
registration manager). This is a once-off procedure. When an agent is registered, it can
participate in any number of auctions rounds. At the beginning of each R, T A s enter a
“mock marketplace", to determine the equilibrium price and overall surplus distribution.
2. Initialisation: The token (a mobile object) is initialised, such that r = 0. After this
initialisation, when the equilibrium price is found, all trades will commence at this price.
3. Participation Request: A new round of the CDA starts, r = r + 1, oa = ∞, and ob = 0.
Any agent willing to submit an offer in the market will request for the token. A MUTEX
protocol is used to serialise a fair market access to the participants.
4. Bid Formation: An agent that receives the token will compute their offer (bid/ask) using
the AA trading strategy and submit it into the token (see Definition 2.1).
5. Transacting: Considering the offer is not invalid, if a matching bid/ask is found the
transaction is instantly concluded and a trade occurs. Otherwise, the offer is put in the
order-book as an outstanding ask/bid. Thus, several situations might arise during a
round:
(a) When a seller T A submits an aska,
• if a ≥ oa then a is an invalid ask;
• if ob < a < oa, then oa is updated to a;
• if a ≤ ob, then this seller T Amakes a deal at ob; go to 3.
(b) When a buyer T A submits a bid of b,
• if b ≤ ob, then b is an invalid bid;
• ifob < b < oa, then ob is updated to b;
• if b ≥ oa, then this buyer T Amakes a deal at oa; go to 3.
(c) This process repeats until no new bids (asks) are submitted during a time period
tround.
The trade information and outstanding offers are made public and visible to other agents.
The number of trades and wins for each T As are recorded and kept in the token. We
consider ‘truthfulness’ similar to [9], where both buyers and sellers full-fill their contractual
obligations once bids are matched.
6. Termination: The order-book is mutual exclusively distributed until the end of a trade
day.
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For the consumers (prosumers) to satisfy their need for energy, while producers (prosumers)
gain as much profit as possible, from selling the energy, an effective adaptive agent strategy is
expected.
4.3.2 Agent Strategy
We understand that heterogeneous T A (with different strategies) can operate in the same CDA
market but for our study we consider a homogeneous population of agents employing the
Adaptive-Aggressive Strategy1 (AA). Our option was inspired by the AA strategy’s performance
superiority against other benchmark strategies, and its ability to adapt to dynamic environments,
where classic strategies fail. All T A can participate in the auction market, with exclusive offer
submission.
4.3.3 Serialization of Market Access
As a recap, the proposed distributed CDA protocol results in a mutual exclusion problem (see
Section 2.3.1). Since at most, one T A can submit an offer in the auction market at a single
instance of time, we propose serialization of market access and fair opportunities to submit an
offer. In traditional CDA algorithms when a successful bid or transaction or bid/ ask is made a
broadcast is sent to all participants. This means the number of messages may be considered
undesirable within a constrained environment. Thus, a workaround we adopt in our CDA
algorithm, is a limit on the number of broadcasts (or total elimination). If no broadcast occurs,
the market information is made available when the token arrives at a T A. This assumption can
be relaxed, by allowing a minimum number of broadcast messages to be sent during the trade
day. The argument is that, even in this relaxed condition, the expected number of messages
would be greatly reduced to favour deployment in a constrained environment. In such a case,
the T A s participation is driven more by factors such as the households’ extended need for
energy or need to sell, than the transaction price broadcast. In the following subsection we shall
discuss the considered data structures and control messages.
4.3.4 Data Structures & Control Messages
Two types of request messages are passed by nodes requesting to take part in the auction market:
Reqsm (global token request) and Reqmp (local token request). An incoming Reqsm is enqueued
in a FIFO RQ1 queue while Reqmp is enqueued in the RQ2 FIFO queues at the Msm. At the Msm
nodes is a POINTER variable which stores the location of an Msm in possession of the token, or
1Developed by Vytelingum in his PhD thesis [1] and then presented in [74]
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next intermediateMsm pointing to that token holding node (see [54]) whereReqsm is sent. When
a Reqsm is sent, the TokenAsked boolean variable is set to TRUE avoiding continuous request
messages to be send for the token by the same node. On arrival of the token toMsm andMmp the
boolean variables FlagMsm and FlagMmp are set to TRUE indicating possession of the token.
The GQ FIFO queue at Msm, stores a copy of requests submitted and “locked-in" at token arrival
on the cluster head. TokenOB is an online copy of the CDA order-book carried in the token.
LocalOB is a local copy of the CDA order-book updated each time a trading agent participates
in the auction market. Each Mmp has a ClusterDir that contains a directory of neighbouring
Mmp nodes. A TokenCounter keeps a record of the number of auction market rounds. When
the predefined number of rounds is reached trading is terminated and an end-of-trading-day
(tround) message may be communicated to the rest of the participating nodes. This message
includes trading-day market information. To get a clearer understanding of how these data
structures and control messages function we shall discuss the routines executed by the nodes.
FIGURE 4.1: Decentralised CDA Procedures
4.3.5 Procedures & Routines
The T A s will execute the following routines:
• T ARequest;
• FormOffer
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Local Token Request: When a T A needs to trade in the auction market, the T A triggers
the hosting Mmp node to send a Reqmp to the Msm provided that battery is above the critical
condition and it does not already possess the token. When a Reqmp is sent to Msm, the sleep
mode is deactivated to ensure the Mmp node remains online to receive the token. Algorithm 4.1
presents the LocalTokenRequest Procedure.
Algorithm 4.1: LocalTokenRequest Procedure
Input : ReqTA, BatteryLife, CriticalCondition
Output : TokenRecieved
1 FlagMmp ← FALSE ;
2 TokenReceived← FALSE;
3 for each Mmp ∈Mmp,a[.] do
4 while FlagMmp = FALSE do
5 if ReqTA = TRUE then
6 if BatteryLife > CriticalCondition AND FlagMmp = FALSE then
7 Send ReqMmp to Local Msm ;
8 Disable doze mode ;
9 Wait for TOKEN ;
10 else if BatteryLife ≤ CriticalCondition AND FlagMmp = FALSE then
11 Do not send ReqMmp ;
12 Wait till BatteryLife > CriticalCondition ; // Battery life determines
participation
13 else
14 Do nothing ; // TA has not requested for participation
15 TokenReceived← TRUE;
16 return TokenReceived ;
Local Market Execution: This procedure is executed on receipt of the token at Mmp. The
TokenCounter variable is incremented and the FlagMmp is set to TRUE. The T A forms
an offer (bid/ask) which is submitted into TokenOB and TokenCounter is incremented. If the
predefined number of rounds is reached, the trading day is terminated. Success or failure of
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an T A s offer to result in a trade does not affect passing-on of the token. The Algorithm 4.2
presents the LocalMarketExecution Procedure.
Algorithm 4.2: LocalMarketExecution Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, TokenCounter + + ,R, TAa[.].
Output : R, TokenCounter TokenOB.
1 R← 1000;
2 TokenCounter ← 0 ;
3 TAi ← ∅ ; // Where i = 0, 1, 2... N
4 for each Mmp ∈Mmp,a[.] do
5 if TokenRecieved = TRUE AND FlagMmp = TRUE then
6 TokenCounter + + ; // The Token Counter is incremented
7 Set FlagMmp to TRUE ;
8 Ask TAi to FormOffer() ; // A TA submits its offer
9 if tradeID = buyer then
10 bid← offer ;
11 if bid ≤ ob OR out of [Pll, Pul] range then
12 bid is invalid ;
13 else
14 ob← bid ;
15 if ob ≥ oa then
16 Pt ← oa ;
17 Trade and TokenOB update ;
18 else if tradeID = seller then
19 ask ← offer ;
20 if ask ≥ oa OR out of [Pll, Pul] range then
21 ask is invalid ;
22 else
23 oa← ask ;
24 if ob ≥ oa then
25 Pt ← ob ;
26 Trade and TokenOB update ;
27 else
28 no new oa or ob in a pre-specified time period ;
29 Round ended with no transaction ;
30 Update LocalOB from TokenOB ; // Local Orderbook copy is updated
31 R−− ; // Auto-decrementing remaining trade rounds
32 return TokenOB, R, TokenCounter ;
33 else
34 wait for TOKEN ;
Local Token Transfer: On completing of the Local Market execution the token is returned to
the cluster’sMsm. When direct connection to anMsm is unavailable (due to various reasons), the
token possessingMmp will try send the token via a close neighbouringMmp in its ClusterDir with
the best connectivity to the cluster Msm. The Algorithm 4.3 presents the LocalTokenTransfer
Procedure.
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Algorithm 4.3: LocalTokenTransfer Procedure
Input : LocalOB, Mmpa[.].
Output : TOKEN
1 for each Mmp ∈Mmp,a[.] do
2 if Connection to Msm = ALIV E then
3 Return Token to Msm ;
4 else if Connection to Mmp via Msm = ALIV E then
5 Send TOKEN to Msm ;
6 else
7 Destroy the TOKEN ;
8 Revert back changes in the LocalOB ;
9 Set FlagMmptoFALSE
10 return TOKEN ;
Global Token Request: An Msm node uses this procedure to send a request for the token. A
Reqsm is sent to the neighbour node holding the token or in path to the token and TokenAsked
is set to TRUE. This ensures that similar request messages are not sent to the same token holder.
EnqueueRequest routine is executed while Msm is waiting for the token. EnqueueRequest
enqueues the Reqsm and Reqmp requests into RQ1 and RQ2 respectively. The Algorithm 4.4
presents the GlobalTokenRequest Procedure.
Algorithm 4.4: GlobalTokenRequest Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMmp, R, TokenCounter TokenOB.
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if FlagMsm = FALSE AND RQ1 6= 0 AND TokenAsked = 0 then
3 Send ReqMsm to Msm in POINTER ;
4 Set TokenAsked to TRUE ;
5 Assign TokenReceived = FALSE ;
6 while TokenReceived = FALSE do
7 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ; // Requests are enqueued in RQ1 and
RQ2
8 else if FlagMsm = FALSE AND RQ1 6= 0 AND TokenAsked = 0 then
9 while TokenReceived = FALSE do
10 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ;
Local Token Distribution: Once the token is received the algorithm moves to the LocalTok-
enDistribution routine. Receipt of the token by the requestingMsm node sets the boolean variable
FlagMsm to TRUE indicating possession of the token. GQ is a FIFO queue that stores a copy
of requests submitted and “locked in" at the arrival of the token to the cluster head. Once the
token is received, all requests in RQ2 are transferred to GQ. While there are still requests in GQ,
the algorithm will run the EnqueueRequest and BackupNode subroutines before sending the
token to an Mmp node with a request at the head of GQ. After token is allocated to an Mmp node,
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the nodes corresponding Reqmp entry is removed from GQ. The Msm node expects the return
of the token within a predetermined time. To ensure that Msm does not wait for the token for
an undefined time, the routine will consider a time bound on the wait period. Failure of the
Mmp nodes to return the token within the predefined time results in the token degradation (at
Mmp) and regeneration (at Msm) from the last known backup. The Algorithm 4.5 presents the
LocalTokenDistribution Procedure.
Algorithm 4.5: LocalTokenDistribution Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMmp, R, TokenCounter TokenOB.
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if TokenRecieved = TRUE AND self ReqMsm is at head then
3 Set FlagMsm to TRUE ;
4 GQ← RQ2 ;
5 n← number of GQ entries ;
6 repeat
7 if Mmp at head 6= disconnected then
8 DequeueRequest(ReqMmp) ; // Remove request from GQ
9 Assign token to Mmp ;
10 if TokenReturn = TRUE then
11 Move to next GQ entry ;
12 else




17 Cancel request entry in GQ ;
18 Move to next GQ entry ;
19 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ;
20 n−− ;
21 until n < 1;
22 else
23 Wait for TOKEN ;
24 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ;
Global Token Transfer: A token possessing Msm node will send the token if it has a non-
empty RQ1 (where Reqsm at head of the RQ1 is not its request). The boolean FlagMsm is then
set to FALSE and the token is sent to the respective Msm node with a Reqsm at the head of
RQ1. The Algorithm 4.6 presents the GlobalTokenTransfer Procedure.
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Algorithm 4.6: GlobalTokenTransfer Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMsm, R, TOKEN .
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if FlagMsm = TRUE AND RQ1 6= 0 AND ReqMsm! =′ self ′ then
3 Set FlagMsm to FALSE ;
4 Send TOKEN to ReqMsm at RQ1 head ;
5 Return TOKEN ;
4.4 Algorithm Correctness
In this section we show how our decentralised CDA algorithm guarantees the MUTEX proper-
ties:
4.4.1 ME1- Mutual Exclusion
Our CDA scheme guarantees that only one node exclusively holds the token that at any instant
of time. Each time a node receives a token in Algorithm 4.4 and 4.5, it becomes exclusively
privileged: (line 15) and (line 3) respectively. Similarly, each time a node sends the token in
Algorithm 4.3 and 4.6, it becomes unprivileged (line 9) and (line 3). Between the instants one
node becomes unprivileged and another node becomes privileged, there is no privileged node.
Thus, there is at most one privileged node at any point of time in the network.
Theorem 4.1 (Mutual Exclusion). There is at most one privileged node at any point of time in the
network.
Proof. Assume a ReqMsm in transit on a link, then the link is not directed toward any of the two
entities connected by it. More precisely, we denote by transit (Msm;u, Msm;v) the set of messages
in transit from u to neighbour v at time t.
 Property 1: If ReqMsm ∈ transit (Msm;u, Msm;v)[t], then last (Msm;u)[t] 6= Msm;v and last
(Msm;v)[t] 6= Msm;u. The property trivially holds as there are no requests in transit.
If an Mmp, fails to return the token to its head Mmp within predefined time due to link-failure,
the nodes token session is cancelled and the token is considered lost. The respective cluster
head will regenerate the token with all details prior its submission to the failed node. This
guarantees mutual exclusiveness.
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4.4.2 ME2- Deadlock
A deadloack may occur when the token is free, and one or more T A s want to enter the auction
market but are not able to do so. This happens when: the token cannot be transferred to a node
because no node holds the privilege; the node in possession of the token is unaware that there
are other nodes requiring the privilege; or the token does not reach the requesting unprivileged
node. The logical pattern established using POINTER variables ensures a node that needs
the token sends ReqMsm either to Msm;v holding the token or to Msm;u that has a path to the
node holding the token [28]. In addition, Mmp nodes send ReqMmp to their Msm. Thus, this can
never occur. Lets consider the orientation of tree links formed by the Msm nodes, say L at time t
the resulting in a directed graph. In all cases, there are no directed cycles.
 Property 2: L[t] is acyclic.
 Property 3: In L[t], from any non-terminal node there is a directed path to exactly one
terminal entity.
Theorem 4.2 (Deadlock Free at Msm). From properties 1-3, in L[t] any terminal path leads to the
entity holding the token.
Proof. Within finite time, we consider every message will stop travelling at a Msm. Let us call
target (Msm;v)[t] the terminal node at the end of the terminal path ofMsmv at time t; if aReqMsm
is travelling from Msm;u to Msm;v at time t, then the target of the token message is target Msm;v
[t].
Theorem 4.3 (Deadlock Free at Mmp). The Msm entity holding the token will service only Mmp
entities with ReqMmp at the time of token arrival.
Proof. Each token receipt by Msm;v results in the RQ entries to be transferred to the GQ. This
mechanism ensures all ReqMmp from Msm;v after the token is received will be considered for
next token round. The token is then distributed to the specific Mmp in the GQ FIFO list. When
the GQ is empty, the token is passed on to another Msm;w. Now, using proof by assertions on
the responsible loop (Algorithm 4.5,line 6) we show it terminates.
 Precondition: n← number of ReqMsm in GQ
 Invariant: n 6= 0
 Postcondition: all n requests receive the token after n+ 1 iterations. This is O(n)
 Initialization: True in the first iteration of the loop n = 0P (n) = n+1 ; thenP (0) = 0+1 = 1
where n 6= 0 is True
 Maintenance: Assume P (k) is True for some k
P (k) = k + 1; then by induction we prove P (k + 1) is True
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P (k + 1) = (k + 1) + 1
P (k + 1) = k + 2 where (k + 2) is True
 Termination: occurs when GQ is empty (no requests in GQ)
Claim: From above proof every request will be delivered to a target Msm and Mmp.
4.4.3 ME3- Starvation
If Msm;u holds the token and another node Msmv requests for the token, the identity of Msmv
or of proxy nodes for Msm;v will be present in the RQ1s of various Msmnodes in the path
connecting the requesting node to the currently token-holding node. Thus depending on the
position of the node Msm;v requests in those RQ1 s, Msm;v will sooner or later receive the
privilege. In addition, enqueuing ReqMmp requests in RQ2 ensures that a token gets released
to the next Msm at the head of the RQ1 once the GQ is empty, no single cluster of Mmp nodes
continues to trade while other nodes are starved.
4.4.4 ME4- Fairness
Each T A is endowed with the same opportunity to submit an offer in the auction market. First,
the FIFO queues RQ1 and RQ2 are serviced in the order of arrival of the requests from nodes. A
new request from an agent that acquired the token in the recent past is enqueued behind the
remaining pending requests. This condition holds given the assumption that latency does not
affect delivery of requests from neighbouring Msm nodes.
4.5 Algorithm Performance
Due to the complex nature of MUTEX algorithms, it is very difficult to mathematically analyse
their performance [117]. Gravey and Dupis in [118] analyse the performance of two mutual
exclusion algorithms for a distributed system consisting of only two sites. From their obser-
vations there argue that when number of sites is more than two, analytic performance study
of mutual exclusion algorithms becomes intractable, due to the rapid growth of state space of
the underlying Markov chain. However, in limiting cases (“low traffic" or “heavy traffic" of CS
requests), it is possible to analyse the performance of mutual exclusion algorithms [119]. In this
section, we analyse the performance of the proposed algorithm for limiting cases. We employ
two metrics that are generally used for measuring performance of mutual exclusion algorithms
namely time complexity and message complexity.
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4.5.1 Message complexity:
Assuming the routing, spanning tree and cluster forming algorithms are handled by some
protocols separate from our CDA algorithm, their complexities are not considered in our
analysis. We employed a token based algorithm with cluster heads forming a logical spanning
tree overlaying a physical hierarchically clustered network. Since the tree structure is logically
imposed upon underlying network, the pathological cases (e.g. chain topology) where the
diameter is not O(logN) can be avoided in favour of trees which approximate a radiating star
topology (see [28]. Thus, under light demand, our algorithm exchanges O(logN) messages per
market auction execution. In the Worst Case, the token requesting Msm and token holding Msm
will be on the farthest sides in the worst situation. In such a case, the message complexity for
a request is (N − 1) + (N − 1) = O(2N − 2), resulting in O(N). Under heavy load, we expect
that as the number of nodes requesting for the privilege increases, the number of messages
exchanged per access of token decreases substantially (refer to [54]). Thus, in heavy load the
algorithm requires the exchange of only four messages per market auction execution.
4.5.2 Time Complexity:
We consider the input to be the number of agents participating in the CDA. Operation in
LocalMarketExecution is dominant and will be executed n times. We expect our CDA to run in
linear time complexity O(N).
4.6 Token Handling
We employ a protocol using the notion of logical time to detect and recover from token loss
—Token handling. Unlike other approaches, our approach results in the integration of token
handling within the CDA algorithm itself on conception. Thus, we eliminate the need for
expensive election protocols that are generally used in token-based algorithms to regenerate lost
tokens. Such an approach has since been proposed by Agrawal and Elabbadi [120]. To avoid
drowning the contributions of this chapter we only discuss token loss due to Mmp link and
node failure. In Chapter 5, an in-depth investigation of Msm node and Msm-Msm link failures is
done as part of the fault cases presented in Section 2.3.2. The token-handling specifications of
our initial algorithm address the following cases:
A link breaks between Msm —Mmpi, while Mmpi is in possession of the token: Frequent
link failure is expected between the Msm and the ever mobile Mmp nodes. The duration of the
disconnections is varied and within a system that performs close to real-time, node reconnection
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and message resubmission may not be an ideal solution to address the problem. Such network
link failures result in reduced performance of the overall system. The Mmpi node temporarily
relaying the token through a close-by same-cluster Mmpi node with a better connectivity to
Msm. This suggestion aims to address transient and to some extent intermittent faults due to
link failure, thereby reducing chances of token loss.
An Mmpi node completely fails to pass the token back to the proxy Msm: i.e node is com-
pletely disconnected or takes long to complete its execution in the auction. It possible that the
Mmpi may disconnect as a result of battery depletion, sleep (doze) mode activation, or being
switched off by user. Loss of a single Mmpi has negligible impact on the overall functionality of
CDA, although it may disadvantage the T A residing on the node from participating in the auc-
tion. The Mmp nodes’ failure results in reduced performance as system resources are channelled
towards token regeneration. In order to prevent the occurrence of node disconnections the
algorithm in [28] prompts an Mmp requesting the token to disable the sleep mode functionality
until it has executed in the auction market. In addition, timing checks are used to ensure that
an Mmpi node does not hold on to the token indefinitely as a result of faults or disconnections.
Hence, the token is destroyed at the Mmp node and a copy is regenerated at Msm once the
expected time of execution (considering network latency) has elapsed.
4.7 Summary
This chapter presented a decentralised CDA scheme for an energy distribution within resource
limited, smart micro-grids. This CDA captures i) implementation simplicity, ii) robustness
through token handling and iii) efficiency in minimising messages exchanged. These attributes
are vital in maintaining stability in critical information systems for energy distribution. Trading
agents require mutually exclusive permission to submit an offer in the auction market. We cast
the CDA protocol as a mutual exclusion problem in a hierarchical clustered network model.
The algorithm’s correctness and efficiency were presented. We found the time complexity for
a single agent to trade in the auction market is O(N) and message complexity is O(logN).
These are reasonable upper bounds if we assume node or link do not fail within the smart
meter tier of the hierarchical network. These results indicate the scalability of our solution
while addressing, in part, the concerns of centralisation. We are aware that, the single token is
equally vulnerable to loss due to component malfunctions and probable user misbehaviour. To
address this concern we integrate a preliminary token handling protocol to allow resiliency of
our solution. Our proposed decentralised CDA algorithm is deployable in islanded, resource-
constrained micro-grids operating with no centralised controller. In general, the algorithm
should run on micro-grids supported by a hierarchical network topology, where households
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form cluster nodes around a single smart meter-cluster head. Importantly, our decentralised
CDA algorithm does not capture power transmission losses explicitly. The assumption herein, is
that when the bid is submitted into the market, the clearing rule will cater for this phenomenon.
An interesting direction for future work may entail relaxing the assumption on Mmp mobility;
where each Mmp is allowed to rejoin the network in another cluster. An interesting challenge is
catering for mobility, while effectively minimising communication and performance overheads.
In the next chapter, we attempt to make the CDA scheme resilient to link and node failure.
These are crucial attributes to consider when aiming to achieve stability of the micro-grid.
Chapter 5
Resilient, Fault Tolerant Continuous
Double Auctioning




One major drawback of the token-based approach we employ to support our decentralised
CDA algorithm for serialising market access (Section 4.3.3), is resilience to failure [82] [83]
[84]. Due to this realisation, we include some fault prevention and to a lesser extent fault
tolerance as part of the token-handling specification (in Section 4.6) of our initially proposed
CDA algorithm. However, the decentralised CDA algorithm fails to guarantee continuous
trading agents participation in the event of crash-fail or Byzantine faults (classified in Section
2.3.2). In this chapter, we address the aforementioned challenges that disrupt auctioning and
inevitably leads to users buying out. In Section 5.2 we consider additional assumptions, and
then discuss the fault models chosen from fault scenarios described in section 2.3.2. While a
myriad of faults can manifest on the proposed decentralised CDA, we narrow the scope of
our work to crash-fail (5.3.1) and Byzantine (5.3.2) faults. First, we look at providing fault
tolerance to crash-fail faults in Section 5.4. In Section 5.4.1 describes data structures and control
messages the algorithm extensions use, while Section 5.4.2 details the procedures and routines.
We present the correctness (Section 5.4.3.1) and efficiency (Section 5.4.3.2) analyses of the fault
tolerant algorithm extensions to handle crash-fail faults. Second we look at fault tolerance to
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Byzantine faults (Section 5.5). Section 5.7 summaries the contributions of this chapter in relation
to the overall thesis.
5.2 Assumptions
In section 5.3 we specify the fault classes that guide the formulation of our fault models in this
chapter. In addition to the assumptions made in sections 2.2.3, 2.2.4.1 and 5.3, we continue
working on the notion that each node continues to communicate with its direct neighbours only,
similar to Raymond’s MUTEX [54].
5.3 Fault Models
In this section, we discuss the Crash-fail and Byzantine Faults introduced in Section 2.3.2.
5.3.1 Crash-Fail Faults
A crash failure occurs when a process prematurely halts, but was working correctly until it
stopped. We consider a typical crash failure of theMsm nodes, where once the node has stopped,
nothing is heard from it anymore. Communication through Msm is blocked; hence, an auction
algorithm does not progress but instead will be held up until the node is recovered. We consider
two cases that can arise when an Msm node crashes: (i) in possession of the token or (ii) not in
possession.
Case A: If a token possessing Msm node fails
If the CDA algorithm is to be successful it needs to ensure recovery from failure of the Msm
site holding the token and all its neighbours. Failure of the token possessing Msm node means,
the dependent child Mmp nodes connected to it will not access the auction market. In addition,
Msm failure can partition the network, which undermines the MUTEX properties and disrupts
the functioning of the CDA. We consider the following cases:
• Msm fails with the token in Mmp: Under this condition, the token will be trapped in the
Mmp as it waits indefinitely to be delivered to the Msm. Deadlock and starvation occurs,
where other participating Mmp nodes wait indefinitely for an inaccessible token.
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• Msm fails with the token in its possession: Assuming anMsm node fails and is bypassed by
a protocol which prompts a neighbouring Msm node to regenerate the token, resumption
of the faulty Msm node may reintroduce the old token, which was kept alive. More than
one token is in the network. Furthermore, if an Msm node fails and is bypassed, it loses
the opportunity to distribute the token to the rest of its child nodes, and if the failure is
prolonged or permanent, starvation of the child Mmp nodes will occur.
• The token is in transit between Mmp and Msm: In this thesis, we assume that, all com-
munication occurs with no message loss. Hence, we consider that a sent token will be
received.
• A token requesting Msm fails: A token requesting Msm is an Msm node waiting on the
token or is in the token request path. In this case, if the faulty node were to be used for
forwarding the token request, the path would have to be re-established. Failure of such
a node results in partitioning of the network, leading to similar impacts stated in the
previous case.
Case B: If a token requesting Msm node fails
Failure of a requesting Msm might have less serious, but crucial repercussions compared to
those in token possessing Msm failures.
5.3.2 Byzantine Faults
We consider general Byzantine faults where a faulty node(s) exhibit arbitrary behaviour. In
particular we consider that a faulty node may corrupt its local state and send arbitrary messages,
including specific messages aimed at subverting the system. We investigate Byzantine faults
resulting from Mmp nodes passing arbitrary request messages to the Msm nodes. The following
subsections detail two Byzantine fault cases we aim to provide tolerance against.
Case A: A single Mmp sends arbitrary, multiple continuous token requests
The current protocol allows cluster Mmp nodes to send a request to the cluster-head Msm node
when ever a T Awants to participate in the auction. The cluster head Msm will in turn send a
request to the token-holding or neighbouring Msm which is in the path to the token holding
Msm. Thereafter, all Reqmp requests from the cluster Mmp nodes will be queued in the GQ of
the cluster head Msm till the token is received. However, say a faulty node(s) was to send
continuous multiple requests to the cluster node within an arbitrary time frame, the current
mechanism would allow these requests to be enqueued in GQ. This assumes the multiple
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requests do not in anyway overwhelm the cluster head Msm, leading to a crash. On arrival of
the token the GQ entries are "locked in" and copied into the RQ2. Every Mmp request in the
RQ2 is serviced with the token in FIFO order. This implies, all the multiple requests belonging
to a single, faulty Mmp will receive the token multiple times, with respect to the number of its
requests present in RQ2. If the number of the multiple requests in RQ2 is significantly large
starvation maybe realised. The token will be trapped within a loop servicing the same nodes
within one cluster for an arbitrarily long time. The main impacts include:
• The Msm nodes that have requested for the token may wait a finitely longer time than
is favourable to the system as there is no mechanism to ensure such starvation or delay
is avoided. Even if we assume the system has backup M2sm nodes; starvation or delay
is not avoided, despite the main component being active. Fair trade is compromised as
trading agents residing outside the cluster (where the token is "trapped") are deprived
of a fair opportunity to trade. Market efficiency is expected to be significantly reduced,
as a fault agent (at times, unwilling to participate), can constantly submit invalid offers.
This phenomenon, portrays a denial of service attack, if the adversary makes the token
inaccessible for agents, in other clusters. The token is trapped in a continuous loop at a
single Msm node. User trust and therefore participation will be disrupted as services are
rendered unavailable.
• However, these measures do not guarantee fair token access to all the cluster nodes. Say, a
single, malicious Mmp cluster node sends multiple requests to the Msm without giving
other Mmp nodes opportunity to submit a request before the limit of requests is reached.
This makes the token inaccessible to the victim traders, as there are disallowed from
submitting a request.
Case B: Multiple Mmp send arbitrary, multiple continuous token requests:
In this case, we assume, that more than one Mmp is faulty. The faulty nodes are not under any
form of coördination, but may simultaneously send multiple requests continuously to their
Msm cluster head node. Assuming the arbitrary requests do not overwhelm the head cluster
Msm node leading to a crash; a significant number of requests will be enqueued within the GQ
before arrival of the token. As with the previous scenario, when multiple nodes send multiple
requests delay and therefore starvation is inevitable for a long while.
5.4 Crash-Fail Fault Tolerance Approach
We adopt redundancy, to ensure preservation of Msm nodes functionality with M2sm, which
take over in the event of a crash-fail faults. This ensures, T As hosted by Mmp nodes are
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guaranteed to continue transacting even in the even of the primary Msm failure. Employing a
primary backup handles Byzantine failures poorly, because there is usually no check routine to
make sure the primary is functioning correctly; which is an obvious downside. More so, the
backup system must always be in sync with the main system to guarantee a successful take over
of the main systems’ tasks. Recovering from a node failure is time consuming and complex.
FIGURE 5.1: Crash-Fail and Byzantine Fault Tolerance CDA Procedures
5.4.1 Data Structures & Control Messages
The fault tolerance mechanism is an extension to the initial proposed CDA scheme. Thus, the
algorithm continues to use the same control messages and data structures described in 4.3.4.
5.4.2 Procedures and Routines




The M2sm nodes also execute an additional routine called
• CrashFailureHandling
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The routines executed by the Mmp node, do not change after introduction of the fault tolerance
protocol, thus we shall only discuss the procedures executed by the Msm and M2sm nodes. We
refer the reader to Section 4.3.5 for an understanding of Mmp procedure description.
Global Token Request: If we consider an abstraction of the CDA model, the GlobalToken-
Request() routine will be the initial procedure that allows an Msm node to send a request to
participate in the token exchange. Once a Reqsm is sent to the neighbour node holding the token
or in path to the token, TokenAsked which is a boolean variable is set to TRUE. This avoids
forwarding of similar request messages to the same token holder. Two subroutines or methods
namely EnqueueRequest() and Nodebackup() are executed while Msm is waiting for the token.
EnqueueRequest() enqueues the Reqsm and Reqmp requests into RQ1 and RQ2 respectively,
while Nodebackup() creates a checkpoint by sending updates to the M2sm node.
Algorithm 5.1: GlobalTokenRequest Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMmp, TokenAsked.
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if FlagMsm = FALSE AND RQ1 6= 0 AND TokenAsked = 0 then
3 Send ReqMsm to Msm in POINTER ;
4 Set TokenAsked to TRUE ;
5 Assign TokenReceived = FALSE ;
6 repeat
7 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ; // Only D ReqMmp are enqueued RQ2
during time Q
8 NodeBackup() ; // Function runs a backup Msm,i
9 until TokenReceived = FALSE;
10 else
11 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ;
12 NodeBackup() ;
Local Token Distribution: Once the token is received the algorithm moves to the LocalTok-
enDistribution routine. Receipt of the token by the requestingMsm node sets the boolean variable
FlagMsm to TRUE indicating possession of the token. GQ is a FIFO queue that stores a copy
of requests submitted and “locked in" at the arrival of the token to the cluster head. Once a
token is received all requests in RQ2 are transferred to GQ2. While there are still requests in GQ,
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the algorithm will run the EnqueueRequest() and BackupNode() subroutines before sending
them to an Mmp node with a request at the head of the GQ. After token is allocated to an Mmp
node, the nodes corresponding Reqmp entry is removed from GQ. The Msm node then waits for
a predefined time for the return of the token. To ensure that Msm does not wait for the token for
an undefined time, the routine will consider a time bound on the wait period. Failure of the
Mmp nodes to return the token within the predefined time results in the token degradation (an
Mmp) and regenerated (at Msm) from the last known backup.
Algorithm 5.2: LocalTokenDistribution Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMmp, R, TokenCounter TokenOB.
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if TokenRecieved = TRUE AND self ReqMsm is at head then
3 Set FlagMsm to TRUE ;
4 GQ← RQ2 ;
5 n← number of GQ entries ;
6 repeat
7 NodeBackup() ; // Function runs a backup of Msm,i
8 if Mmp at head 6= disconnected then
9 Remove request entry in GQ ;
10 Assign token to Mmp ;
11 if TokenReturn = TRUE then
12 Move to next GQ entry ;
13 else
14 TokenReturn = timed-out ; // When TOKEN return times-out
15 Remove entry in GQ ;
16 TokenRegenerate(BackupID) ;
17 else
18 Cancel request entry in GQ ;
19 Move to next GQ entry ;
20 TokenRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ; // Function enqueues requests into RQ1
and RQ2
21 n−− ;
22 until n < 1;
23 else
24 Wait for TOKEN ;
25 TokenRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ;
Global Token Transfer: A token possessing Msm node, will send the token if it has a non-
empty RQ1, where Reqsm at head of the RQ1 is not its request. The boolean FlagMsm, is set to
FALSE and the token is sent to the respective Msms with a Reqsm at the head of RQ1.
Crash Failure Handling: This routine is executed at theM2sm node. There are four general ac-
tivities defined by [15], that systems employing fault tolerance have to perform: error detection,
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Algorithm 5.3: GlobalTokenTransfer Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMsm, R, TOKEN .
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if FlagMsm = TRUE AND RQ1 6= 0 AND ReqMsm! =′ self ′ then
3 Set FlagMsm to FALSE ;
4 Send TOKEN to ReqMsm at RQ1 head ;
5 Return TOKEN ;
damage confinement, error recovery and fault treatment, and continued system service. The
considerations have been factored into the new fault tolerant protocol as shown in Algorithm
5.4.
Algorithm 5.4: CrashFailureHandling Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMsm, R, TOKEN .
1 for each M2sm ∈M2sm,i[.] do
2 if Timeout = TRUE OR NQuery = TRUE then
3 Ping Msm with Enquiry() msg ;
4 if Msm respond = TRUE then
5 Msm is alive ;
6 Wait for NodeBackup() ;
7 else
8 FailureContainment() ;
9 Resume Msm operations ;
10 Return TOKEN ;
• Error Detection: This phase deduces the presence of faults by detecting an error in the
state of some subsystem. It is from the errors that failures and faults are deduced. Unless
errors are detected successfully by a fault model, the fault model is somewhat useless.
We consider that detection of Msm node failure is done by use of timing checks. Timing
checks typically use a timer with a value predetermined from the specifications of the
component. If a node does not respond within the pre-specified time period, its behaviour
is declared erroneous and the node is assumed to have failed. In our context if the standby
node M2sm does not receive a backup message from the Msm node with respect to the
timer clock, it will send a “query" message to the Msm. If no response is received, it is
assumed the Msm has failed which triggers M2sm to enter the recovery phase.
We consider that, each M2sm carries a failure detector, to try to detect crashed Msm. A
failure detector is called strongly accurate if only crashed processes are ever suspected
[121]. We understand, in bounded delay networks, a strongly accurate (and complete)
failure detector is implemented as follows: Suppose lmax is a known upper bound on
network latency from Msm to M2sm. Each Msm thus broadcasts an “alive" message every
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ν time units. Each Msm from which no message is received for ν + lmax time units is
suspected to have crashed. An inquiry message is then send to confirm this suspicion
(Algorithm 5.4 line 3).
• Damage Confinement: The system design incorporates mechanisms to limit the spread-
ing of errors in the system, thereby confining the damage to predetermined boundaries
(Algorithm 5.4 line 8). In order to prevent the spread of error, the faulty node is tem-
porarily suspended, while the standby component takes over. We assume, the standby
component has dissimilar properties to the primary component, and susceptibility to error.
• Error Recovery: The two general techniques for error recovery include backward and
forward recovery [15]. We chose backward recovery, where check-pointing is done often
on the standby M2sm node, and in the event of a failure a system roll-back occurs. One
main drawback of the backward technique is on the incurred overheads. Assuming the
M2sm nodes have a fairly stable storage, frequent check-pointing is required, which affects
normal system operations, despite failure absence. Despite the high overheads, we opt for
backward recovery due to its simplicity. Backward recovery is independent of the fault
or failure [15], thus, recovery from arbitrary faults, whether transient or permanent us
possible. We assume, check-pointing in our case invokes the NodeBackup() procedure
everytime a token is returned by Mmp to Msm (Algorithm 5.2 line 7), or when a ReqMmp
or a ReqMsm is received (Algorithm 5.1 line 8, 11). To reduce the overhead, one message
(that includes Msm current data structures) is sent to the M2sm if Msm is in possession
of the token and is check-pointing. We assume a roll-back procedure is executed at the
M2sm node with regards to the last checkpoint.
• Fault Treatment and Continued Service: The fault or faulty component has to be identified,
and its use is suspended through a fault containment method (line 108). By assuming
the main component’s role the backup M2sm node masks primary Msm node failure,
isolating the faulty component but maintaining system availability and reliability. The
M2sm re-establishes connection with Mmp nodes the resumes communication with the
neighbouring Msm nodes (Algorithm 5.4 line 9).
5.4.3 Algorithm Analysis
Fault scenarios are used to investigate if the modified fault-tolerance algorithm maintains the
crucial mutual exclusion properties despite the occurrence of faults. Furthermore, we discuss
the message and time complexity of the extended algorithm.
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5.4.3.1 Correctness of the Algorithm
We analyse how the fault tolerant CDA algorithm guarantees the following properties in the
presence of potential fault, thus, failure:
• ME1- Mutual Exclusion:
If token handling is diligently implemented, only one token will be in the network at any
particular time, despite the presence of faults. The proposed algorithm ensures that at
any instant of time, not more than one node holds the token. In the LocalTokenDistribution
procedure 5.2 whenever an Msm receives a token, it becomes exclusively privileged: (line
3) by setting the FlagMsm to TRUE. Similarly, in the GlobalTokenTransfer procedure 4.6
when a node sends the token, it becomes unprivileged (line 3) by setting the FlagMsm to
FALSE.
Between the instants, when one node becomes unprivileged and another node becomes
privileged, there is no privileged node. Thus, there is one privileged node at any time in
the network. If Msm granting the token fails then a privileged cluster node Mmp will not
return the token within a predefined time. The token session is cancelled and the token is
considered to be lost. The same Mmp node, will revert changes to a time before the token
is received, and the timed-out token is destroyed, before a token regeneration procedure
in the M2sm node. If a privileged Msm node, finds itself without outgoing links to the
neighbouring Msm nodes, and time has elapsed, it will destroy the copy of the token,
before failure on reboot or resumption of services. The respective M2sm backup node,
will regenerate the token with all details with respect to the last checkpoint. Thus, only
one token is in the system, guaranteeing mutual exclusiveness.
• ME2- Deadlock : When the token is free, and one or more T A s wants to enter the auction
market, unsuccessfully, a deadlock can occur. This happens due to:
– the token not being able to be transferred to a node because no node holds the
privilege,
– the node in possession of the token being unaware that there are other nodes requiring
the privilege, or
– the token failing to reach a requesting unprivileged node.
We understand, the logical pattern established using POINTER variables, ensures a node
that needs the token, sends ReqMsm either to Msmv holding the token or to Msmu a neigh-
bouring node in the token holder path. Mmp nodes send ReqMmp to their cluster head
Msm node. If we consider the orientation of the tree links formed by the Msm nodes, say
L at time t the resulting directed graph. In all cases, there are no directed cycles, making
L[t] acyclic, where from any non-terminal node there is a directed path to exactly one
terminal entity. Within finite time, we consider every message will stop travelling at a
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Msm. Thus, in the absence of failure, the conditions (i-iii) will not occur. If a privileged
node fails our algorithm ensures that the copy in the failed node is deleted while a copy is
regenerated from the last checkpoint. By establishing connection with the neighbouring
Msm nodes and Mmp nodes, previously connected to the primary component, the token
path is complete and the M2sm will pass on the token.
• ME3- Starvation If Msmu holds the token and another node Msmv requests for the token,
the identity of Msmv, or of proxy nodes to Msmv will be present in the RQ1s of Msmnodes
in the path to the token-holding node. Thus, depending on Msmvs requests’ position
in the RQ1s, Msmv will sooner or later receive the privilege. In addition, enqueuing
ReqMmp requests in RQ2, ensures that a token is released to the next Msm at the head
of the RQ1, once the GQ is empty (line 22), no single cluster of Mmp nodes continues to
trade while other nodes are starved. In the presence of failure the static spanning tree
may be partitioned, which means, a sub-tree that has the token, will benefit, while the
other sub-tree(s) is starved. Our algorithm ensures that partitioning does not occur with a
backup node taking the place of the failed node.
• ME4- Fairness: Every trading agent has the same opportunity to enter the auction market.
The FIFO queues, RQ1 and RQ2, are serviced according to request arrival order. A new
request from an agent that acquired the token in the recent past is enqueued behind the
remaining pending requests. If a privileged Msm node fails, while granting the local
cluster Mmp nodes a opportunity to participate in the auction, our algorithm ensures
the remaining Mmp nodes get a opportunity to receive the token in request arrival or-
der. Allowing the backup M2sm to resume the roles of the failed Msm, instead of total
elimination, guarantees continued, fair token distribution.
5.4.3.2 Performance Analysis
Two metrics used for measuring performance of mutual exclusion algorithms are time complex-
ity and message complexity.
Runtime of the Algorithm: It usually suffices to identify a dominant operation and estimate
the number of times it is executed. In the CDA Algorithm, we consider LocalTokenDistribution
procedure 5.2, executed on the Msm, as the most costly operation. As a dominant operation, we
regard the while loop in line 6. The run time depends linearly on the input size n.
Time Complexity: An analysis of the run time of our fault tolerant CDA algorithm, is not
sufficient, as our interests are on investigating the running time increase, when the input
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size increases. Thus, we consider the order of growth measure, which is estimated by taking
the dominant term of the running time expression. The dominant operation in Algorithm 1
is influenced by N which is the number of cluster nodes. As N grows the time complexity
increases linearly at an order of O(N).
Message complexity: Assuming V =
∑
v1 + v2...+ vn is the number of Reqsm received by a
non-token possessing node Msmi from its neighbours because it is in line to a token holding
node. While U =
∑
u1 + u2 + ...+ un is the number Reqmp received by Msmi. Each time a
BackupNode() is executed, W , a summation of u and v, is saved in the stable M2sm storage. In
a worst case scenario, all the n cluster nodes will send a Repmp at random times while all child
Msm nodes in a K-ary tree. The result is a message complexity of order O((logN) +W ).
5.5 Byzantine Fault Tolerance Approach
The algorithm continues to use the same control messages and data structures described in 4.3.4
and procedures (routines) described in 5.4.2
5.5.1 Procedures and Routines
The routines executed by the Msm node do change after introduction of the Byzantine fault
tolerance protocol. Since the algorithm should tolerate multiple requests coming from a faulty
Mmp our focus lies mainly on the Global Token Request procedure executed by the Msm nodes
and M2sm nodes. As before, we refer the reader to Section 4.3.5 and Section 5.4.2 for an
understanding of the initial and the fault tolerance enabled procedures respectively.
Global Token Request: A subroutine (method) named EnqueueRequest(Reqsm, Reqmp), is
executed when Msm is waiting for the token. This method will enqueue the Reqsm and Reqmp
requests into RQ1 and RQ2 respectively, while Nodebackup() creates a checkpoint of updates to
the M2sm node. In the event that a faulty Mmp starts sending continuous Reqmp’s, an extension
allowing only one Reqmp from a number of J Mmp’s to be enqueued into RQ2, within a time
period of Q, while TokenRecieved is FALSE.
Byzantine Fault Handling: To recall, [15] defines four general activities that systems employ-
ing fault tolerance have to perform. These include: error detection, damage confinement, error
recovery and fault treatment and continued system service.
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Algorithm 5.5: GlobalTokenRequest Procedure
Input : TokenRecieved, ReqMsm , ReqMmp, TOKEN , Msm,i[.].
Output : FlagMmp, TokenAsked.
1 for each Msm ∈Msm,i[.] do
2 if FlagMsm = FALSE AND RQ1 6= 0 AND TokenAsked = 0 then
3 Send ReqMsm to Msm in POINTER ;
4 Set TokenAsked to TRUE ;
5 Assign TokenReceived = FALSE ;
6 repeat
7 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ; // Only D ReqMmp are enqueued RQ2
during time Q
8 NodeBackup() ; // Function runs a backup Msm,i
9 until TokenReceived = FALSE;
10 else
11 EnqueueRequest(ReqMsm, ReqMmp) ;
12 NodeBackup() ;
• Error Detection: If a node sends more than 1 request, during period Q, it is marked as
a faulty node. Every Mmp is expected to send a single ReqMmp. We consider that each
Mmp’s identification is known, to the Msm which can then uniquely identify the faulty
node and inform the human participant to reset the Mmp or associated T A.
• Damage Confinement: The responsible Msm will drop the additional requests from any
cluster Mmp or extra requests beyond J . This ensures, only one request from a single
Mmp is serviced and the requests have an upper bound, J , of the maximum requests that
are acceptable when Msm is waiting on the token.
• Error Recovery: After reset, the Mmp is expected to resume normal operations. If similar
faults are detected again by the Msm, the Mmp is suspended from further participation
until the issue is addressed by a trusted system specialist.
• Fault Treatment and Continued Service: The CDA algorithm can proceed despite the occur-
rence of the aforementioned fault. The faulty Mmp, can receive the token only once after a
time period Q, when its proxy Msm has the token.
5.5.2 Performance Analysis
Time Complexity: An increase in the number of cluster head nodes is unaffected by the
Byzantine fault tolerance. The dominant operation is still influenced by N which is the number
of cluster nodes. As N grows the time complexity increases linearly at an order of O(N).
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Message complexity: We consider the Byzantine fault tolerance extension to be an additional
layer on top of the crash-fail protocol, thus, no additional messages are exchanged, apart from
those already sent (see Section 5.4.3.2).
5.6 Overall Overheads Analysis
Overall Time Complexity The two fault tolerance protocols described, rely on the dominant
operation, which is the number of cluster nodes. As N grows the time complexity increases
linearly at an order of O(N).
Overall Message Complexity The crash-fail fault tolerance protocol has a message complex-
ity of order O((logN) + W ), and no additional messages are expected from the Byzantine
fault tolerance extension, since it runs on top of the crash-fail protocol. The overall message
complexity remains as O((logN) +W ).
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we integrate a fault tolerance mechanism to the decentralised CDA algorithm
for computationally limited micro-grids. First we craft a fault tolerance protocol that addresses
crash-fail faults of cluster-head nodes. Instead of by-passing the failed node(s) and reconnecting
the remaining spanning tree segments as proposed in the literature, our approach ensures
the algorithm masks such failure by employing a redundant node to each cluster head node.
The fault tolerant CDA, affords trading agents, mutually exclusive permission to participate
in the auction market, despite the presence of crash failures. We present the correctness and
efficiency of the fault tolerant algorithm. The runtime of the algorithm is linearly dependent on
the input size N. The time complexity for a single agent to trade is O(N), where N is number of
cluster nodes. The message complexity is O((logN) + W ), where W is the number of check-
pointing messages; and N is the number messages exchanged per critical section execution.
These are reasonable upper bounds for a crash-fail, fault tolerant, supported CDA algorithm
employing redundancy and check-pointing. The Byzantine fault tolerance extension we propose,
does not incur additional messages. Instead, it makes the underlying fault tolerance protocol
more efficient, by eliminating the additional faulty requests. However, note that the proposed
mechanisms for token handling and fault tolerance, up till this point, fail to guarantee trader
participation, if the agent’s hosting Mmp device fails to connect to Msm. In the next chapter,
we propose a complementary consumption scheduling mechanism, that can run on a RCSMG,
while ensuring users get fair power allocation.
Chapter 6
Scheduling Power Consumption




Fault tolerance alone can fail to guarantee the continued participation of the automated traders in
the auction. This raises the problem of participants buying out of the power-sharing agreement
due to unsatisfied power allocation. In this chapter, we consider a complimentary, decentralised
consumption scheduling scheme, that provides an extra layer of power management within
RCSMGs. Power consumption scheduling smoothens the demand profiles over time to avoid
overloading. Thus, a scheduling algorithm can be used to distribute power cost-effectively,
encouraging users to shift heavy consumption activities to off-peak periods. For example, a
user could opt to use heavy power consuming appliances (e.g. a geyser) at off-peak instead
of on-peak periods; with the added benefit of paying less per kilowatt consumed. In a case
where auctioning fails, the consumption scheduling algorithm can offer a more enforcing power
management option.
To recap, the literature indicates how a myriad of centralised demand management approaches
in the literature may not be ideal in the RCSMGs context, as there are: computationally intensive;
could raise serious privacy concerns due to centralisation [17], [18]; and there assume avail-
ability of security and a reliable network. The latter is unrealistic in computationally limited,
micro-grids, where data is transmitted over insecure and unreliable networks. We propose a
decentralised scheduling algorithm to address this problem. In Section 6.3 we formulate the
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problem of scheduling power distribution on the RCSMG as a convex optimisation problem
[19], [20]; with the goal of minimising the total power consumption while maximising on the
social benefit [18] of power distribution on the grid. In Section 6.4, we study a decentralised
electricity consumption scheduling algorithm based on alternating direction method of mul-
tipliers (ADMM) [88], which has been shown [89], [122], to be robust in solving optimisation
problems in smart grid communication networks. The ADMM algorithm is presented in a
decentralised (Section 6.5.1) and fully distributed way (Section 6.5.2). The ADMM algorithm
enables users to report demands as aggregated and not single values, which addresses the
privacy concern; while the distribution of computations across network devices, significantly
reduces the computational strain. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter discussing integration
possibilities of the scheduling scheme to the auctioning algorithm.
6.2 Additional System Model Assumptions
The reader is referred to section 3.4.2 for an overview of related work on power consumption
scheduling and section 2.2 for an understanding of the RCSMG model. Besides the RCSMG
architecture (inspired by [7]), we make more assumptions, to formulate the power consumption
scheduling problem as a convex optimisation problem. The RCSMG architecture describes a
combination of a power and communication network, interconnecting households and a utility
(see 2.2).
6.2.1 Power Network Model
To recap, the utility is capable of: generating part of the electricity in the RCSMG; facilitating
efficient exchange of energy in the community through an auction market; participating in a
short-term wholesale market. In this particular chapter, the utility provider buys electricity
from competing generators in the MG and then retails it to consumers (households).
6.2.2 Communication Network Model
The communication network can be represented by a graph G = (V, E), where V and E are sets
of nodes and edges, respectively. An edge is denoted by {i, j} = {j, i}, and {i, j} ∈ E implying
that nodes i and j communicate directly and thus can exchange their estimates. The nodes
represent local controllers1 (LC)s, at the household and the central central controller (CC) at the
utility. At a given interval of time, the LC will collect a snapshot of energy consumption [29];
1Mobile phonesMmp can be used as the LCs (i.e. schedulers) that automatically control the distributed generations
(DGs), and loads locally in the households
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load demand; and/or generation of the household it is associated with and sends it to the utility.
The utility analyses the data considering weather forecast of wind speed and solar radiation.
This has been observed by [123] to be helpful in predicting the household load demand based
on power consumption patterns.
We consider a continuous discrete-time model with a finite horizon, T = {1, 2, ..., T}, where
T is finite and divided into T equal intervals of ∆t size. Further, an asynchronous ADMM
is considered, with possibilities of information loss or delay during communications. The
asynchronous ADMM uses the value from the previous transmission to substitute for missing
information due to loss and/or delay.
6.2.3 Household Appliance Model
Assume the consumption estimate is provided by the household, and based on a power





a,h) be the power consumption scheduling vector of each appliance a ∈ Ah
over T , pa,h ∈ RT , where pta,h the power consumption ; t the time slot for appliance a ∈ Ah
in household h. The set of energy consumption schedules for all appliances in a household
h ∈ H at time horizon T , is denoted as Ph where Ph = pa,h,∀a ∈ Ah and can be represented
with a matrix of dimension |Ah| × T . The total load of a particular household h ∈ H denoted
Ph is the sum of four types of loads: resistive, inductive, non-linear and composite loads [30].
Formally, we let the total load of a household h at T time slot be denoted by lh = (l1h, ..., l
T
h );





In cases of load scheduling, each category of appliances is studied according to the level of
priority, the interruptibility during operation and the energy consumption. The latter represents
consumption patterns over a fixed time interval.
6.3 Cost models and Problem Formulation
6.3.1 Cost functions
Assuming intermittent renewable energy can be predicated using a short-term prediction, the
total generation capacity of the set of households h ∈ H is represented by Gh. The household
power generation over T time slots is given by gh = gth + ε
t
g,h,∀t ∈ T , and it is constrained by ‘
0 ≤ gth ≤ Gh,∀t ∈ T ,∀h ∈ Hg, where gth denotes the distributed generation of the household
h ∈ Hg and εtg,h is the prediction error considered with distribution N (0, σ2g)
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h is the predicated renewable generation for the set of households h ∈ Hg,
QtG is the predicated utility generation andQ
t
s is the energy available on battery at the scheduling
horizon.
Say the predicated generation of household h ∈ Hg at time t ∈ T is gth . When gth < lth, the
generation of the household does not convert demand and h purchases electricity from the
utility. Otherwise, gth > l
t
h, and the household sells back extra generation to the utility. The













∀t ∈ T . (6.2)
As the generation from both household and utility are different from the conventional power
generation, renewable energy generation does not consume fuel sources. For simplicity, we
assume a zero generation cost. Thus, the MG available energy QtMG cannot be greater than the
MG capacity,i.e, 0 ≤ QtMG ≤ QmaxG , ∀t ∈ T
When the utility generation is not enough to meet the demand, utility buys excess generation
from a set of households h ∈ Hg. The total cost Cu(qh) for supply generally consists of the
generation cost and the energy purchase cost from the household h ∈ Hg. However, as the
generation cost is equal to zero, the supplier cost is only the cost of purchasing energy. Let pt
denote the electricity price set by the utility at time t, and let qh = qth, ∀t ∈ T denote the amount










, ∀gth > lth
Since the utility needs to satisfy the power demand, the total cost from the utility end, taking
into account user satisfaction cost is given by






At the household side, the power consumption scheduling problem is usually solved by finding
the optimal loads scheduling that minimises the household cost, and this in turn flattens the
aggregated load curve and reduce the cost to the utility [124]. Thus, we let CU,h denote the
total cost function associated with each household h ∈ H . CU,h encompasses the cost related to
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the use of energy; the satisfaction cost induced by the operating mode mismatch; the cost of
operating the battery; and the penalty cost.
Penalty Cost Function: A penalty cost function is associated to a duration of an interruption
C(P ten). Similar to the function described in [125], we consider a piecewise linear convex
function of the form C(x) = kix+ bi to approximate the penalty cost function C(P ten).
Energy Cost Function: The energy cost (the cost of purchasing energy from the utility) for the







where pt is a dynamic price provided by utility.
Satisfaction Cost Function: Each household chooses a list of appliances and a preferred time
for operation. Furthermore, since different households may have diverse preferences, it is
not trivial to characterise them with a precise mathematical model. However, according to
O’Neill et al. [126] the utility function is an abstract method used to model household preference.
Similarly, we follow the same approach in this paper and assume that households would prefer
to have their appliances operate sooner than later. This preference can be expressed as a strictly
concave utility function that represents satisfaction of the user regarding the schedule. But we
rather choose to work with the negation of this function, namely a dissatisfaction function that
captures the dissatisfaction of the consumers (due to delaying or advancing the operation of an




as dissatisfaction of consumer when running appliance a ∈ Ah.
Depending on the priority level and the interruptibility, the dissatisfaction function may take
different forms [127].







• Deferrable loads such as a composite load,Ū (pa,h) can be defined as






Battery Cost Function: The battery is an energy storage device that flattens the power load by
storing energy during low-cost (high-production) periods for use during high-cost periods. We
assume that a subset of households Hs each have a battery storage device. At each interval, one
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can either recharge or discharge the battery, but not both at the same time. Each battery has




s,h denote the energy charged, discharged and
stored at time t ∈ T respectively. The charging and discharging power levels at each time t are
bounded, and satisfy the following constraints:
0 ≤ Qtc,h ≤ Qmaxc,h ,∀t ∈ T ,∀h ∈ Hs
0 ≤ Qtd,h ≤ Qmaxd,h ,∀t ∈ T ,∀h ∈ Hs,
Where Qmaxc,h and Q
max
d,h denote the maximum charging and discharging rates, respectively. The
energy stored in the battery should be non-negative and not greater than the battery capacity,
and thus satisfies the following constraint 0 ≤ Qts,h ≤ Bmaxs , ∀t ∈ T , ∀h ∈ Hs
The life-time of energy storage is usually characterised by the number of charging/discharging
cycles that the battery storage can sustain, and repeated charging and discharging cause ageing
of the battery devices. Therefore, let cs denote the unit cost of charging and discharging, and
the total cost of operating a battery storage is modelled after [128], [129] as follows,









Where bs denotes the vector of charging and discharging amount over the scheduling horizon
T , respectively.






















a∈Ah Ū (pa,h) + Ch,buy + C (bs) if h ∈ Hg, h ∈ Hs
(6.6)
For a household with generation h ∈ Hg, the energy cost also includes the profit they make
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6.3.2 Problem formalisation
We consider, the optimal power consumption scheduling problem (OPCSP) in a RCSMG to be a
constraint based optimisation problem. The global objective is the sum of objective functions
(the local objective functions at h ∈ H , and the global objective functions of N household
loads). The local objective functions are used to find optimal schedule by minimising the
households’ cost functions while the global objective function is used to minimise the utility’s
costs (of operating the MG) while balancing the total power consumption/generation. The











S.t. qh(t) = ph(t),∀t ∈ T (6.7b)
pa,h(t)
min ≤ pa,h(t) ≤ pa,h(t)max,∀t ∈ T , Eminh ≤
∑
a∈Ah
lth ≤ Emaxh ,∀t ∈ T (6.7c)
0 ≤ Qc,h(t) ≤ Qmaxc,h ,∀t ∈ T ,∀h ∈ Hs (6.7d)
0 ≤ Qd,h(t) ≤ Qmaxd,h ,∀t ∈ T ,∀h ∈ Hs, 0 ≤ Qs,h(t) ≤ Bmaxs ,∀t ∈ T ,∀h ∈ Hs (6.7e)






Our objective function (6.7a), CU,h, represents the household cost function as described by
the household cost model, while Cu represents the utility cost function. The constraint (6.7b)
represents the power supply-demand balance for each time slot t; and (6.7c) is the appliances
operational constraints. (6.7d)-(6.7e) describe the battery storage operational constraints, and
6.7f is the MG generation constraint. The objective function (6.7a) is considered as a convex
function, and its minimisation can lead to an optimal solution. Intuitively, such problem (6.7a)
could be solved by the CC in a centralised manner; but for reasons explained in the overview
of this chapter, such an approach raises a number of issues. Thus, to solve (6.7a) a distributed
convex optimisation algorithms such as ADMM can be employed. In the next section we briefly
describe the ADMM approach.
6.4 The ADMM Approach
The ADMM approach is a fairly dated concept which was introduced in the mid-seventies [130],
and was recently reviewed [88]. An ADMM algorithm solves convex optimisation problems by
decomposing them into smaller optimisation problems, which are simpler to solve individually
in a distributed manner. The ADMM is known to solve problems of the form:
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min
x1,x2
f1(x1) + f2(x2) subject to A1x1 +A2(x2) = c (6.8)
with variables xi ∈ Rni , where fi : Rni → R are closed, proper, convex functions; Ai ∈
Rmxni are given matrices; and c ∈ Rm is a given vector. Augmented Lagrangian methods
yield convergence without assumptions like strict convexity or finiteness of fi [88]. Thus, the
augmented Lagrangian for (6.8) is defined as follows:
Lρ(x1, x2, λ) = f1(x1) + f2(x2)− λT (A1x1 +A2x2 − c) +
ρ
2
||A1x1 +A2x2 − c||22
where λ ∈ Rm is the Lagrange multiplier and ρ > 0 is the penalty parameter. First, the
augmented Lagrangian is minimised with respect to the first variable x1; next, using the new
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Thus, x1 and x2 are updated in an alternating fashion, which accounts for the term alternating
direction. Separating the minimisation over x1 and x2 is precisely what allows for decomposition
when f1(x1) or f1(x2) are separable, which will be useful in our algorithm’s design. The
drawback of the standard ADMM method is that it partitions the problem into only two sub-
problems and thus cannot be implemented efficiently in a centralised way for a larger network.
One way is to simply replace the two-block alternating minimisation scheme sequentially (the
Gauss-Seidel update fashion), i.e., update xi for {i = 1, 2, ..., N}. This approach updates the
blocks one after another, which is not suitable for parallelization. To overcome this disadvantage,
the Jacobi-type scheme updates all the N blocks in parallel [131]. In the proximal Jacobian
Multi-block ADMM, the update of xi is
xk+1i = argminLρ(xi, {x
k
j }j 6=i, λk) +
1
2
||xi − xki ||2Pi where ||xi||
2
Pi
= xTi Pixi (6.10)
for some symmetric and positive semi-definite matrix Pi  0. When the xi− sub-problem is
not strictly convex, adding the proximal term [132] can make the sub-problem of xi strictly or
strongly convex, and make the problem more stable. The update of the Lagrangian multiplier
in the proximal Jacobian ADMM is:
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i − c), (6.11)
Where γ > 0 is the damping parameter. The resulting optimisation problem is solved with the
ADMM, where convergence is guaranteed if the following requirements are satisfied [88]:
1. The functions fi are closed, proper, and convex
2. The Lagrange function Lρ has a saddle point (x∗1, x∗2, λ∗) ∈ R such that
Lρ(x∗1, x∗2, λ) ≤ Lρ(x∗1, x∗2, λ∗) ≤ Lρ(x1, x2, λ∗)
Wei et al. [131] proved the global convergence of Jacobian ADMM for appropriately chosen
regularization matrices Pi. Moreover, they showed that Jacobian ADMM has a convergence
rate of o(1/k). In section 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, we employ the multi-block ADMM to solve the power
consumption scheduling problem in a decentralised and a fully-distributed manner. Liu et al.
[133] discuss the use of Multi-block ADMM for smart-grid applications.
6.5 The ADMM Algorithms
6.5.1 Decentralised Power Consumption Optimisation
In this section, we study a decentralised power consumption scheduling algorithm using
ADMM to solve the optimisation problem (6.7a). Procedures in 6.1 and 6.2 shows the resulting
power consumption, decentralised asynchronous ADMM scheduling algorithm. Each LC is
responsible for updating its own (pk+1h ,λ
k+1) using the most recent qh value (denoted as q̃h)




h ) from the LCs.
Analogous to equation (6.9), the value of pk+1h and λh





k) + 〈λkhh , ph(t)
k〉+ ρ
2




kh+1 − q̃h) (6.12b)
We consider qh as the load which is suggested by the central controller to minimise the fluctua-
tion in the power generation and consumption, and ph as the load according to the consumers’
own benefit. In a synchronization communication model, the CC must wait for the pki+1h updates
from all the N LCs. One draw back in this approach is that the CC has to wait for all updates
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(ph) from all the LC before updating λ resulting in the straggler problem2. A similar approach is
discussed in [134]. We consider an asynchronous algorithm, where instead of a full synchro-
nization on all LCs’ reports in each ADMM iteration, a partial synchronization is only required.
Updates from the more swift LCs are incorporated more frequently by the CC, while those from
the slower LCs are not allowed to be older than a certain maximum delay. We consider the CC
node keeps a clock k, which is incremented by 1 from zero after each λk+1 update. Likewise,
each LC also has a clock ki, which is also incremented by 1 from zero after each λi update. All
the clocks k and (ki)Ni=1 are run independently. We let, p
ki
h (where i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}) be the values
of ph when a LC i’s clock is at ki; and λk be the value of λ(k) when the central controller’s clock
is at k.
To alleviate the straggler problem, a partial barrier can be employed [135]. The CC only needs to
wait for a minimum of W updates, (where W ≥ 1 and W < N ). Reliance on this partial barrier
with a small W means updates from slower LCs will be incorporated into computations less
frequently than faster controllers. To ensure sufficient “freshness" of all the updates, we enforce
a bounded delay condition: update from every LC has to be serviced by the central controller
at least once every T iterations. T is a user-defined parameter (T ≥ 1), where updates from
each LC i can at most be T clock cycles old (with respect to the grid controllers clock). When
both the minimum W updates and bounded delay conditions are met, the controlling node will
proceed with the qh update. We let Φk be the set of LCs with (pkih ) updates that are received by
controlling node (at iteration k). When the central controller updates, and sends qhk+1 to the


















where p̃h and λ̃h are the most recent ph and λh received from LC by the CC.
2The straggler problem allows the system to move forward only at the pace of the slowest LC
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Algorithm 6.1: Local Controller Procedure
1 Initialize: k = 0,p̃hkh+1 = 0 λ̃h = 0, h = 1, 2, ..., N
2 p̃h




6 until receive W LC updates and max(T1T2, ..., TN ) ≤ T ;
7 for LC h ∈ φk do
8 Th ← 1;
9 ph ← newly received ph from local controller h;
10 λh ← newly received λh from local controller h;
11 for LC h /∈ φk do
12 Th ← Th + 1;
13 Update qk+1h by (6.13);
14 Send qk+1h to all LC in φ
k;
15 until termination;
16 k ← k + 1 ;
17 until termination
18 output qkh
Algorithm 6.2: Central Controller Procedure
1 Initialize: λ0h = 0, kh = 0
2 repeat
3 update pkh+1h by (6.12a);
4 send pkh+1h to the grid controller;
5 repeat
6 wait;
7 until qhk+1’ is received from central controller;
8 Update λkh+1h by (5b) ;
9 kh ← kh + 1;
10 until termination;
Correctness Analysis
• Partial correctness: We claim that the loop invariant always hold at the loop test: k ≤ T
(kh ≤ Th) and 1 ≤W ≤ N where T ≥ 1.
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• Base case: Assuming the loop invariant holds and the loop test passes. Say in first iteration,
k = 1 then k ≤ T (kh ≤ Th) is satisfied where T ≥ 1 (considering that T has a considerable
number of cycles). An update will occur in both algorithm fragments.
• Inductive case: Assume that the loop invariant holds at the loop test, and also that the loop
test passes. New values of k, p̃h and λ̃h ( λh and kh) will also hold given h = 1, 2, ..., N
• Termination: The loop always terminates in the presence of at least one LC update (1 ≥
W ≤ N ) and at most T clock cycles when k = T (kh = Th).
Message complexity
Considering the decentralised algorithm, every LC sends a message in one clock cycle, k to
receive an update. The CC will broadcast w messages to a set of LCs with ph updates that were
received (at iteration k). Each time the CC will require at least Z messages for a single successful
update of the price signal, where Z is a partial barrier of the minimum updates that the CC
requires to be updated. Overall the CC would require ZTN where in T is user-defined.
6.5.2 Fully Decentralised Power Consumption Optimisation
In subsection 6.5.1 a decentralised approach for solving the power consumption scheduling
problem is presented. However, it is envisaged that as micro-grids become increasingly intercon-
nected, in the future, a fully distributed power consumption scheduling approach will present a
valuable alternative to the decentralised approach. In this section, we study a fully distributed
algorithm to solve the optimisation problem (6.7a), where the devices make and coordinate
their schedules through local communication with their neighbouring nodes. The key feature of
this algorithm is that the computation is localised at the nodal level of the micro-grid network,
which does not require any form of central coordination.














Constraint (6.7b) is the power supply-demand balance equation that ensures the total demand
is satisfied by the power generation for each time slot t. It couples variables across different
DGs and loads. Constraint (6.7c)-(6.7f) are local constraints that ensure the loads, batteries and
generators do not violate operative limits. Let λ := [λ1, , , λT ] denote Lagrange multiplier vector
associated with the coupling equality constraint. The augmented Lagrangian for equation 6.14
Chapter 6 Scheduling Power Consumption 81
can be given as follows:






































where λ and ρ/2 are the penalty coefficients for the first and second order terms of disagreement.
The OPCSP is solved across the LCs of the DERs and loads. That is, at each step k, each LC
of DG and load solves the primal problem of ensuring that the local constraints hold, then
communicates the generation and consumption schedules to their neighbouring nodes. The
update of the LCs can be performed concurrently according to the proximal Jacobian multi-
block ADMM. Algorithm 6.3 presents the resulting fully decentralised power consumption
scheduling solution. Initially set k ← 0. The LCs of the DGs and loads set their initial schedules
and communicate them to their neighbour nodes. One of the LCs sets the initial λ(k), and
broadcasts to its neighbour nodes. Then,
• The LC of each DG unit solves the following problem (analogous to equation 6.10): OPCSP-
LC(DG)
qh(t)
k+1 = argminqh Cu(qh(t)) + ρ/2
∑T
t=1 ||qh(t)− ph(t)






The qh(t) is computed and broadcast to the neighbouring nodes while the utility function
is kept private.













The ph(t) is computed and broadcast to the neighbouring nodes while the information of
cost function is kept private.
• The dual updating step λ can be computed by any one of the LCs and broadcast for all
neighbouring nodes. That is, after receiving schedules from the neighbouring LCs of DGs
and loads, one of the LCs perform a simple update on the dual variable.
This ensures the privacy of the consumer’s preferences and constraints (the load) and the
production costs and constraints of DGs is preserved by the power consumption, since control
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signals and schedules is the only data exchanged between LCs.
Algorithm 6.3: Distributed Power Consumption Scheduling using ADMM
1 Initialize: k ← 0, ρ > 0, γ > 0, λ0 ← 0
2 repeat
3 /* The LC at each DG and each load computes a schedule */
4 /* by solving the corresponding OPCSP-LC */
5 qh(t)
k+1 = argminqh Cu(qh(t)) + ρ/2
∑T
t=1 ||qh(t)− ph(t)


















7 /* Update λ using one of the LCs in each period */






9 k ← k + 1;
10 until convergence;
6.6 Summary
We presented a robust enforcing consumption scheduling algorithm which operates close to
real-time that can be integrated into the CDA (dedicated on future provisioning of power). In
standard grid architectures, demand management is handled via scheduling protocols that are
centrally coordinated. Centralised approaches are however computationally intensive, as such,
there are not well suited for distributed grid architectures with limited computational power. We
address this problem with a decentralised scheduling algorithm. In our scheduling algorithm,
the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is used to decompose the scheduling
problem into smaller sub problems that are solved in parallel over local computation devices,
which yields an optimal solution. We show that ADMM can be used to model a scheduling
solution that handles both decentralised and fully decentralised cases.
Importantly, it is reasonable, to expect power scheduling algorithms to have significant attention
from a security perspective [16]. In [16], we investigate false data injection attacks that can be
provoked by compromising parts of the communication infrastructure or a set of computing
devices. Such attacks result in the decentralised consumption scheduling algorithm failing to
converge to the optimal solution or allows it to converge toward a value that benefits the attacker.
Such an approach although valuable, fails to provide a more encompassing and systematic
way in which system defenders can better understand vulnerabilities and attacks in developing
security solutions. As future work, it is worthwhile developing a framework to formalise and
design attacks on the decentralised ADMM types of algorithms.
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In Chapters 7 and 8 we shift our focus to cheating detection and mitigation aspects of the
decentralised CDA algorithm.
Chapter 7
The Design and Classification of
Cheating Attacks in CDAs
Good fences make good neighbours.
UNKNOWN.
7.1 Overview
Despite the evident benefits and hype, there is a sinister reality quickly associated with con-
tinuous double auctioning (CDA). The algorithm is susceptible to fraudulent behaviour and
malicious attacks in the form of Cheating. Participants can engage in undesirable and fraudulent
behaviour in an attempt to gain an unfair advantage or additional energy in the auction. The
literature we reviewed in Section 3.5, shows that cheating attacks and their inherent mitigation
measures are auction mechanism specific. This observation, coupled with the realisation that
known classic cheating attacks are unlikely to manifest on a decentralised CDA (Section 4),
leaves system defenders limited understanding of the attacks to defend against and the ideal
mitigation measures to deploy. The design of cheating attacks is important, because it provides
insights into new attacks; can inspire design of novel mitigation solutions; maintains grid
stability and reliability. To the best of our knowledge, no systematic framework exists, to guide
the design and analysis of cheating attacks. The purpose of this chapter, is to advance the
state-of-the-art, by providing such a framework for decentralised CDA for RCSMGs. To model
cheating attacks on decentralised CDA algorithms we propose an ACA framework in Section 7.2.
The ACA framework consists of a Domain model 7.2.1, an Attacker model 7.2.4, and an Attack model
7.2.5. In Section 7.3, we classify the cheating attacks then in Section 7.4 further analyse a few
selected cheating attacks, outlining the attacks’ feasibility, procedures, performance overheads
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and drawbacks. The summary in Section 7.5 concludes this chapter. The plausible detection
and mitigation solutions are discussed in the next chapter.
7.2 Framework Design
In this chapter we propose a framework that allow designing of a variety of cheating attack
models for CDA. Our framework, which we shall refer to as the Automated-Cheating-Attacks
(ACA) Framework is inspired by the work of Adepu and Mathur [103]. We base our framework
on Adepu and Mathur’s work as it is simple, allows easy design of attacks and to the best of
our knowledge is the closest framework that describes designing of attacks with more coverage.
By leveraging some aspects of Adepu and Mathur’s framework and extending it to capture
the CDA and behavioural aspects, we are able to develop an arguably effective framework
for designing cheating attacks for the given context. Figure 7.1 depicts the ACA Framework.
We envisage that our framework allows researchers to design a variety of cheating attacks on













































FIGURE 7.1: ACA Framework for deriving attacks
For simplicity and ease of conceptualising, the ACA framework has the following main com-
ponents or models, namely: Attack-Domain model, Attacker model, and Attack model, as these
directly guide the design of attacks. The Attack-Domain model captures the CDA and supporting
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(infrastructure) elements that could serve as the target of an attacker. The Attacker model cap-
tures adversary’s intentions as functions on the attack-domain model. This identifies the target
and intent of an attacker. The Attack model captures the relevant encompassing elements of an
attack which include: attack domain, attack vectors, attack procedures and the start/end states
of the attack. The ACA Framework summarised in Figure 7.1 is a process consisting of eight
stages, labelled 1 through 8, to derive attacks. Similar to [103] at Stage 1 is an abstract1 domain
model. Three dimensions can be used to describe the attack-domain space: components Cm,
process properties Pr, and system performance metrics Pe. For example, Cm has terminal nodes,
communication nodes, etc.; while Pr has properties such as number of trades, surplus(profit
margins) etc.; and Pe has metrics such as allocative efficiency, number of messages, time to trade,
etc.; but no further details of these elements (Figure 7.2). Stage 2, is a mapping of the abstract
attack-domain maps to a concise attack-domain model for a CDA as explained in subsection
7.2.1. Stage 3, 4, 5 are aimed at defining the attacker’s behaviour aspects. Stage 3, defines the
Attacker Intents, which are combined with the concrete domain model in stage 6 to generate
an attacker model. Stage 4 and 5 defines the Attacker’s Capability model and Attackers Rational
respectively. In Stage 7, the Attacker model is combined with the states, Attacker capability,
Attack Vectors, and Attack Procedures to generate an Attack model. The left-hand side inputs
are mostly technical aspects, while the right-hand side inputs are human behaviour aspects.
Attacks are derived from the attack model and the Attackers Rational in stage 8. The following
subsections outline the 8-stage process citing specific examples of a decentralised CDA [28]
designed for a RCSMG context.
7.2.1 Attack Domain Model
The attack domain consists of three finite sets namely the component set (Cm), property set (Pr),
and performance set (Pe). As shown in Figure 2, each of these is part of a three-dimensional
attack space. Formally, an attack-domain model ADM of a CDA is a 3-tuple of (Cm,Pr, Pe),
where Cm, Pr, and Pe denote system components, system properties, and system performance
metrics, respectively. Thus, ADM defines a finite attack space an attacker can explore and
enables specification of the attacker intent (Figure 7.2).
Cm usually includes elements that may be physical, cyber, and logic, but in this thesis we narrow
Cm to define cyber components (eg. wireless network) on top of which a CDA algorithm is run.
A CDA is supported by components that are usually networked together to ensure multiple
buyers and sellers participate in the auction. Cm defines the cyber and logical components
that supports the auctioning algorithm and the participants such as terminals for participants;
networking components; software agents trading on behalf of the participants; etc. There
1The domain is considered abstract, as its elements do not have the specifics required for the modelling and
analysis of a CDA.
Chapter 7 The Design and Classification of Cheating Attacks 87
FIGURE 7.2: Attack Domains
certainly are other categories of components in a CDA; thus the examples given herein are not
claimed to be complete in any sense. In Adepu et al. [103], each element of Cm is also referred
to as an attack point, or simply as a point. An attack point serves to define an attack vector.
The Pr dimension includes measurable properties of the products being produced or controlled
by the CDA such as market surplus, number of trades, the market equilibrium price. It is
important to note that the same property is likely to be measured at different physical/logical
locations depending on the architecture of the CDA.
The Pe dimension refers to one or more performance characteristics of a CDA such allocative
efficiency, convergence rate to equilibrium price, communication overheads, time of a single
trade, etc. While the Pe metrics may appear similar to Pr properties; it is arguably better
to consider them as separate dimensions of a CDAs. Consider an element in Pe to refer to a
measurement taken at a specific point in the progression of a CDA to ascertain how a component
or the whole system is performing. As such elements of the set Pr show how well the whole
CDA or its components are performing. Pe is measured at different physical/logical locations
(measurement points) depending on the architecture of the CDA.
7.2.2 Concise Attack Model
In order to come up with a concise Attack-Model there is need to understand the CDA component
in the framework. Section 4.3, formalises the descriptor of the decentralised CDA as a septuple.
To recap, the main activities —which define valid states, S (see section 7.2.6) in a decentralised
CDA are: Registration, Initialisation, Participation Request, Bid Formation, Transacting, Ter-
mination. The decentralised CDA algorithm has been partitioned into procedures, which are
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executed at the different components within the auction infrastructure. In this chapter, we
focus on the Local Market Execution procedure (Algorithm 4.2) as it is more informative on the
types of attacks that can occur. For further understanding of the Continuous Double Auction
algorithms and their application in grid-like platforms, the reader is also referred to Chapter 3
and the literature [9], [136], [77], [68], [13], [73], [1].
7.2.3 Attacker Behaviour Model
The ability to model ‘attacker behaviour’ can provide attack scenarios that will probably happen,
which gives precise risk assessments and damage predictions. Representing attacker behaviour
in terms of attack effects, instead of the attack itself, allows indirect evaluation of the system
security, by identifying families of attacks and not each instantiation [137]. Attacker behaviour
can be modelled as a strategic decision-making process that accounts for the following factors
affecting the attacker’s decisions:
Attacker Intent: Intent-based approach is evident in earlier design attacks [138]. As social
criminals, in cyberspace, attacks are typically not random, and an attacker launches an attack
to achieve some malicious goals [139]. From Figure 7.2, point I implies an attacker designs an
attack with the possible intention of damaging a specific component in its domain without, in
the short term, affecting any system property or performance. Point II requires an attack to alter
some system property such as profit margins (cheating). Point III requires an attack for reducing
some system output such as convergence to an equilibrium price within an auction trade day.
Such an attacker model captures the mapping of attacker intentions to the attack-domain.
Attacker Capability Model: Formally, the attacker capability model ATC of a CDA is a 3-tuple
(Sk,De,Dn), where Sk, De, and Dn denotes sets of system knowledge, disclosure resources,
and disruption resources. Thus, ATC defines a finite attack space an attacker can explore in
relation to attacker capability/ constraints (see Figure 7.3).
Similar to previous approaches [140] [141], we propose three dimensions for the attack space: the
adversary’s a priori system model knowledge Sk; his disclosure resources De; and disruption
resources Dn. An attacker with a priori system knowledge (including knowledge of elements
on ADM) can construct more complex attacks, possibly more difficult to detect and with more
severe consequences. This depends on the extent and depth of the knowledge such as knowledge
of terminals used by auction participants; the networking components; the software components
etc.. Similarly, the disclosure resources De enable the attacker to obtain sensitive information
about the system, or its components during the attack by violating the data confidentiality. For
example the attacker can obtain private information secret to other auctioneers (trading agents).
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FIGURE 7.3: Attacker’s Capability Space
We consider that disclosure resources cannot be used to disrupt the system operation. On the
other hand, disruption resources can be used to affect the system operation, which happens for
instance when data integrity or availability properties are violated
Attacker Rational: As emphasised by Sedaghatbaf and Azgomi [100], it is necessary to find
out how probable an attack is, from its potential costs and benefits, instead of relying only on
the technical aspects of the system. The supporting notion is that attacks are considered unlikely
if their cost is not worth their benefits. Thus, if an attack is unlikely to occur, it is assumed the
system is secure towards that attack, despite its potential technical vulnerability, because it is
irrational for an attacker to perform an unprofitable attack. Formally, the Attacker’s RationalR
is a 3-tuple (Cb, Sd,Ac), where Cb is a cost-benefit-analysis function, Sd is the behaviour set
dependent on the system’s defence, and Ac is the number of attackers and their coordination.
This model is helpful in building a taxonomy of attacks within the ACA Framework.
• Cost-Benefit-Analysis: An attacker’s decision to execute an attack is made by a cost-benefit
model, such as those defined by Amenaza [142] and Buldas et al. [143]. Thus, we consider
an attacker attacks only if the overall attack is profitable. The attacker chooses the most
beneficial strategy in each stage of the attack. This assumption serves as an upper bound in
the modelling context, as any irrational decision hinders the result of the attacker himself.
• System Defence Interdependency: The behaviour of an attacker and the system’s defence
mechanism are interdependent, and security reactions can change the possible attack steps
for the attacker [139]. Petri net-based models [144] or partially observable Markov decision
process [137] can be used to capture the dynamics between the interaction between attacker
and defender (i.e. the system’s defence mechanism).
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• Attacker Coordination: The type of plausible attack need to factor in the potential of
more than one individual attacking the system concurrently. Such attackers can be
individualistic or can collaborate and coordinate to deliver some attack that benefits the
parties.
7.2.4 Attacker Model
The Attacker Model Ä is defined as a 2-tuple ( Ĩ , ADM) where Ĩ is a finite set of attackers’
intents and ADM is an attack-domain model. In this chapter, the attacker’s goal or an objective
is treated as an intent. Given its inherently personal and social nature, Adepu and Mathur
[103], note it is difficult to precisely specify the intent, set Ĩ . However, we consider intents to
include: damage to a component (Cm), disturbing a system property (Pr), or altering system
performance (Pe). An intent is applied to an element or a region of the domain as in Figure 7.2.
Thus, an intent function is used by an attacker to one or more elements of an Attack Domain that
defines a CDA. The Attacker Model does not describe the actual attack itself. As noted by Adepu
and Mathur, attacks are designed to achieve an intention goal.
7.2.5 Attack Model
For a CDA, say X we consider an attacker model ÄX = (̃I, ADM) , where ADM = (Cm,Pr, Pe)
and Ĩ is a function. The attack model Ă is a sextuple
ĂX = {Ȧ, C̆, Ĩ,D,P,S0,Se,R} (7.1)
where, Ȧ is potentially infinite set of procedures to launch attacks; C̆ is an attacker capability
model for the attacks derived from ATC; Ĩ is a finite set of attacker intents; D is the domain
model for the attacks derived from the attack-domain model ADM of X; P ⊆ Cm is a finite set
of attack points; and S0 and Se are possibly infinite sets of states of X, that denote, possible start
and end states of interest to the attacker;R is the attacker rational that determines the feasibility
of launching the attack. An attack point in X could be a physical element or an entry point
through the communications network connecting CDA and the underlying power system.
We are aware that some attacks could be modelled to leverage on faults, but that phenomenon
is beyond the scope of attacks we cover in the ACA Framework. Implicitly, our attack model
herein assumes no faults occur (thus, fault-related attacks are excluded). We note that several
formalisms exist for modelling attack procedures, Ȧ, by employing graphical methods, among
others [145], [144], and [146] as cited in [103]. Modelling of Ȧ are imposed on the attack methods.
The set Å is similar to the attacker payload [138].
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From the above Attack Model definition several attack models can be built for a given CDA.
The different attack models on the same CDA are derived by altering/changing the constraints
imposed on Å and selecting different subsets of the Attack-Domain variables (Cm,Pr, Pe);
and Attacker Behaviour which encompasses the Attacker Capabilities (Sk,De,Dn); the At-
tacker Rational (Cb, Sd,Ac). The context in which an attack model is used will determine its
appropriateness and effectiveness. We expect the attack model presented herein, to be useful in
designing, among other attacks, cheating attacks to study the resilience of a decentralised CDA.
7.2.6 Attacks
For a CDA, say X, we consider an attack model
ĂX = {Ȧ, C̆, Ĩ,D,P,S0,Se,R} (7.2)
An attack Æ in X is defined as a terminating or a non-terminating procedure ȧ ∈ Ȧ designed to
realise a finite set of intents ĩ ⊂ Ĩ , aimed at domain d ⊂ D, requiring a finite set of capabilities
c̆ ⊂ C̆, launched through a finite set of points p ⊂ P when X is in state s0 ∈ S0 and possibly
removed when X is in state se ∈ Se.
Attack Success: We consider an attack Æ to be successful if all intents in ı̃ are realised in
a finite time. Part successful attacks occur when a subset of intents in ı̃ are realised, while
unsuccessful attacks occur when none of the intents in ı̃ is realised and there is no intended
or unintended side effect of applying an å to CDAX . The attack procedure å may or may not
terminate after all intents in ı̃ are realised.
Attack Vector: An attack vector is a path in a CDA that starts at an attack point p and allows
the exploitation of a vulnerability. In other words, an attack is a parameterised procedure that
exploits such a path. Identification of attack vectors is beyond the scope of this book chapter,
but it is possible to identify attack vectors for the design of attack procedures using the attack
domain model and knowledge of its operation.
Attack Procedure: One key factor to a successful attack, is the design of an effective attack
procedure å. This requires the attacker to be familiar with at least the targeted components
and CDA system C. In cases where multiple points are attacked, and deception is needed to
avoid detection, å might actually involve computation of data values being sent in real time.
For example, an attacker may be interested in knowing the evaluation and reservation prices of
other victim participants in real time, so as to inform his decision in the CDA. Doing so requires
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a deeper knowledge of the properties of the CDA and its components. It is assumed that, such
knowledge is used in the design of å for a successful attack. Thus, in the attacker and attack
models, the knowledge of the system: partial or complete (as specified in Attack Capability
model), is encapsulated in the attack procedure.
Attack Start States: Say an attacker, is able to install a piece of malware into a component(s)
when the CDA system is in some state s. Then consider the malware will remain dormant until
the CDA system reaches another state s
′
when it actually executes the intended attack. The start
state s0 in this case can one of who cases:
• The attack is a sequence of two separate attacks, with malware injection attack followed
by the malware’s payload execution. The start state for malware injection is s and for the
subsequent payload execution launched by the malware is s
′
.
• The entire attack is one and we treat the start state as s.
The best approach between the aforementioned two depends on the intent of the attack. If the
state in which malware is inserted is key to the attack being not detected, while the payload
execution can be launched in any state, then s should to be considered the start state while s
′
can be ignored. However, if malware must launch the subsequent attack in a specific state for
intent realization, then s
′
should be considered. Examples of attacks and their types are given
in Section 7.4.
Valid State Sequences: Valid sequences are those sequences that appear at least once during
the normal operation of CDAC (see Section 4.3). Given how complex a CDA can be, the space of
all valid sequences of any arbitrary length is huge and difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate.
Under attack, or in case of some form of failure, CDAX might enter an invalid sequence, i.e., a
sequence that would never occur under normal operation constrained by rules of the CDA.
7.3 Design and Classification of Cheating Attacks
The ACA Framework described allows a variety of attacks which are beyond only cheating
attacks to be designed. Overall, the set of attacks that can be designed at a time is governed
by the intent of an attacker. For instance, cheating intent can be considered as a function that
is applied by an attacker to the property dimension Pr Dimension of the Attack-Domain in
order to influence profit distribution. In Figure 7.2 this set of attacks can be mapped on Point
II domain. The RCSMG platform warrants that such attacks be resource aware in order to be
successful and to avoid easy detection. As such, a concise Attack-Domain Model will define the
upper and lower bounds of the system resources in which plausible attacks can be executed.
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Consider the decentralised CDA as the appropriate auction mechanism for power allocation in
a smart grid. Such a decentralised CDA will determine the states, attack vectors and tentative
procedures on which an attack can be build on. In turn, this implicitly narrows the set of
plausible attacks that are likely to manifest such a CDA scheme. It is due to this reasoning that
traditional cheating attacks can be eliminated as there are unlikely to manifest on the given CDA
states and attack vectors. For example in a centralised auction the auctioneer is a vector for the
attack. This is not necessarily the case in a decentralised scheme considered herein (as proposed
in [28]). The attack model in turn specifies the attacker model according to a CDA’s states and
attack procedures, which are guided by the attacker’s capability and rational. Cheating attacks
can be classified with respect to the attacker’s capabilities and attacker’s rationality, in that
order.
TABLE 7.1: Adversary types and capabilities
Adversary Capabilities
Attacker Types Knowledge Disclosure Disruption







Expert Attacker High Yes Yes
Attacks are categorised according to attacker capabilities in step 7 in Figure 7.1: Limited,
Advanced (A and B) and Expert (shown in Table 7.1). For the purpose of this chapter we will
sideline Attacker B type and focus on Attacker A as the most likely capable attacker types to
bring forth automated forms of cheating. At step 8 of the framework, the attackers can be further
categorised using the Rational Model (Section 7.2.3) according to the number of adversaries and
their interaction as follows: a single attacker; multiple non-cooperating attackers; and multiple
cooperating attackers (Figure 7.4). The single attacks can be carried out even by multiple
adversaries, with an additional complexity on the impacts and the respective attack model that
can be designed.
7.4 Cheating Attack Cases
In this section we use the ACA framework as a basis for modelling the cheating attacks towards
a decentralised CDA. The cheating attacks we consider herein are not exhaustive but crucial
in informing on the mitigation measures that can be put in place ensuring the CDA algorithm
executes successfully. The Victim Strategy Downgrade and Collusion by Dynamic Strategy Change
have been described in [27]. We expand on the aforementioned attacks with a more formalised
approach demonstrating how the proposed framework can be used in designing such attacks.
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FIGURE 7.4: A classification of cheating attacks on decentralised CDAs
We additionally consider Profiling and Market Prediction Attack; and AA Manipulation Attack.Our
choice of attacks was guided by the following reasons:
• can be generalised and can provide a wider coverage of attacks to consider for the system
defenders;
• can provide more insight into the system’s behaviour under different attack procedures
and parameters;
• can be used to learn and test the resilience of the system.
7.4.1 Victim Strategy Downgrade
An attacker, PAi, where (i = 1, PA ⊂ P , and P is a set of all participants) employs an automated
tool (e.g. malware) to gain control of other trading agents T A strategies. The attacker can
‘downgrade’ victim TAs to trading strategy that is inferior to gain them additional advantage.
We are aware the same attack can be perpetrated by an adversary simply changing their agent
strategy to adopt a different but superior bidding strategy which affords higher surplus. We will
focus on the former, as it presents an exciting problem opposed to a simple PAi upgrading to a
superior strategy. The Victim Strategy Downgrade has been described in detail in the literature
[27] and [21]. The term attacker and adversary are used interchangeably. We shall consider the
following assumption:
• the adversary PA has control of P − 1 victim T A s;
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• despite P − 1 victim T A s having their strategy downgraded, to say, ZI Strategy, the T A s
will seamlessly continue participating in the auction as normal;
• the adversary has computational capacity to launch the attack and a reliable connection
exists with the victim T As.
Motivation: A number of trading agent strategies that have been developed for the CDA over
the years. We note experimental evidence that supports the phenomenon of some strategies
being superior; with the ability to gain more surplus from trade than their inferior counterparts
[1], [74], [95], [36]. The Adaptive Aggressive strategy is one such superior strategy, while
the Zero Intelligence is the most inferior [95], [1], [74]. Ma and Leung [36], demonstrate that
AA agents are adaptive to different combinations of competitors; and to different supply and
demand relationships. ZI agents behaved worse since they do not analyse their environment
and the other agents whom they are competing with. The AA obtains huge profit margins in
comparison to ZI strategy [36].
Attack: Assume an attacker distributes a malicious code to attach itself onto other participants
TAs (the attack vector). The malicious code (or malware describe in [97]) carries a payload
capable of incorporating an inferior ZI strategy to the victim T A s’ bid forming mechanism.
Formally, a strategy downgrade attack Æ (sda) in X is defined as a terminating procedure å
∈ Å designed to realise a finite set of intents ı̃ ⊂ Ĩ (where ı̃ includes gaining control of other
T A s strategy component, changing their strategy, influencing the market to gain additional
surplus), aimed at domain d ⊂ D (where d is a set of all Mmp components where T A s are
hosted), requiring a finite set of capabilities c̆ ⊂ C̆ (c̆ includes knowledge of participants, ability
to launch a malicious code2, access and communication with victim T A s), launched through a
finite set of attack points p ⊂ P (p is a set of all victim T A s), when X is in state s0 ∈ S0 (where
s0 is a set of all valid CDA states where an attack can be launched) and possibly removed when
X is in state se ∈ Se (where se is a set of all valid states the attack can be stopped which is
controlled by a clock trigger).
Attack States: The attack is a sequence of two separate phases: malware injection phase
followed by the malware’s payload execution phase. The start state for malware injection is s
and for the subsequent payload execution launched by the malware is s
′
. Malware injection
occurs in any of the valid states of the CDA, while payload execution is triggered by a clock. It
is important that victim T A s are all in s′ concurrently through a synchronisation protocol. The
aim of this attack is not to put the overall CDA into an invalid state, but to ensure despite the
attack the CDA is always in its valid states.
2These are described as disclosure resources
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Attack Variants This attack can take two forms: static or dynamic downgrade. In static
downgrade, an agent will instantly change its strategy on infection (once adversary payload is
delivered). This change is somehow permanent. If no further coordination occurs between the
infected agents and the adversary, it would be difficult to use communication overheads to infer
occurrence of such cheating. However, such attack can easily be detected by analysis of market
efficiency as ZI agent population yields fairly lower market efficiency than a homogeneous AA
population. Thus, an advanced attacker would employ a dynamic downgrade to victims TA
strategies allowing victim agents to revert to the AA strategy based on a clock-based trigger.
We consider the payload incorporates the inferior ZI strategy to the victim T A s bid forming
mechanism. Since the attack is dynamic, the payload will ensure the victim toggles between AA
and ZI strategy in strict response to a clock trigger or messages from the adversary. Algorithms
7.1 and 7.2 present the dynamic attack from an attacker and the victims’ perspective.
Attacker Rational In order to evade easy detection an attacker can send P−1 ‘revert’ messages
to the victims using a private back-channel directly to victims. Only the trading outcome is
affected as the CDA remains fairly the same. The Adversary is required to be computationally
upt, and to establish a reliable connection with the victims in order to execute such an attack. In
a resource constrained setup, this might not be feasible. To maximise on the surplus to be gained
the adversary can only participate when the clock trigger occurs. If a considerable number of
victim T A s have requested for the token, the adversary might not gain as high a surplus as
early requesting T A s will have traded against each other. This can be addressed by making
the clock trigger to encompass the full duration of a single or multiple trade days in a random
manner.
Attack Analyses: The adversary PA is required to be computationally apt, and to establish a
reliable connection with the victims in order to execute such an attack. In a resource constrained
setup, this might not be feasible. To maximise on the surplus to be gained the adversary can
only participate when the clock trigger occurs. If a considerable number of victim T A s have
requested for the token, the adversary might not gain as high a surplus as early requesting T A
s will have traded against each other. Thus, the clock trigger can be used to encompass the full
duration of a single or multiple trade days in a random manner.
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Algorithm 7.1: Dynamic Strategy Downgrade Attack - Adversary
Input : WillingToTrade, Clock
Output :Revertmsg, ReqMmp
1 Initialisation: R = 1000, Clock = FALSE




6 until Clock = TRUE;
7 if WillingtoTrade = TRUE then
8 Request TOKEN ;
9 else
10 Send Revertmsg to P − 1 victims ;
11 until termination;
Algorithm 7.2: Dynamic Strategy Downgrade Attack - Victim
Input : Revertmsg, Clock
Output : strategy
1 Initialise: R = 1000, Clock = FALSE
2 /* For each infected TA */




7 until Clock = TRUE;
8 repeat
9 Use ZI strategy;
10 until Revertmsg = TRUE or Clock = FALSE;
11 until termination;
Sketch Proof: Algorithm 1.2 outputs Revertmsg messages to the victim TAs if the adversary is
not willing to trade and the clock triggers a strategy downgrade. The sub-algorithm terminates
at the end of a trade day when R = tround. The loop will always terminate when Clock is
TRUE (since the attack is clock triggered). If we consider the inner conditional statement
(line 7), say S, if c then A1 else A2 endif. If c is well defined (meaning it can be evaluated),
P ∧ c A→ Q and P ∧ c̄ A→ Q, then P A→ Q. This suggests that we verify the correctness of
the branch (both when c is true and when c is false). The sub-algorithm’s preconditions are
WillingTotrade = {0, 1}, clock = {0, 1} and the postcondition is a Revertmsg or ReqMmp. If
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the condition c is WillingToTrade = TRUE then a request is made for the TOKEN. In the
other case, WillingToTrade = FALSE holds and a Revertmsg is sent to the victim TAs. In
Algorithm 1.3 each victim will change strategy when the clock trigger is TRUE. This repeats
until Revertmsg is received or the clock trigger is off (FALSE).
7.4.2 Dynamic Collusion Attack
Assume adversary participants PAi, form a coalition and coordinate among themselves using an
automated tool to gain additional surplus over the rest of victim participants, Pν . We consider,
i = {1...η...κ}, where η is the bound on maximum colluders that guarantee added profit on
strategy switch, κ is the number of all the colluders and PA ⊂ P and Pν ⊂ P . The aim of the
tool is to coordinate population ratio of PA’s to Pν ’s by maintaining η. The Pν will continue
using the default strategy (in this case the AA strategy). For this Collusion Attack we further
consider the following:
• a symmetrical relationship of buyers and sellers;
• all T A s get the same amount of units to trade;
• only the PA colluders can change their strategy;
• despite random and numerous strategy changes, PA s can seamlessly continue participat-
ing in the auction;
• the PA colluders have computational capacity and reliable channels to coordinate the
attack.
Motivation: Vach and Maršál experimental results in [96] indicate that additional surplus can
be gained from changing population ratios of T A’s from AA to GDX3 strategy with the minority
population dominating in average profit.
Attack: κ of PA install a tool (piece of software or script) that enables only η to autonomously
change agent strategy from AA to GDX. Colluders’ TA is the attack points where the CDA
rule allowing TAs to participate regardless of the bidding strategy they use becomes the vector
of this type of attack. The colluding T A s use a separate channel to communicate among
themselves. On receipt of the beginning of trading day signal the strategy changing automated
tool will allow a number of adversary agents to shift their strategy to the GDX. In considering
experimental evidence in literature [96], the adversary agent population ratio to the truthful
agent population can be either 2 to 4 or 1 to m to ensure a high surplus on adversary population.
To ensure such coordination the strategy changing automated tool can use some group MUTEX
3Strategy developed by Tesauro and Bredin [48] as a modification of the Gjerstad-Dickhaut (GD) strategy that
uses dynamic programming to price orders.
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protocol to select η number of colluders allowed to change their strategy at one particular time.
The η-MUTEX algorithm will allow at most η colluders at a time to change their strategy (enter
critical section). The protocol is token based and η tokens are used. Thus, a colluding T A can
only change its strategy to GDX when it is in possession of the token. As an input the algorithm
gets P; the number of all participants in the market. For instance, Chaudhuri and Edward [147]
proposed one such protocol which performed on a worst case message complexity of O(
√
n).
The single trade-day-signal that is used to trigger the selection of colluding T A s can be altered
to a number of signals (therefore trading days) to allow the selected colluders more number of
rounds to benefit before the change. Tolerance to node and link failure ensures robustness of
the η-MUTEX protocol. We assert that as long as the colluders are coordinated in such a manner
this attack will not deviate, with high probability; κ colluders will continuously take turns and
cheat.
Formally, a dynamic collusion attack Æ (dca) in X is defined as a non-terminating procedure
å ∈ Å designed to realise a finite set of intents ı̃ ⊂ Ĩ (where ı̃ includes coordination with other
colluders T A s strategy component, using a κ-MUTEX to switch between strategies), aimed
at domain d ⊂ D (where d is a set of all Mmp components where colluding T A s are hosted),
requiring a finite set of capabilities c̆ ⊂ C̆ (c̆ includes knowledge of all participating T A s, ability
to launch a coordinating tool, connection and communication with colluding T A s), launched
through a finite set of enabling points p ⊂ P (p is a set of all colluding T A s), when X is in state
s0 ∈ S0 (where s0 is the initial state CDA at the start of an auction where an attack is launched)
and possibly removed when X is in state se ∈ Se (where se is a set of all valid states the attack
can be stopped or other colluders are selected).
Attacker Rational: Intuitively, a group of attackers can opt collude motivated by the significant
surplus there will obtain in the CDA. In taking turns to cheat, this attack can be difficult for
the system defenders to detect. Since at any time, κ colluders will cheat and obtain surplus,
the system defender can be suspicious of such behaviour. A possible workaround would be to
randomly allow such cheating in different periods of the auction market.
Attack Analysis: Additional computational overheads are incurred by the κ adversaries, as
they need to establish a reliable connection among themselves and change their strategy in
turns. No additional messages are introduced on the CDA communication channel in this
attack, assuming that adversaries strictly communicate in a back channel. Using the same
experimental findings that can be used to support occurrence of this collusion attack [96], we
observe that if all users do not use AA strategy the market allocative efficiency is significantly
reduced. Additionally, messages need to be exchanged among the κ PA s. For this attack to be a
success, at least η adversaries (κ = η) should agree to collude, otherwise additional surplus will
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not be realised. This is because the ratios between AA (of victim T A s) and GDX (of adversary
T A s) is such that GDX can not gain additional surplus.
7.4.3 Evasive Agent Attack
We consider a single adversary that employs an evasive strategy that leverages on other traders
secret information such as reservation price to make better predictions of bids/asks to submit.
Assuming the auction allows trade of single indivisible electrical power/energy unit. Each
bidder and seller associates two values with a unit of energy —a reservation price and a bid/ask.
Reservation price (limit price) is the maximum (minimum) price a bidder (seller) is willing
to pay (be paid) for energy based on personal valuation and preferences. This information is
private to each trading agent. An offer (bid/ask) on the other hand is the publicly declared price
that a bidder (seller) is willing to pay (sell). We further consider the following assumptions:
• a symmetrical relationship of buyers and sellers;
• all T A s get the same amount of units to trade;
• only the PA can change its strategy;
• despite random and/ or numerous strategy changes, the attacker PA can seamlessly
continue participating in the auction;
• the attacker PA and the victims PV have computational capacity and reliable channels to
send their reservation price to the attacker PA.
Motivation: Assume each agent’s reservation value can be independently drawn from a
cumulative distribution function (CDF) F over [0, 1], where F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1.Similar to
[148] We assume F (.) is strictly increasing and differentiable in the interval [0, 1]. The derivative
of CDF, f(λ) is then the probability density function (PDF). The adversarial node knows his
reservation value and the distribution F of other agents. The adversarial agent tries to maximise
his utility and quits the auction if the auction price goes beyond its reservation value. The
private data is then used in formulating a trading pattern to obtain a trading advantage over
other traders. This phenomenon is very similar to insider trading described by Kyle in [149].
Kyle uses a dynamic model of insider trading to examine the value of private information to an
insider.
Attack: Similar to the aforementioned attacks, an adversary employs a tool (e.g. a piece of
malware [97]) whose payload elicits victim T A s’ private data (e.g. reservation price) and sends
it to the attacker. The vector of the attack is other participants T A s. At the beginning of each
trading day or a predetermined time specified by a timer, the victim T A s will automatically
send their private information to the adversary agent. We assume the adversarial node employs
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fuzzy logic where the illegally elicited private information forms part of a fuzzy set to inform
some fuzzy rules. Knowledge gained from the fuzzy sets can be combined using rules to
make decisions based on this information. One such strategy is proposed by He et al. [49].
This approach is supported by the notion that a T A’s decision-making about bidding involves
uncertainty, multiple factors, and non-determinism that are affected by the attitudes toward risk
of its opponents, the nature of the market supply (demand), and the preferences of the other
bidders. Formally, an evasive attack Æ(ea) in X is defined as a non-terminating procedure å ∈ Å
designed to realise a finite set of intents ı̃ ⊂ Ĩ (where ı̃ includes gaining control of other T A s
strategy component, eliciting their reservation price, using the data to make informed offers in
the market), aimed at domain d ⊂ D (where d is a set of all Mmp components where T A s are
hosted), requiring a finite set of capabilities c̆ ⊂ C̆ (c̆ includes knowledge of all participating
T A s, ability to launch a malicious code, connection and communication with victim T A s),
launched through a finite set of attack points p ⊂ P (p is a set of all victim T A s), when X is in
state s0 ∈ S0 (where s0 is a set of all valid CDA states where an attack can be launched) and
possibly removed when X is in state se ∈ Se (where se is a set of all valid states the attack can be
stopped).
Attack States: The attack is a sequence of two separate phases: malware injection phase
followed by the malware’s payload execution phase. The start state for malware injection is s
and for the subsequent payload execution launched by the malware is s
′
. Malware injection
occurs in any of the valid states of the CDA, while payload execution is triggered by a clock. It
is important that victim T A s are all in s′ concurrently through a synchronisation protocol. The
evasive attack does not put the system in an invalid state, which arguably makes it difficult to
detect through simple defensive measures that observe occurrence of invalid states. Algorithms
in 7.3 and 7.4 present the Evasive Attack from the victims’ and attacker’s perspective.
Attack variants In our description of the evasive attack, we only considered a single adversary.
However, a variant of such an attack can have multiple non-cooperating attackers using the
same attack simultaneously. Intuitively, the steps of the attack are the same but additional
aspects should be considered. For instance, the re-infection of victim TAs by other attackers;
attackers being victims to attacks from other attackers; the increase in computational and
communication overheads from the victims’ perspective; increase in complexity of concurrent
attacks.
Attack Analysis: This attack results in frequent messages of victim trader’s reservation price
being sent to the attacker. Additional computational resources are consumed within each victim
node, while additional storage and computational resources are required of the adversary.
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Assuming the victim T A s communicate with the adversary through a back-channel, the
initial message complexity of the CDA algorithm is not affected. The attack results in frequent
messages being passed between the attacker and the victim T A s. Such activity can be observed
and used to inform some irregular agent behaviour.
Algorithm 7.3: Evasive Attack - Adversary
Input : WillingToTrade, Clock
Output : R, Concealmsg, ReqMmp
1 Initialisation: R = 1000, Clock = FALSE




6 until Clock = TRUE;
7 if WillingtoTrade = TRUE then
8 Change to FL Strategy;
9 Request TOKEN ;
10 else
11 Send Concealmsg to P − 1 victims ;
12 until termination;
Algorithm 7.4: Evasive Attack - Victim
Input : ClockInput, Concealmsg
Output : Privatemsg
1 Initialise: R = 1000, Clock = FALSE
2 /* For each infected TA */




7 until Clock = TRUE;
8 repeat
9 Send Privatemsg;
10 until Concealmsg = TRUE or Clock = FALSE;
11 until termination;
Sketch Proof: The Algorithm 7.3 outputs Concealmsg messages to the victim TAs if the adversary
is not willing to trade while the clock has triggered a strategy downgrade. The outer loop
(line 3), guarantees the sub-algorithm terminates at the end of a trade day when R = tround.
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The inner loop (line 4) will always terminate when Clock is TRUE (since the attack is clock
triggered). If we consider the inner conditional statement (line 7), say S, if c then A1 else A2
endif. If c is well defined (meaning it can be evaluated), P ∧ c A→ Q and P ∧ c̄ A→ Q, then P A→ Q.
We verify the correctness of the branches (both when c is true and when c is false). The sub-
algorithm’s preconditions are WillingTotrade = {0, 1}, Clock = {0, 1} and the postcondition is
a Revertmsg or ReqMmp. If the condition c is WillingToTrade = TRUE then a request is made
for the TOKEN. In the other case, WillingToTrade = FALSE holds and a Concealmsg is sent
to the victim TAs. In Algorithm 7.4 each victim will send Privatemsg when the clock trigger is
TRUE. The outer loop (line 4), shows the sub-algorithm terminates at the end of a trade day,
tround. The first inner loop (line 5) will always terminate when Clock is TRUE. This warrants
victim TAs to sent until Clock is FALSE or a Concealmsg from the adversary is recorded.
7.4.4 Adaptive Aggressive Strategy Manipulation
Assuming an attacker has access and control of victim TA’s through an automated tool (a
malware, [97]) he/she can manipulate a number of components, parameters and variables
involved in the bid-formulation process of a population of homogeneous victim T A s. The end-
goal in this scenario is to influence victim T As behaviour to get favourable offers in the auction.
For instance, victim T A s will be manipulated to sell (buy) energy at very low (high) offers
favourable to a buying (selling) attacker. Figure 7.5 shows the components (presented in [1])
that an adversary could manipulate in order to tip the auction balance to their favour. Overall,
the AA Strategy manipulation attack can take one of many forms, which include: market
information attack, adaptive parameters attack, agent preferences attack. These variations are
not exhaustive, but, can be helpful in understanding AA Strategy Manipulation Attack. For this
chapter we shall consider only two randomly chosen variants of the AA Manipulation Attack,
namely: Market information Attack and Adaptive-Parameters Attack
A. Market-Information Attack
An adversarial payload can alter the victim TA’s market information input to trigger aggressive
agent behaviour in the auction. Figure 7.5 shows the AA strategy’s 3 main components of ‘logic
and reasoning’(the Equilibrium Estimator, the Bidding Layer and the Adaptive Layer) rely on
market information (the current outstanding bid/ask, the equilibrium price, etc.) as input to
their computations. The payload will give misrepresented market information as input to the
victim T A s causing the victim T A s to make false (non-profitable or non-competitive) offers.
For instance, assume the payload’s input of the market conditions is a false high outstanding bid
to a buyer T A. This means the buyer T A s are forced to adapt their bids to the false outstanding
bid. The result is a set non-competitive bids which can be profitable for the adversary. This
















FIGURE 7.5: The AA Strategy Manipulation attack points
(Adapted from Vytelingum [1])
ultimately prolongs converge of the auction market to a stable equilibrium price. Further,
market efficiency is expected to be greatly reduced as a result.
B. Adaptive-Parameters Attack
An aggressive agent will submit better offers than what it believes the competitive equilibrium
price to be in an attempt to improve its chances of successfully transacting. In turn, such an agent
will compromise its profit margins for a chance to trade [1]. Thus, similar to the previously
discussed variant of the attack, if an adversary was to employ a payload that alters short
term and long term parameters of victim T A s, the adversary will gain an added advantage
and surplus in the market. For instance, by changing the value of θ (volatility parameter)
the adversary forces trading agents under his control to adapt a more aggressive bidding
behaviour4, in long term, while his own agent obtains better profitable deal. Intuitively, by
failing to effectively adapt to the ever-changing market the victim agents will obtain less surplus
while adversarial agent(s) benefit from this condition.
Attack: Assume a single attacker delivers a malicious code to victim T A s whose payload is
aimed at one of the AA manipulation attack variants (Market information attack or Adaptive
parameters attack). The payload can incorporate a malicious code to the victim T A s that
4(Aggressive behaving agents focus on successfully bidding while trading off their profitability)
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corrupts the input required for normal AA strategy functioning. A decentralised CDA ensures
that market access is granted on the basis of a token which is distributed by a MUTEX protocol.
Arrival of the Token (which carries the order-book and ensures a single TA mutually exclusively
participates in the auction), can be a trigger that the payload will use to effect changes on
the specific AA strategy component. An AA strategy attack, Æ(aasma) in X is defined as a
non-terminating procedure å ∈ Å designed to realise a finite set of intents ı̃ ⊂ Ĩ (where ı̃ includes
gaining control of other T A s strategy component, altering inputs of internal components of TAs,
provoke bad offer creation), aimed at domain d ⊂ D (where d is a set of all Mmp components
where T A s are hosted), requiring a finite set of capabilities c̆ ⊂ C̆ (c̆ includes knowledge of
all participating T A s, ability to launch a malicious code, connection and communication with
victim T A s), launched through a finite set of attack points p ⊂ P (p is a set of all victim T A s
AA strategy component), when X is in state s0 ∈ S0 (where s0 is a set of all valid CDA states
where an attack can be launched) and possibly removed when X is in state se ∈ Se (where se is
a set of all valid states the attack can be stopped).
Attack States: The start state for malware injection is s and for the subsequent payload
execution launched by the malware is s
′
. Malware injection occurs in any of the valid states of
the CDA, while payload execution is triggered by the arrival of a token at the victim TA. The
AA strategy manipulation attack does not put the system in an invalid state, arguably making
it challenging for the system defender to detect through the occurrence of invalid states. The
attack only affects the trade outcome as the CDA states remain the same. Algorithms 7.1 and
7.2 present the dynamic attack from an attacker and the victims’ perspective.
Attacker Rational Similar to the strategy downgrade attack, an attacker can send P −1 ‘revert’
messages to the victims using a private back-channel directly to victims in order to evade
easy detection. For this to occur, the Adversary is required to be computationally capable
of establishing a reliable connection with the victims and coordinating the poisoning of their
strategy component. In a resource constrained setup, this can be challenging. This attack is
similar to the strategy downgrade attack in that it ensures victim T A s perform inefficiently in
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the market, while the attacker with a better efficient strategy capitalises on this phenomenon.
Algorithm 7.5: AA Strategy Manipulation - Adversary
Input : TokenReceived
Output : Relievemsg, ReqMmp
1 Initialise: R← 1000, TokenReceived← FALSE




6 until TokenReceived = TRUE;
7 if WillingtoTrade = TRUE then
8 Request TOKEN ;
9 else
10 Send Relievemsg to P − 1 victims ;
11 until termination;
Algorithm 7.6: AA Strategy Manipulation - Victim
Input : TokenReceived, Relievemsg
Output : offer
1 Initialise: R = 1000, TokenReceived = FALSE
2 /* For each infected TA */




7 until Tokenreceived = TRUE;
8 repeat
9 Manipulate inputs; // Dependent on attack variant
10 until Relievemsg = TRUE or TokenReceived = FALSE;
11 until termination;
Sketch Proof: Algorithm 1.6 and 1.7 share similar construct and logic with 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.
For instance, Algorithm 1.6 has the Relievemsg send to P-1 victim TAs when the adversary is
not willing to trade, as opposed to the Revertmsg in Algorithm 1.2. Similarly, the Algorithm 1.7
creates a condition for inputs to be manipulated instead of reverting the strategy as shown in
Algorithm 1.3. Correctness proof is similar to the one given in 3.1.
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7.5 Summary
In this chapter we looked at a general ACA framework for designing cheating attacks; a
framework that is simple enough to be applicable in a broad range of market mechanisms, but
modular enough to be used in the design of complex attacks on such platforms. We believe such
a model is important for the CDA system designer because it provides a principled approach
towards the systematic engineering of such attacks which, in turn, can foster more reliable
and robust attack detection and mitigation strategies. The results are important specifically
for this thesis as there help us in formulating the proposed novel exception handling inspired
mitigation solution.
The broad applicability and utility of the framework is demonstrated by designing cheating
attacks on decentralised CDAs for constrained smart micro-grids. The examples considered
are definitely not exhaustive. We do not formally analyse the impact of each attack. This
is a tentatively future work direction that can be undertaken to improve on the results of
this chapter. More attacks that can be constructed based on different attacker intents, for
example of an attacker learning and experimenting with disruptive resources in his arsenal
can also be interesting path for future work. We classify the cheating attacks in a decentralised
CDA according to the attacker’s capabilities (limited and advanced attackers) and the number
of attackers a particular attack can have (single, multiple coordinating, and multiple non-
coordinating).
The next chapter 8 seeks to use the results and findings presented in this chapter in order to
formulate and develop countermeasures aimed at the proposed cheating attacks.
Chapter 8
Detection and Mitigation of Cheating
Attacks
I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool
you have is a hammer, to treat everything
as if it were a nail.
ABRAHAM H. MASLOW
8.1 Overview
To the best of our understanding, cheating within CDAs can be resolved in one of three ways:
adding cryptography scheme; modifying the auction protocol; or adding a distinct, proactive,
detection and mitigation protocol. Cryptographic operations can be computationally intensive
and may fail to detect undesirable behaviour such as cheating. The review in Section 3.5.3,
indicates that a comprehensive solution is one based on a cryptographic model, in conjunction
with proactive programs to detect cheating, and an auction format that discourages cheating.
The main contribution of this chapter, is the development of a proactive protocol to detect and
resolve cheating. We propose a novel exception handling (EH) inspired mitigation mechanism
that employs sentinels to detect and resolve a subset of the automated cheating attacks; while
yielding a reasonable performance overheads. In Section 8.2 we describe the EH approach
that our mitigation solution employs. Furthermore, we modify the initial CDA algorithm’s
Market Execution Procedure in Section 8.2.1, then present additional procedures executed by
the EH sentinels in Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3. In Section 8.3, we present mitigation measures to
attacks analysed in Chapter 7. In Section 8.4, message and time complexity measures are used
to evaluate the performance of our solution. A discussion on applicability of the EH solution
within the RCSMG in Section 8.5 and a summary in Section 8.6 concludes this chapter.
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8.2 Exception Handling Approach
In [27] [21], cheating attacks are shown to give rise to exceptions; situations which fall outside
the normal operating conditions expected of the CDA and its components. As such cheating
attacks’ exceptions are resolved through exception handling by distinct domain-independent
agents (Figure 8.1) using the citizen approach [147]. In [27] [21] we proposed two properties of
the CDA that can be use the exception handlers for positive detection and mitigation. The first
property is allocative efficiency — a measure of how well the market runs [70]. This measure,
is given as, a ratio of the profit made during the auction to the profit that could be made if
the agents traded in the most efficient way (if each offered at its private value, and the traders
were matched to maximise the profits obtained). This provides an economic measure of the
effectiveness of the market. For instance, the experimental results motivating the collusion
cheating attack (Section 7.4), show that colluding T A s may gain higher surplus, while a decrease
in the allocative efficiency will be observed. Intuitively, an exception handling mechanism
should use such information, to positively detect a cheating attack and identify the culprit. The
second property is the number of messages exchanged by an individual T A. Any slight and
sudden increase in the number of messages, a TA exchanges, will raise a red flag incident. In
this chapter, we employ the EH approach to mitigate more cheating attacks, designed in the
previous chapter. To integrate EH, the Local Market Procedure of the initial CDA algorithm
4.2 are modified and additional procedures that the sentinels will use to detect and mitigate











FIGURE 8.1: Exception Handling mechanism in a RCSMG
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8.2.1 Local Market Procedure Extension
The effectiveness of the decentralised CDA is based on its arguably efficient token-based MUTEX
protocol. EH addition does not affect the MUTEX properties since it does not interfere with
the token distribution process. The token-handling protocol is not altered except for additional
time. T A s now require additional time to be considered in the token handling timers. The
initial constraints from our initial CDA algorithm are maintained. The algorithm procedure
gets inputs from the central sentinel in the variables: TAiPen (a positively identified adversary
TA to be penalised), TAiν (a positively identified victim TA). TAa[.] represents an array of all
positively identified adversary TAs. When an TAi receives a token (line 8), and a certain TAis
have been identified as adversaries (line 9), the TAs in question will be penalised (line 10) and
the human participant alerted (line 11). Otherwise, the ‘normal’ procedure described in 4.2 is
executed.
Algorithm 8.1: LocalMarketExecution Extension
Input : blacklist, TokenReceived, TAa[.]
Output : FlagMmp, R, TokenCounter, TokenOB, LocalOB
1 Initialisation: FlagMsm ← FALSE, TokenReceived← FALSE, R← 1000,
TokenCounter ← 0, TAi − Sentinel← ∅ ; // (where i = 0, 1, 2... N)
2 for each TA ∈ TAi[.] do
3 if TokenRecieved = TRUE then
4 if TAi ∈ blacklist and TAi ∈ TAa[] then
5 Penalise[TAi] ; // penalised for cheating
6 Alert Participant! ;
7 else
8 TokenCounter + + ; // the market execution continues as normal
9 Set FlagMmp to TRUE ;
10 Ask TAi-Sentinel for report ;
11 Ask TAi to FormOffer() ; // TAs submits its offer
12 Execute Trade() ; // TAs offer is accepted or rejected
13 Update LocalOB from TokenOB ;
14 return TokenOB ;
15 else
16 wait for TOKEN ;
Sketch Proof: This sub-algorithm is similar to 4.2, with slight changes in lines 8-10 which capture
the conditional statement allowing for the penalisation and notification of a cheating agent. If a
TA is blacklisted and some TAs have been identified as victims, the blacklisted TA is penalised
for cheating. Say, S if c then A1 else A2 endif, where c is well defined (meaning it can be
evaluated), P ∧ c A→ Q and P ∧ c̄ A→ Q, then P A→ Q. We can verify the correctness of the
branch (both when c is true and when c is false). Given the algorithm’s precondition, P, is
TokenReceived = {0, 1}, blacklist = {0, 1} and the postcondition, Q, is a Penalise[TAi] or
TokenOB update, when the condition, c, that is TAi ∈ blacklist and TAi ∈ TAa[.] is satisfied,
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the Penalise[TAi] variable is set to TRUE and the participant is alerted. In the other case, the
auctioning process goes as in Algorithm 1.1. This holds for any number of TokenReceived or
blacklisted TAs observed.
8.2.2 TA-Sentinel Execution
We consider that T A-sentinels have no access to the internal state of the T A s there are associated
with as this could open up the system to a myriad array of adversaries through sentinel
compromise. We assume T A-sentinels and the associated T A reside on the same Mmp (see
Figure 8.1). Each T A -sentinel is capable of monitoring all messages exchanged by the associated
T A s. Algorithm 8.2 presents a pseudocode of the TA-Sentinel procedure. Each T A -sentinel
knows the expected maximum number of messages, u, and some irregular messages, v, that
can be exchanged by the associated T A (line 5). Thus, if a sentinel, TA− Sentinel1, monitoring
say TAi, observes an anomalous message count of (u+ v) messages it will red-flag TAi (line 7) .
Red-flagging is the first step in detecting an exception, allowing the T A-sentinel to keep records
of this incident for future reference (Algorithm 8.2). On arrival of the token, when FlagMmp is
set to TRUE, a TA-sentinel will pass the report to the T-sentinel.
Algorithm 8.2: TA− SentinelExecution Procedure
Input : FlagMmp
Output : RedF lag[TAi]
1 Initialise: u = 0, RedF lag = FALSE
2 for each TA-Sentinel ∈ TAi-Sentinel[.] do
3 repeat
4 repeat
5 Listen for messages ;
6 if messages > u then
7 set RedF lag = TRUE ; // when additional messages are observed
8 else
9 set RedF lag = FALSE ;
10 until FlagMmp = TRUE;
11 until Termination;
Sketch Proof: The Algorithm 1.9 allows the TA–Sentinel to observe the messages exchanged by
the TA it is monitoring. For each TA (line 2), the outer loop (line 3), guarantees the sub-algorithm
terminates at the end of a trade day tround. The inner loop (line 4) will always terminate when
FlagMmp is TRUE (on the receipt of the TOKEN at the mobile phone Mmp hosting the TA).
The loop ensures the TA–Sentinel listens to messages based on the condition that additional
messages are observed. Say, S if c then A1 else A2 endif, where c is well defined (meaning it
can be evaluated), P ∧ c A→ Q and P ∧ c̄ A→ Q, then P A→ Q. We can verify the correctness of
the branch (both when c is true and when c is false). Given the algorithm’s precondition, P,
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is FlagMmp = {0, 1} and the postcondition, Q, is a RedF lag[TAi], when the condition, c, is
messages > u is satisfied, the RedF lag variable is set to TRUE. In the other case, Redflag is set
to FALSE. This holds for any number of messages observed.
8.2.3 T-Sentinel Execution
We consider a T-sentinel that is embedded into the mobile token. The token carries the auction
order-book and respective records of the market, which include the current allocative efficiency
and each T A’s surplus. We assume, the T-sentinel has access to this information, to analyse trade
history to confirm cheating of T A s. Algorithm 8.3 presents the pseudocode that is executed by
the T-sentinel. The token is accessible to all T A s by virtue of the MUTEX protocol. On arrival
at, say TAi, the TAi-sentinel will be prompted to submit a report to the T-sentinel on condition
that a red-flag was recorded prior to token arrival. On reception of the report (line 6), the
T-sentinel will blacklist TAi for further enquiry at the end of the trade day (line 7). The reason
is cheating resolution can only be comprehensive if adequate market data has been collected
and analysed. By incorporating the T-sentinel into the order-book, our approach ensures: no
additional messages are incurred. At the end of the trade day (line 5) the T-sentinel will be
tasked with ascertaining the cheating cases presented.
Algorithm 8.3: T − SentinelExecution Procedure
Input : RedF lag[TAi], ExpectedSurplus, ExpectedEfficiency
Output :TAiPen, TAiV ic
1 Initialise: RedF lag = FALSE, blacklist = ∅, TAiPen = ∅, TAiV ic = ∅
2 repeat
3 Receive of RedF lag ;
4 blacklist← RedF lag[TAi] ;
5 until termination;
6 Calculate Allocative Efficiency ;
7 if blacklist 6= and AllocativeEfficiency < ExpectedEfficiency then
8 Cheating Confirmed! ;
9 if TAi ∈ blacklist and ActualSurplus > ExpectedSurplus then
10 TAi is an adversary! ;
11 TAiPen← TAi ; // The TA is identified as an adversary
12 else if TAi ∈ blacklisted and ActualSurplus < ExpectedSurplus then
13 TAi is a victim! ;




18 No Cheating! ;
Sketch Proof: The Algorithm 1.10 executed by the T–Sentinel ensures receipt of Redflags (which
leads to blacklisting of TAs) and the identification of the victims and adversary by considering
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the allocative efficiency, actual surplus and expected surplus. The first loop (line 2) ensures the
red-flagged TAs that are identified are blacklisted until end of trading day tround. Assume S,
if c1 then A1 elseif c2 then A2 else A3 endif, where c1 and c2 are well defined (meaning these
can be evaluated), P ∧ c1
A→ Q or P ∧ c2
A→ Q, then P A→ Q. We can verify the correctness of
the branches (when both c1 and c2 are true and when these are false). Given the algorithm’s
precondition, P, is the RedF lag and the AllocativeEfficency, while the postcondition, Q, is a
TAiPen, TAiV ic confirmation or false flag indication. If the condition, c1, is TAi ∈ blacklist
and ActualSurplus > ExpectedSurplus while condition c2 is TAi ∈ blacklisted and ActualSurplus
< ExpectedSurplus are satisfied, the TAiPen, TAiV ic can simply be confirmed and S verified. In
the other case, A false flag is reported due to the condition in line 7.
8.3 Cheating Attacks Mitigation
Attacks are designed to achieve a goal inherent to cheat. This implies some financial benefit is
sort by the attacker, usually at the cost of system performance. Intuitively, one way in which
a defender of a decentralised CDA system can address such forms of attacks is by detecting
inconsistent behaviour such as profit distribution and system performance properties. Specific
T A surplus margins form the core requirement in distinguishing the cheating nodes from well
behaving T A s. Sudden increase in surplus is the goal of adversarial nodes, thus making it the
best parameter to use in detecting cheating.
Strategy-Downgrade Cheating If a red-flagged incident, of say, TAi coincides with other T A
s red-flag incidents, agent manipulation or collusion can be re-affirmed with greater probability.
Intuitively, it is implied that extra messages are being exchanged by T A s, indicating plausible
T Amanipulation. Thus, Strategy-Downgrade Cheating is confirmed by:
• a sudden decrease in the market allocative efficiency;
• evidence of more than 1 blacklisted agent in previous trade rounds;
• a sudden decrease in the number of wins by red-flagged T A s;
• identification of an individual T A with a constantly higher surplus, while the other T A s
have distinctly low surplus.
Dynamic Collusion Attack Similar to the Strategy-Downgrade Attack, adversary T A s can
positively be identified by the extra surplus they gain. One evident problem of this notion is,
the scheme would have to store the surplus margins of individual T A s for further inquiries. A
possible workaround is, ensuring accurate surplus records are made and kept by the T-sentinel
as soon as a successful trade is made. Collusion Attack is confirmed by:
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• a sudden decrease in market allocative efficiency;
• a number of blacklisted agents in previous trade rounds;
• sudden increase in the number of wins by red-flagged T A s;
• identification of a subset of η T A s constantly obtaining a higher surplus in as many
rounds.
Evasive Attack The Evasive adversary can positively be identified by a significant gain in
extra surplus and an unusual rise in a number of messages passed by the adversary agent.
Evasive Attack is confirmed by:
• blacklisting of 1 or more agents in previous trade rounds;
• sudden increase in the number of wins by red-flagged T A s;
AA Strategy Manipulation Attack Detection can follow the same notion described for the
strategy downgrade attack. Thus, AA Strategy Manipulation Attack is confirmed by:
• a sudden decrease in the market allocative efficiency;
• blacklisting of 1 or more T A s in previous trade rounds;
• a sudden decrease in the number of wins by red-flagged T A s;
• identification of an individual T A with a constantly higher surplus, while the other T A s
have distinctly low surplus.
Resolution will follow positive identification and confirmation of cheating. If a blacklisted TAi
is considered as an adversary TAa, it will be penalised in the next trade day. If a sufficiently
large amount of penalty is imposed on a discovered cheating T A, cheating will not be profitable
for the adversary. There are several methods to impose such a penalty. For example, a form
of a security deposit similar to one described in [26] can be utilised. If a T A does not cheat,
the security deposit would be returned and when caught cheating it would be confiscated.
Similarly, the cheating T A can be disallowed from trading in the current round or subsequent
rounds. Further, if a T A is penalised the human participant is alerted of their penalisation. In
cases where the human contests the penalty, further investigation can be done by the system
administrators for instance. However, this is beyond the scope our work, but can be explored as
future work.
8.4 Performance Analysis
We use message and time complexity analysis to give a sketch evaluation of our solution.
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Message Complexity Overall, in constructing the EH scheme the emphasis in on ensuring
that no significant additional message overheads are incurred. Thus, a slight deviation in the
message complexity from the initial CDA algorithm was expected. At the Msm level the EH
solution involves an exchange of O(logN) messages to pass the token (orderbook) per market
auction execution under light demand, per critical section execution. At the Mmp level, apart
from 4n messages passed by T As to execute, the only additional messages are those between
the T- and T A -sentinels: T-sentinel prompting T A to report = 1; T A -sentinel reporting = 1;
T-Sentinel issuing a penalty = 1; resulting in 3n additional messages where n is the number of
T A s. Total messages exchanged at the Mmp level would be 7n. Overall, message complexity
expected in light demand is therefore O(nlogN).
Time Complexity We consider the input of the overall algorithm to be M , that is the number
of T A s participating in the CDA. Since operation in T-SentinelExecution Procedure is dominant
of the two detection and resolution procedures, it is executed M times by the T-sentinel. We
expect the detection and resolution algorithms to run in linear time complexity O(M).
8.5 Discussion
In this chapter, allocative efficiency and message complexity are employed to analyse our
proposed solution. Allocative efficiency is simply a measure of how well the market runs. It
is usually measured as, a ratio of the profit made during the auction, to the profit that could
be made if the agents traded in the most efficient way (if each offered at its private value,
and the traders were matched to maximise the profits obtained). As indicated in [27], any
occurrence of cheating would significantly result in allocative efficiency decrease. Such a
sudden decrease in allocative efficiency is the used as an indication of cheating. Intuitively,
resolving cheating will restore the auctions high allocative efficiency. Message complexity —the
number of messages sent during the auction is the second measure. As such, any decrease in
efficiency, would give probable suspicion that malicious or malfunctions are consuming extra
resources in a run. Thus, by combining allocative efficiency and messages transmitted within
an exception handling protocol we can to offer reasonable identification of automated cheating
forms. Our proposed EH scheme incurs considerably lower overheads attributed to the token-
based MUTEX protocol that is used in the CDA scheme yielding a low message complexity.
Due to this reason our solution may be modified to handle other exceptions manifesting from
infrastructure issues like the unreliability of communication or death of agents [70]. Although
our EH solution is yet to be evaluated experimentally, its integration into a CDA scheme might
not significant message overheads being incurred. we base these claims from similar work by
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Parsons and Klein [70] indicating in a similar double auction1 resolution handlers performed
with no significant computational overhead. This phenomenon is important if our solution is
to perform in a RCSMG setup. However, one significant concern is the potential increase in
the message size of the token. This is related to added functionality of the token due to the
incorporation of the T-Sentinel. Thus, crafting an elegant solution that addresses this challenge
and ensures performance is maintained a potential direction to explore. Furthermore, our
solution guarantees identification of an adversary through surplus recorded after a successful
trade. If surplus margins are manipulated an adversary may evade identification and false
identification.
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, an exception handling (EH) was proposed as a tool for detection and resolution
of some cheating attacks, allowing the identification and reprimand of the culprit trader. The
cheating attacks give rise to exceptions, which are situations which fall outside the normal
operating conditions expected of the T A s. We adopt a similar approach to one in [70] of
employing exception handling by distinct domain-independent agents. The exception handling
mechanism makes use of allocative efficiency and message overheads to detect and mitigate
cheating forms described herein. We argue that EH could deter automated cheating attacks,
while yielding low message overheads. The EH solution does not offer intrusion tolerance,
which is, the ability of the system and its components to perform their intended function in
spite of partially successful attacks. This can be an interesting direction that can be pursed
as future work. We envisage that continued work in designing different types of attacks can
provide a vast information for system defenders to ensure CDA algorithms realise their fullest
potential within resource constrained smart micro-grids. As future work, additional validation
and evaluation of the EH protocol through some theoretical and experimental evidence can be
carried out. Due to the significance of CDAs in resource allocation, we believe that exploring
and mitigating cheating will be interesting to micro-grid research community.
1The double auction has more communication overheads than the one we propose in this thesis
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This thesis has looked at a decentralised Continuous Double Auctioning algorithm for guaran-
teeing power allocation within a resource constrained smart micro-grid (RCSMG). We show
that such an approach ensures scalability, efficient performance and sensitivity to constrained
computational resources of the platform. A decentralised CDA can provide a vital market mech-
anism, with applications ranging from market-based control, decentralised resource allocation,
to financial markets. With such valuable applications, understanding and improvement of
efficiency, fault tolerance and security aspects of the CDA algorithms is essential. To this end,
this thesis has looked at the efficiency (Chapter 4), robust (Chapter 5 and 6) and security aspects
(Chapter 7 and 8) of the CDA and present research contributions towards them. In the following
subsection we re-cap these contributions and match them against our original research aims in
Section 1.3. Thereafter, we outline directions for future research in this area in 9.3.
9.2 Research Achievements
We began with a focus on a CDA that is decentralised and sensitive to operate in a constrained
environment (see Chapter 4). It is known, the classic CDA scheme allows for efficient allocative
market efficiency. First, we extend the original CDA scheme to enable decentralised auctioning.
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This ensures, support of the desirable properties associated with CDA, while improving its
adaptability on a RCSMG. We integrated a token-based, mutual-exclusion (MUTEX) distributive
primitive, that allow a CDA to operate at a reasonably efficient time and message complexity
of O(N) and O(logN) respectively, per critical section invocation (auction market execution).
Such a decentralised CDA can be adopted, instead of the centralised CDAs, when the desirable
properties of a decentralised mechanism are required; scalability is a major concern; and
sensitivity to platform processing constraints is necessary. In addition, such a decentralised
CDA scheme presents an ideal alternative in scenarios when privacy and security associated
with centralised CDAs is a concern.
Next, we considered reliability and robustness of our CDA, since we envisage its use within
a RCSMG, characterised by malfunctioning devices on an unreliable network (such as a lossy
network). We looked at two significant fault models encompassing different fault scenarios,
namely Fail-Stop and Byzantine faults (see Chapter 5). First, we modified the MUTEX protocol
supporting our CDA algorithm to handle fail-stop and some Byzantine type faults of sites. We do
this by using node redundancy of important cluster head nodes. The resulting algorithm yields
a time complexity of O(N), where N is number of cluster-head nodes; and message complexity
of O((logN) +W ) time, where W is the number of check-pointing messages. In general, our
extended fault tolerant CDA can allow for continued power allocation despite component
and device failures, while maintaining reasonable performance overheads. This is important
especially for applications in a constrained environment plagued by component failure and
performance limitations. Secondly, we realised that, fault tolerance does not guarantee power
allocation if the auction algorithm fails. Thus, we have proposed a decentralised consumption
scheduling scheme that compliments the auctioning scheme in guaranteeing successful power
allocation within the RCSMG. This work is reported in Chapter 6. We formulated the problem of
scheduling power distribution on the smart micro-grid as a convex optimisation problem; with
the goal of minimising the total power consumption while maximising on the social benefit of
power distribution on the grid. We use the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)
to decompose the scheduling problem into smaller, sub problems, solved in parallel over local
computation devices, yielding an optimal solution. Our scheduling solution can handle both
decentralised and fully decentralised cases within the same RCSMG.
We went on to consider the issue of cheating, provoked when participants misbehave to get
favourable outcomes from the auction. Such behaviour can compromise grid stability and may
lead to participants pulling out. Thus, in line with our fourth research question, we look at the
design and study of cheating attacks. We developed a multi-layered framework (ACA) for the
systematic design of cheating attacks for our CDA and other variants, to help system defenders
get an insight into developing effective mitigation solutions (see Chapter 7).
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Furthermore, we developed a novel mitigation scheme to address the cheating attacks we
designed towards our decentralised CDA scheme in line with our fifth research aim (see
Chapter 8). We used the exception handling (EH) approach with sentinel agents using allocative
efficiency and message overheads to detect and mitigate cheating forms. This result is important
in showing how proactive detection and mitigation can effectively be used to solve cheating. In
general, such exception handling can offer an extra security layer to deter cheating, on top of
some standard security solutions like cryptography.
When taken together, the outlined contributions present an important step towards improv-
ing the structure of the CDA, while highlighting that decentralised CDA can offer valuable
power allocation within constrained micro-grids. The aforementioned advances, show how we
successfully managed to address the research aims we set out at the beginning of our thesis.
Importantly, our work highlights new avenues that require more investigations. In the next
section, we discuss the future work and potential points of departure.
9.3 Future Work
While this thesis addresses efficiency, reliability and security issues on a decentralised CDA,
there still exist other areas where substantial work is required. Some of the most interesting and
vital of these include the following:
• The main advancement offered by the decentralised CDA we propose, is an integration
of a token-based, MUTEX for serialization of market access. Our protocol works on the
assumption that, T A hosting mobile phones only connect to a single, specific, shared
meter. In reality, one would expect, each user being allowed the flexibility to rejoin
the network at another cluster. The interesting challenge is not on the mobility, but the
ability to cater for mobility while effectively minimising communication and performance
overheads. Thus, we intend to extend the CDA protocol to allow such mobility and
flexibility without compromising the desired CDA properties, reliability and security. The
aim of this extension would allow us to observe the evolution of the decentralised CDA
from a reliability and security perspective.
• Furthermore, we intend to simulate the decentralised CDA, first, without mobility then
later with mobility. This can be done by employing a multi-agent modelling platform
such as Netlogo, due to its simplicity and suitability for modelling large collections of
independent agents developing over time. In carrying out this inquiry, we seek to establish
if integrating a MUTEX protocol on a standard CDA would alter auction market efficiency.
Secondly, we seek to establish if mobility would significantly affect the market efficiency
and possibly the computational complexity. The results from this simulation can provide
a benchmark to future studies that involve a decentralised CDA such as the one we
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propose. For instance, one can set out to enquire and validate the cheating attacks we
proposed in Chapter 7, through changing the agent bidding strategies. Instead of using
Zero Intelligence (ZI) for the agent strategies, other agent strategies such as Adaptive
Aggressive strategy can be tested. The suspicion is the allocative efficiency would improve
with an efficient strategy supporting why attackers would want to use such a strategy.
• We proposed a decentralised scheduling algorithm in Chapter 6. Two important issues
were raised towards security and integration. We believe integrating the scheduling
scheme to the auctioning scheme is a vital and interesting challenge where first the
framework for integration has to be developed. One approach is to use both auctioning and
scheduling alternatively to handle different power capacities, or having auctioning take
care of power allocation a day before while scheduling works close to real time. We intend
to find an optimal and efficient way in which the two resource allocation applications
can be deployed within a constrained grid platform. From a security perspective, a
framework should be developed to formalise and design some attacks on the decentralised
ADMM types of algorithms. The aim of this investigation would be to find out a more
encompassing and systematic way in which system defenders can better understand
vulnerabilities and attacks in developing security solutions.
• In Chapter 8, we proposed an EH mechanism to detect and mitigate, automated cheating.
The EH solution does not offer intrusion tolerance, which is, the ability of the system and
its components to perform their intended function, despite partly successful attacks. We
aim to further our studies in designing an intrusion tolerance scheme, that allows our
decentralised CDA to run continuously, in the event cheating detection and mitigation fails.
One challenge and important contribution of exploring this problem, is the development
of a cheating tolerance scheme within a constrained platform. The results from such an
enquiry will certainly draw attention from the auction, security community.
9.4 Last Remarks
We know about the growing popularity of the CDA and its applications as resource allocation
tools, and we expect more research will continue on this technology. From such an understand-
ing, this thesis illuminates the different areas of research on CDA for constrained environments
and advances the state-of-the-art on efficiency, reliability and security.
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